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NOTE ON L ANGUAGE
People I met in Beirut spoke mainly in Lebanese dialect, English, and 
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fi ed system for transliterating the Lebanese Arabic dialect, omitt ing all indi-
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soft  lett ers. I trust that specialist readers will be able to use the context to 
follow my transliteration. Names of places and people adhere to their offi  -
cial or common spellings. All translations of Arabic- and French-language 
textual materials are my own unless otherwise noted.

THE INSECURE CITY

1INTRODUCTION
An American in Beirut 
My fi rst knowledge of Beirut came from television news about Terry 
Anderson, a U.S. hostage captured during the Lebanese civil and regional 
war by Hizbullah militants in 1985 and held in captivity for six years.1 
Anderson grew up in a town near where I spent my childhood and local 
news coverage during the years of his captivity regularly featured members 
of his family, most especially his sister and her eff orts to gain his release. 
Th us, my fi rst image of Beirut was one of war. Years later, when I was a 
graduate student, a professor, knowing of my interest in issues of class and 
urban space in the Middle East, suggested I visit Beirut. Aft er a preliminary 
visit in 2003, I was struck, as any visitor is, by Beirut’s vibrancy and diver-
sity, the coexistence of so many diff erent ways of living: peddlers with carts 
overloaded with seasonal produce sharing the street with global corpo-
rate retail outlets; a woman in conservative Islamic dress having coff ee 
with a friend wearing a revealing outfi t; sleek high-rise residential build-
ings being constructed alongside timeworn two-story houses. But I was 
also struck by the class and status aspects of urban public life and culture 
and was surprised to fi nd that studies of class in Lebanon were relatively 
few as issues related to political sectarianism have long been the primary 
subject of scholarly inquiry. From the start, then, even as Lebanese told 
me “you’ll never fi gure out how social class works here” or “we don’t really 
have social class here,” I set out to explore how class and status matt ered in 
the space of Beirut. As I describe later, my further focus on mobility, as a 
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particular way of using space, came from living in the city and the concerns of 
people I met.
A host of sad and disruptive events, which I explore more fully through-
out the book, unfolded during my research, which was undertaken in three 
phases: October 2004 to June 2006, summer 2010, and June 2013. My fi rst 
and most extended period of research coincided with the initial stages 
of violent political unrest that began just prior to and in the wake of the 
assassination of former prime minister Rafi q Hariri in early 2005. Th ese 
were diffi  cult times. Nearly every month, a political fi gure or journalist 
was assassinated by a car bomb. Other bombs exploded in commercial 
or industrial locations of the predominantly Christian parts of Beirut and 
its suburbs. Security measures and blockades sprung up near anticipated 
targets. Schools were closed an inordinate number of days in 2005. Apart 
from the optimism that existed for those allied with the anti-Syrian March 
14th political coalition upon the full withdrawal of the Syrian army from 
Lebanese land in April 2005, the overall mood in the city that year was 
both depressed and anxious. In early 2006, intersectarian tension was on 
the rise, and it fl ared up in Beirut during the controversy over the publica-
tion of cartoons satirizing the Prophet Mohammad by a Danish newspaper. 
And, just a few weeks aft er my return to the United States in mid-June 2006, 
times grew far worse. In July 2006, in retaliation for Hizbullah’s capture of 
two Israeli soldiers, Israeli bombs began to land fi rst in southern Lebanon 
and then in South Beirut and elsewhere around the country. I watched the 
images from the United States, from safety, and read the news and e-mail 
missives with apprehension. I learned that the apartment where I had lived 
was now a temporary refuge—opened by a friend and the new tenant—
for a Palestinian family fl eeing their home, which was located near Dahiya 
(literally “the suburb” in Arabic but used to refer to the southern suburbs 
of Beirut), the area under heaviest assault. By the war’s end in August 2006, 
immense infrastructural damage blighted the entire country, but most 
extensively Dahiya and southern Lebanon. Th ousands of people were dis-
placed. Th e Israeli Defense Force’s indiscriminate ground and air strikes, 
according to Human Rights Watch, resulted in the deaths of approximately 
900 civilians.2
It would be diffi  cult for me to measure, or to isolate, the ways in which 
these events shaped my research. Th ey shaped the project completely. 
Closures in and of the city, which occurred following an explosion or had 
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to do with security measures, were the cause for the delay or cancellation 
of interview appointments. In the weeks following Hariri’s assassination, 
I was cut off  from any formal or informal research activities. Lebanese were 
fearful about what violence would occur next, much of the nation was 
in mourning, and the practices of everyday life came to a halt. And then 
regular life would begin again, but Beirutis, I quickly learned, resumed 
their activities with an awareness that beneath the surface of normality lay 
the possibility for everything to come apart again. Th is kind of cycle, of 
 violence-stop-pause-resumption, punctuated the months of 2005 and 2006 
aft er an assassination or bombing att ack occurred. Between the bombs, 
there existed what anthropologists Roma Chatt erji and Deepak Mehta 
(2007) call “the recovery of the everyday.” Anxiety, born from anticipation 
about what might happen next, resided in this everyday. During this period 
in Beirut, there were moments when the agenda of research was neither a 
practical choice nor a compassionate one.
Th e bombs, and the anxiety, did not stop people from living, of course. 
And thus, while the fi rst period of my research showed me a Beirut in dis-
tress, it also cheered me with its warmth, its humor, and its energy. In juxta-
position to the threat posed to the public and the dejection felt by Beirutis 
at the return of violence and political sectarian strife to their city’s streets, 
scenes of everyday public sociality showed another side. Th is is the side 
of Beirut that sociologist Anthony Giddens (1984) would describe using 
the term co-presence, or face-to-face interaction. It is an aspect of Beirut’s 
public life that goes beyond the trope of Lebanese as resilient in the face 
of challenges and that counters Richard Sennett ’s (1974) description of the 
isolating, “stale and empty” public that has come to characterize the mod-
ern, Western city. More specifi cally, it is the side of Beirut that includes a 
descending basket on its way from an upper fl oor of an apartment build-
ing to the market on the ground fl oor. An apartment dweller leans out over 
the veranda and calls down to the store worker a list of things needed for a 
recipe or meal already in progress. Th e items are placed in the basket, and 
it goes up to the veranda. Money is then put in the basket, and it is sent 
back down to the store. Everyone is satisfi ed. Moments like these, those 
I only observed and those that I also took part in—for instance, the pay-
ing of all my bills in person to employees from the electricity, internet, and 
water companies who came to the door of my apartment—are not only 
charming to the outsider but seem to serve as a kind of salve for Beirutis 
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living with the history, presence, and anticipation of confl ict and divides 
among its people.
Th e stops and starts, the horrifi c spectacle and aft ermath of bomb explo-
sions, and the return of political sectarian strife to the public realm could be 
described as challenges to the conduct of research. At the same time, how-
ever, such a description would be ill-fi tt ing in the sense that these events 
were experiences that came to constitute the research itself. And, oft en, 
challenges having litt le to do with the political crises appeared more formi-
dable. For example, the cultural capital I possessed, initially as “a researcher 
from Stanford,” held sway only to a limited degree in many social and pro-
fessional sett ings in Beirut. Another kind of capital, which is issued in the 
form of connections or relations to a particular person, was usually valued 
much more by people with whom I sought to set up meetings and inter-
views. Gett ing my foot in the door usually required being able to mention 
that I was in some way connected to a person whom a potential interviewee 
knew and trusted. Some interviews, like the one I conducted with the head 
of the traffi  c-police division, required weeks of advance eff ort, during which 
I met with people sequentially. One person would bestow on me access to 
the next and so forth until I had worked my way up the chain of command. 
Th is is also the process by which I secured interviews at Solidere, the corpo-
ration responsible for rebuilding the downtown area. Th is practice of estab-
lishing and fi nessing connections or favors through face-to-face interaction 
is also a topic I take up in the book with regard to people’s sentiments about 
everyday forms of corruption. “Knowing someone who knows someone” 
was oft en my only means of gaining access to professionals such as archi-
tects, engineers, academics, representatives of nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), and government offi  cials. While this description may fi t 
any number of research locales, Lebanon’s relations of patronage, which are 
oft en mobilized to circumvent state authority, heightened the necessity of 
being tied to and circulating through stratifi ed networks of infl uence.
Outside the professional arena, with respect to my entrée into Lebanese 
society more generally, I encountered similar, though less tangible kinds 
of limitations that too shaped my research. First, through formal tutoring 
arrangements and informal viewing of Lebanese television programs and 
everyday conversations, I had to “Lebanize” the formal Arabic I had stud-
ied and spoken for years in classrooms. Second, the fact that I chose to 
live alone and had neither real nor fi ctive ties to a Lebanese family meant 
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that I was fairly unmoored in a society where family life is the basis of the 
social fabric. On Sundays, when Beirutis spend the day with their extended 
families and most commercial life shuts down, being out in the city was 
a lonely, traffi  c-free excursion. All of us from outside Lebanon—the for-
eign migrant workers, ex-pats, students, and researchers—we the family-
less would encounter one another on the near-empty streets. I also found 
developing relationships with Beirutis from outside the middle class to be a 
challenge. While I have a working-class background, my level of education, 
the fact that I was a foreign student/researcher living outside my home 
country, and the way that I could aff ord to live as middle class in Beirut 
situated me squarely in a middle-class world. I took steps to try to expand 
this world by, for example, doing volunteer work with two diff erent organi-
zations working with underprivileged Lebanese youth, volunteering with 
an agency helping process paperwork for Sri Lankan workers trying to get 
home aft er the Asian tsunami in January 2005, and trying actively to forge 
research relationships with working-class residents of the city through 
acquaintances and contacts.
Alongside these limitations, however, I also experienced a certain kind 
of public access. As a mixed-race African American woman, I did not stand 
out when walking down the street in Beirut. Before I spoke, I was assumed 
by Lebanese to be of North African heritage but possibly part Lebanese, as 
I would come to learn through countless conversations that ensued aft er I 
began speaking my non-native Arabic in taxis, stores, restaurants, offi  ces, 
and the like. Blending into the landscape of the city enabled me to move 
around without being outwardly perceived as being from outside the 
Arab world. I could therefore travel without being immediately marked 
as a Westerner, as many other researchers and visitors from the West typi-
cally are. In parts of Dahiya, Beirut’s southern suburbs largely secured by 
Hizbullah, the way I look aff orded me with a kind of right of entry that was 
oft en denied to other Westerners identifi ed as such by Hizbullah security 
members positioned on the streets.
Another kind of access came in a diff erent form. While I was foreign and 
Western, a perceived ally perhaps of the policies pursued in the region and 
Lebanon by the U.S. government, I did not possess a political or sectarian 
affi  liation and my history came from elsewhere. In this sense, not being 
Lebanese endowed me with a certain kind of perceptual and geographic 
privilege to draw my own cartographies of the city and nation. As they were 
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not historically constituted through experiences of violence and fear, my 
mappings were necessarily distinct from those that might be drawn by a 
native of Lebanon, a survivor of the long civil and regional war, or a person 
whose home had been destroyed by Israeli bombs. For me, the terrain was 
more open. As a foreigner and outsider, I was also furnished with a look 
in. I was, time and again, told by Lebanese how and who the Lebanese are: 
that is, “all Lebanese are like X” or “the Lebanese don’t care about X,” or 
“X behavior is typical Lebanese.”
In addition to observing and participating in public space and in infor-
mal conversations in taxis, buses, and on the streets, I conducted interviews 
with a diverse group of residents of the city, including foreign workers, as 
well as representatives from both state and nongovernmental agencies and 
institutions involved with urban planning, traffi  c safety and enforcement, 
and civil society. I also gathered and analyzed historical materials from 
newspapers housed in the libraries of the American University of Beirut 
and Saint Joseph’s University, the Lebanese National Archives, the Centre 
d’Etudes et le Recherche sur le Moyen-Orient, and at the archives of the 
newspapers An-Nahar and L’Orient le Jour.
“You Have to Look More Broadly 
at the Issue of Traffic”
During a conversation I was having in 2005 with Reem, a woman in her early 
forties who worked as an administrator at a university in the northern Beirut 
suburb of Louaize, we were talking about the hassles of living in Beirut. It 
was the topic of traffi  c that set her off . “Look,” she interrupted when I began 
to ask her about the new traffi  c lights being put up in the city, “you have to 
look more broadly at the issue of traffi  c; it tells you a lot about what is hap-
pening in our society. People are stressed—this is what traffi  c is about; peo-
ple are oppressed and we have been living in a police state since the end of 
the [civil] war. It’s a bad economic situation, taxes, education is expensive, 
food is expensive. . . . What you see on the roads? You see that people are 
fi ghting for space. Th ey don’t have space at home, the economy is bad, and 
there are no forests, no parks, no places to breathe. Th ere is only concrete. . . . 
Four times this week I almost got killed driving. Finally, I had a meeting in 
Broumanna and I took a taxi there. I was not going to drive myself.”
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When Reem explained in frustration how traffi  c problems were linked 
with, as she put it, “what was happening in society,” it was one of many 
similar moments during my research: when people talked to each other 
and me about gett ing around Beirut, they were also expressing larger con-
cerns about social, political, and economic life. Talk about mobility experi-
ences, in fact, exposed some of the inequalities of the city itself.3 Stories told 
among passengers in shared service (French pronunciation) taxis4—the 
city’s most widely used form of public transportation—on television pro-
grams, on stage, and through popular culture told of how gett ing around 
Beirut was about more than merely gett ing somewhere;5 it was about 
how people encountered the very formation of their civic culture in a city 
wounded by war and, once again, on the razor’s edge.
Th rough stories and practices of daily life, this book examines how 
people’s movements through a city are profoundly shaped by the insecu-
rity of their lives. In 2004, fi ft een years aft er the end of a protracted war in 
Lebanon (1975–1990), bombs reappeared in Beirut.6 In September 2004, 
the Lebanese parliament voted to amend the constitution to allow for an 
extension of the presidential term. Th is amendment kept the pro-Syrian 
President Emile Lahoud in power for several more years and was a move 
thought to be orchestrated by the Syrian regime. To protest Lahoud’s term 
extension, government ministers, including the prime minister, Hariri, 
resigned. One of these ministers survived an assassination att empt by car 
bomb in October 2004, and a few months later, on February 14, 2005, Hariri 
and twenty-one others in his motorcade were killed in a massive car-bomb 
explosion along a seaside road. A climate of assumed Syrian culpability for 
Hariri’s death ensued, and tensions boiled over as Lebanese took to the 
streets demanding the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanese ter-
ritory and an end to Syrian involvement in Lebanese aff airs. In the months 
aft er Hariri’s assassination, two broad political coalitions, named aft er the 
dates of their mass protests in downtown Beirut, emerged: the March 8th 
group (a coalition of parties with both Shi‘i Muslim and Christian affi  lia-
tion) was aligned with the Syrian regime; the March 14th alliance (a group 
of parties with mainly Sunni Muslim and Christian affi  liation backed by 
the United States and its regional allies) took an anti-Syrian-government 
stance. In the months to come, these political camps would become 
the two central political actors in what is referred to as the post-Hariri 
era in Lebanon.
8 Introduction
Since these events, amid the changing course of Lebanese politics, resi-
dents have once more had to map out lives amid a contentious, oft en vio-
lent, political-economic landscape. In this book, I explore how experiences 
of moving through Beirut are characterized by a precariousness wrought 
not only by the anticipation of violence but also by the workings of class, 
political, and state power. In keeping with urban anthropology’s longstand-
ing att ention to the relationship between urban space and social inequal-
ity, I examine how understandings and practices of spatial mobility in the 
city do more than simply refl ect social diff erences;7 they are also a means 
through which an uneven and insecure urban citizenship is produced as 
dimensions of hierarchy and power shape people’s access to and experi-
ences of urban space.
I arrived in Beirut in fall 2004. I expected to learn about the class dimen-
sions of postwar reconstruction processes. But soon, aft er the fi rst bomb 
targeting a political fi gure exploded, I realized that I was witnessing a 
renewal of violence that would challenge the notion of Lebanon as having 
moved past war altogether. From late 2004 to early 2006, what I found was 
not a long-term sustained war. But it was not peace either. It was something 
else, a place reorganized into divided parts by the resurgence of political 
sectarianism and the threat of bombs, a time of frustration and disaff ection 
with the state, the economy, and the political order.8
In July 2006, a month-long full-scale war between Hizbullah and Israel 
broke out following Hizbullah’s capture of two Israeli soldiers near the bor-
der.9 In 2010, and again in 2013, I returned to Beirut to examine how stories 
about and practices of urban mobility captured the meanings of everyday 
life in this insecure city. I watched Beirutis of diverse backgrounds and per-
spectives move through the city and listened to their talk about what their 
journeys revealed to them and what these journeys revealed about Lebanon. 
Th ese observations and stories form the book’s ethnographic core.
Th e Insecure City
Many studies have pointed out how the organization of urban space in 
Beirut is part and parcel of the exercise of power and hierarchy. In her eth-
nography Reconstructing Beirut: Memory and Space in a Postwar City (2010), 
Aseel Sawalha looks at how ordinary residents there have been displaced by 
the city’s post–civil war reconstruction. She highlights how the city has been 
rebuilt in ways that exclude poor and working people and the increasing 
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takeover of urban space by political and economic elites. Like Sawalha in her 
concern with the spatial relations of power, Lucia Volk (2010) investigates 
Beirut’s and Lebanon’s many public memorials and shows how they express 
elite political authority in public spaces and the long-standing politics of 
cross-sectarian community solidarity. Sune Haugbolle (2010) also consid-
ers space and memory as he examines debates around the cultural produc-
tion of memories about the civil and regional war in the years between 1990 
and 2005 and shows how the war was at one and the same time represented 
and rendered invisible in Beirut’s public spaces. Lara Deeb and Mona Harb 
(2013), in their study of how pious young Shi‘i Muslims navigate leisure 
opportunities amid Beirut’s sectarian and class hierarchies, look closely 
at the relationship between space and morality by examining how leisure 
sites such as cafes, gyms, and weddings shape young people’s social behav-
ior and practices. Scholarship about Beirut’s geography has also been con-
cerned with the role urban infrastructure and planning policies have played 
in producing spatial and social inequalities (Fawaz 2009b, 2009c) and the 
impact of confl ict on urban life and politics (Fregonese 2009, 2012). All this 
impressive scholarly work off ers incisive and multifaceted analyses of the 
spatial and social relations of power in Beirut, but it does not address the 
experiences of insecurity and security that were crucial aspects of everyday 
life during the time of my ethnographic research, when bombs were going 
off  and the threat of political violence intersected with broader anxieties 
about living in uncertain and unprotected times.
Hence, this book aims to contribute to these studies of Beirut’s landscape 
and those focused on other cities in the Arab world by addressing the rela-
tionship between urban space and the meanings and experiences of security 
and insecurity that emerge from people’s movements through the streets.10 
By focusing on a wounded city shaped by its history and ongoing experi-
ence of confl ict,11 this book is part of a growing body of anthropological work 
exploring “how ethnographic subjects contend with matt ers of security and 
insecurity as they att empt to forge a life in a complex, confl ictive, and oft en 
violent and dangerous social and political-economic milieu” (Goldstein 2010, 
489). Like this scholarship, my book moves beyond traditionalist approaches 
to security that focus primarily on how it is fashioned at the level of policy 
and strategy-making in government and military domains and toward a con-
sideration of the lived encounter with security states and insecurity and, in 
this case, how these are refl ected in movement in and around Beirut.
1 0  Introduction
To analyze the situation at this level, I focus on three dimensions of 
insecurity. First, I examine the kinds of insecurities that surround every-
day life in zones of confl ict. In Beirut, as elsewhere in the Lebanon-Syria-
Israel-Palestine region, this context of confl ict is the outcome of a fractious 
political climate whose tenor is shaped by the broader fi eld of regional geo-
politics and its array of transnational actors. Th e periodic ebbs and fl ows of 
tension that characterize these zones of confl ict require residents to stay on 
guard, always ready to adjust their present lives and daily course of activity, 
as well as to manage their fears about the future possibility of a protracted 
and full-scale war, in response to heightened tensions or signs of an oncom-
ing crisis.12 In gett ing around the city, Beirut’s residents, in other words, are 
always aware that just beneath the surface of a normal day is the possibil-
ity for a violent disruption of everyday life that could last hours, a week, 
months, or more.
Second, I provide a picture of how the project of security can create 
insecurity in the pursuit of various goals, from the protection of certain 
people and the enactment of justice to the enforcement of boundaries that 
keep out “unwanted” or “undesirable” populations.13 In the case of Beirut, 
I explore this problem by looking at the following paradox: In Beirut, the 
intensifi cation of security by the state for “the few”—an overlapping group 
of class and political elites—through the installation of checkpoints and 
barriers and the rerouting of traffi  c in ways that close off  not just street 
blocks but whole neighborhoods, requires the deployment of certain kinds 
of spatial and social practices on the part of “the many,” whose lives, as a 
result, become disorderly, and, in this way, less secure. For instance, follow-
ing former prime minister Hariri’s assassination in February 2005, traffi  c on 
a key artery was changed from two-way to one-way as part of the fortifi ca-
tion of security around the Hariri palace in Koreitem, my neighborhood in 
West Beirut.
Th ird, a sense of vulnerability that is both physical and existential is con-
tained in my use of the terms insecurity and unsafety. Feelings of social and 
psychic unsafety that emerge in people’s talk about being mobile in Beirut 
lead to blaming the state for being ineff ective, corrupt, and forcing citizens 
to fend for themselves. Th ese sentiments about not being taken care of by 
the state are of a piece with the kinds of insecurities anthropologists have 
described as a feature of the global human condition in the contemporary 
era, which is marked by neoliberal polices and governance involving the 
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reduction of social safety nets and increased privatization, open markets, 
and deregulation. Th is is an era of downward socioeconomic mobility and 
anxious citizens who, feeling under threat and unprotected by the state, 
oft en move to take responsibility for their own security.14 In using the term 
unsafety, I mean to convey a notion of insecurity or threat that includes 
but does not hinge on the possibility of bodily harm or injury, as the term 
danger oft en does.
Th eories of security and insecurity have helped us understand the ways 
in which contemporary human life is besieged by a whole host of challenges 
and fears, from imminent ecological or fi nancial disaster to the avoidance of 
toxins and crime, that make the management of risk and insecurity a central 
feature of our lives. While the generalizability of the concept of insecurity is 
useful insofar as it directs our att ention to the signifi cance of various social, 
environmental, and political phenomena, my ethnography shows how dif-
ferent kinds of insecurity converge in everyday experience. By consider-
ing how unsafety for Beirut’s residents is engendered by various kinds of 
threats, from the dangers of political instability to the risks posed by reck-
less drivers and the moral and civic injuries of elite corruption, I highlight 
the tensions created by and the links among various forms of insecurity.
By engaging a notion of insecurity that att ends to the ways in which peo-
ple are rendered vulnerable, not only physically but also in a political, eco-
nomic, and ontological sense, I am providing a multifaceted analysis of what 
insecurity means for residents of Beirut. Not only the possibility of political 
violence threatens Beirut’s ordinary residents but also economic and class 
dynamics that make life precarious for ordinary folk amid weakened struc-
tures of social and economic support and rising inequality.15 In this way, my 
account shows how the insecurities of urban and public life in Beirut are 
both an outcome of Lebanon’s contentious geopolitical milieu and part of a 
broader global experience of downward socioeconomic mobility and com-
mon anxieties that characterizes the human condition in the early twenty-
fi rst century. Th us, although many of the experiences I describe in this book 
that relate to the militarized and precarious urban sett ing in which Beirutis 
live may seem quite distant from life elsewhere, in places in the rest of the 
world where there is peace and wars are not fought, for example, many other 
issues that people described to me are increasingly relevant: living with an 
intensifi ed police and security presence, fi nding it ever more diffi  cult to 
make ends meet, and coping with stress about the lack of a social safety net.
1 2  Introduction
Mobility and Urban Space
My investigation of the meanings of security and insecurity in Beirut took 
place in the streets of the city. Being mobile in an urban environment, 
I propose, is a window into the everyday experience of civic life and citi-
zenship and sheds light on how class, politics, and state power are spatial-
ized in a place and time fraught with confl ict and uncertainty. In many 
parts of the Middle East, conditions of insecurity that are an outcome of 
political violence, the practices of the security state, and the militarization 
of everyday life shape people’s everyday mobility experiences. In Palestine, 
for example, daily practices of gett ing from here to there are a physical and 
psychological trial that entails enduring myriad checkpoints and oft en tem-
porary and erratically placed road closures.16 Moreover, the spatial regimes 
of control enacted by the Israeli government in occupied Palestine in the 
name of security are also a feature of state power elsewhere in the region 
and across the globe. In this book, I explore how, in an increasingly milita-
rized post-2004 Beirut, moving through public space has entailed encoun-
ters with constellations of security that discipline and surveil, encounters 
experienced especially by members of disenfranchised populations that 
are understood as “other” or criminal. Th e sudden and variable character 
of these security formations requires residents to fi nd ways to manage their 
daily course of activity in response to the appearance or news of a road-
block, checkpoint, or military installation set up in the wake of but also in 
anticipation of what is deemed a security threat.
Moreover, as sociologist Jack Katz (1999) has shown, experiences of 
mobility are fl eeting, quotidian dramas laden with raw, emotional power.17 
When people move through Beirut, they are experiencing the intersection 
of citizen and state, of the more and the less privileged, and, in general, 
the city’s politically polarized geography. Th e ability to pass through and 
around security blockades, for instance, oft en has to do with an individ-
ual’s class presentation, which emerges from visible markers of class such 
as clothing, hairstyle, grooming, and means of transportation, along with 
behavioral disposition and accent or language.
For these reasons, I found that talk about mobility was an important 
way for Beirut’s residents to convey sentiments about civic interaction and 
public life. When, for example, Beirutis inveighed against high-status show-
off s who drove mithl ma bidhun (however they pleased) with no regard 
for others on the road or when they cited the state’s lack of enforcement 
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of traffi  c rules as a threat to public safety, they registered concerns about 
the workings of the civic order that were not only manifest in the context 
of traffi  c but that undergirded society more generally. Th e stories they told 
about gett ing around Beirut also positioned people as members of an urban 
community in a city marked by both present-day violence and that of the 
remembered past. Th e way that Beirutis engaged matt ers of mobility to talk 
about society, the nation, and politics therefore tells us something about 
urban life in a site of confl ict and how relations of social inequality are 
engendered through spatial movement.
Th is book is about how the everyday spatial mobility that all people 
experience shapes and is shaped by local hierarchies of class and status. In 
my account, I show how ways of moving through the physical space of the 
city, from standing in the streets and hailing a ride in a shared taxi to navigat-
ing various kinds of security barriers as a pedestrian, are streetside interac-
tions between the various kinds of people caught up, as anthropologist Lila 
Abu-Lughod would put it, “in [the] intersecting and confl icting structures 
of power” that span Beirut (1990, 42). In this way, my ethnography builds 
on studies of mobility that use the movement of people in urban spaces as a 
site of inquiry into power relations and is a departure from anthropology’s 
long-standing focus on human movement across transnational borders. 
When anthropologists look at running urban errands by car ( Jain 2002) 
or at motorbikes as unexpected agents of globalization (Truitt  2008) or at 
the aff ective experiences of taxi drivers and day trippers (Notar 2012a) or at 
how public transit is a mechanism of racial and class segregation (Czeglédy 
2004), they are also looking into the implications of automobility for social 
life. Building on geographical, sociological, and historical studies of auto-
mobility,18 these ethnographic studies of spatial movement have shown us 
how mobility practices and narratives order social stratifi cation and frame 
civic possibilities.
Feminist thought has also transformed our understandings of space 
and place in similar ways. Feminist scholars have described how social and 
economic patt erns of gender inequality are expressed in the organization 
of the cultural landscape at various scales—from domestic architecture to 
the boundaries between urban communities—and how these spatial pat-
terns not only refl ect but also reinforce diff erences of gender, class, and 
race.19 In Middle Eastern cities, their research has focused primarily on 
how gender is used to divide and defi ne public and private spheres and on 
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the ways in which women access and move through gendered spaces by 
using, for example, practices of veiling and consumption.20 Th e domain of 
gender is underexplored in urban studies of Beirut and clearly deserves a 
separate study. While issues of gender are treated in the book, I envision 
undertaking a future project about masculinity and public space that will 
allow me to expand on my investigation of the militarization and securiti-
zation of the city and build on emerging scholarship of masculinity in the 
Middle East.21
Citizens and the State in Lebanon
In the book, I use the term urban citizenship, by which I refer to belonging 
to an urban community, a belonging that I think of as being rooted more in 
a shared recognition of a city’s ways of life and culture rather than in rights 
and responsibilities. I therefore conceive of the city as a locus of citizen-
ship in the sense that urban residents feel a sense of membership in and 
identifi cation with cities as a polity apart from—though oft en overlap-
ping with—that of the nation-state.22 In my ethnography, I highlight how 
classed and politicized notions of belonging to an urban community are 
formed through mobility experiences. In so doing, I aim to bring into focus 
the “tumult of citizenship” that anthropologists James Holston and Arjun 
Appadurai (1996, 188) describe. In this formulation the city constitutes 
neither the background nor the foreground for struggles among diff erent 
groups but, as Reem’s words previously in this chapter suggest, the batt le-
ground itself, through which individuals and groups defi ne their identity, 
stake their claims, wage their batt les, and articulate rights, obligations, and 
principles (Isin 2002, 283–284).
Social and cultural histories of Lebanon have understood citizenship 
largely through a focus on the growth of the country’s sectarian-based polit-
ical structure, which apportioned power along sectarian lines to groups of 
political leaders (zu’ama). Th is literature describes how the dominant class, 
comprised of a coalition of families from various religious sects, is but-
tressed by patron-client arrangements that require the loyalty and affi  liation 
of Lebanon’s citizens.23 Th ese kinds of political dynamics, and their intensi-
fi cation during and in the wake of Lebanon’s war (1975–1990), have thereby 
made political sectarianism a kind of subnationalism that is primary in the 
making of Lebanese citizens. In my account, I draw on this understanding 
of Lebanese citizenship as being rooted in the country’s political sectarian 
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framework but also go beyond it by showing how class, status, and every-
day relations with the state critically shape what it means to be an urban 
citizen of Beirut.
Spatializing the State
During summer 2013, in the context of a deteriorating domestic secu-
rity situation because of the spillover from the Syrian civil war, billboards 
throughout Beirut aimed to send a comforting message about the state’s 
interest in taking care of citizens. Th e billboards pictured fi ve members 
of the national police agency, the Internal Security Forces (ISF). Th e bill-
board’s message was “May you be well and in good health every year,” an 
Arabic sentiment expressed on holidays and special occasions and, below, 
“Making the nation and the citizens content.” With its kind message of well-
being and smiling visages of police offi  cers, the billboard cannily person-
alized and made accessible the state’s security apparatus by foregrounding 
its workforce. Th is was a strikingly diff erent political sensibility than those 
expressed by the banners, posters, and images that were draped throughout 
Figure I.1. Internal Security Forces billboard: “Making the nation and the citizens 
 content.” (Photo by author.)
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the city endorsing political fi gures and parties in a way that makes a kind of 
“state for all” secondary to party politics. As citizens moved through Beirut, 
the billboard seemed to remind them that the state was working to protect 
and serve ordinary people.
Yet the idea conveyed by the billboard, of a competent state con-
cerned with the protection of all citizens, was one very much in question. 
Although mechanisms of state security were visible on the streets, people I 
spoke with during the time of my research generally associated these with 
the protection of VIPs rather than ordinary citizens. And, in the context of 
the so-called chaos on the roads, the state was oft en described as failing to 
ensure the safety of citizens by allowing dangerous mobility practices to go 
unchecked. In short, the prevailing understanding of the state I encoun-
tered was one that emphasized its shortcomings.
To build on studies of the state that aim to break down notions of the 
state as a coherent and rational monolith that sits “above society,”24 I am 
looking here at the spatial dimensions of state power that appear in every-
day scenes of gett ing around the city streets. In so doing, I move beyond 
the interpretations, prevalent in political science and policy studies, of the 
Lebanese state as weak or failed,25 by showing that instead of being a uni-
tary entity that is categorically weak or strong, state power is contingent on 
various kinds of social relations that are worked out, quite literally, on the 
ground, in the public fray between citizens and representatives of the state.
As a point of regional comparison, the character of the Lebanese state 
was also debated and discussed by the news media amid the uprisings in the 
Arab world in spring 2011. While Lebanon’s fractious politics oft en make 
headlines, in this case it was the country’s absence of political activity that 
drew att ention. Why have there been no sweeping changes in Lebanon? 
the press asked. As Deeb and Harb write, “Not only is there no dictator 
against whom to revolt; divisions among Lebanon’s political communities 
have been so deeply established over the course of the nation-state’s mod-
ern history so as to preclude the stuff  of united televised protests, most of 
the time” (2013, 33). Part of the story this book tells, however, is about the 
sense of frustration, disaff ection, and disenfranchisement that emerge from 
Lebanon’s fl awed democratic, multiparty system, in which power is shared 
among a small group of leaders and families who claim affi  liation with par-
ticular sectarian and ideological communities.
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Structure of the Book
In chapter 1, I provide a historically informed overview of Beirut’s built, 
physical, and transport environment that reveals the city’s unplanned, 
informal, and privatized character and sets the stage for my ethnography 
of mobility through the city. Chapter 2 presents a picture of how historical 
experiences of war and confl ict have shaped the city’s space. I turn next, 
in chapter 3, to an ethnographic exploration of how this history, in relation 
to contemporary political sectarian violence and tensions, shapes residents’ 
understandings of and movement through the city.
In the next three chapters, I show how people spatially negotiate the city 
in relation to social class, politics, and state power. Chapter 4 takes up the 
ways in which security practices and installations seek to enact a kind of 
spatial order in the city. Th is order—adopted mainly by and for an inter-
secting group of political and class elites—creates conditions of insecu-
rity in the daily lives of ordinary residents. While chapter 4 focuses on the 
establishment of order in the streets of the city, chapter 5 focuses on how 
disorderly traffi  c is understood through an ethnographic investigation of 
talk about the “chaos” of gett ing around the city and about how, on the one 
hand, talk of a chaotic mobility unites diff erent kinds of Lebanese under 
a political imaginary about citizens coping with a “developing” nation and 
corrupt government, while, on the other hand, hierarchical distinctions 
among citizen-drivers are engendered by this same discourse. In chapter 6, 
I focus on a particular type of encounter with political and state power in 
public space: interactions between traffi  c police and drivers. By looking 
closely at the work of the traffi  c police as a site of everyday state formation, 
I consider how the state is constituted and understood from the perspec-
tive of both citizens and street-level bureaucrats, who, despite, but also as 
a result of, their discord, share common ground in their sense of insecurity 
and disappointment with the state; this perception is conveyed through the 
oft -used expression ma fi  dowla (there is no state). Th e Conclusion summa-
rizes the key fi ndings of the book by emphasizing the role of mobility in the 
public enactment of class, political, and state power. 
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1 • THE PRIVATIZED CITY
Forming a cape that extends into the sea, Beirut is situated at 
the geographical center of the Lebanese coast. Initially developed around 
its port area, the city expanded through the twentieth century in all direc-
tions: northward along the coastal plains and their neighboring mountain-
ous areas toward the country’s second largest city of Tripoli, eastward in the 
direction of the Beirut-Damascus highway, which rises into the mountains, 
and to the south, where, by the early 1950s, villages were being transformed 
into suburbs by rural migrants seeking economic opportunity in the capital 
and, later, several Palestinian refugee camps were established.1 Today, about 
half of Lebanon’s total population—close to two million people2—lives in 
the Greater Beirut area, which comprises the city and its suburbs.3 It is a 
densely built landscape of concrete structures, “mostly indiscriminate mid-
rise and high-rise buildings that cast their shadows on the remaining ves-
tiges of villas or low-rise houses of the French Mandate period” (Verdeil 
2005).4 Buildings sit in close proximity to one another with narrow setbacks 
from the street; commercial shops and services are on their ground fl oors.
In many neighborhoods, towers of otherwise indistinctive apartment 
blocks express the individuality of their occupants through a particu-
lar architectural feature: the balcony. Beirutis speak about a kind of ilfeh 
(familiarity or intimacy) that characterizes the city’s urban culture. Th e 
apartment balcony, situated on the border between the public space of the 
street and the private realm of the domestic sphere, is a site where this inti-
macy is cultivated. From balconies, which are used year-round, neighbors 
converse with one another, families’ socks and undergarments are hung 
Figure 1.1. Map of Beirut in Lebanon and the region. (Map by Richard Gilbreath. 
Adapted from map by Andrew Alfred-Duggan, ITMB Publishing.)
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Figure 1.2. Neighborhood map of Beirut with main sites referred to in this book. 
(Map by Richard Gilbreath. Adapted from map by Andrew Alfred-Duggan, ITMB 
Publishing.)
out on clotheslines to dry in view of passersby, and residents shout down 
requests for grocery items to be carried upstairs by workers in shops below. 
Walking through the city or sitt ing at the open window of a public bus as it 
crawls through traffi  c, the streetside observer encounters these household 
scenes. In this way, the balconies help to produce an urban street culture 
that is caught up in the sights, sounds, and even smells of everyday domes-
tic life, from the yells of children calling down to their friends in the street 
and the aromas of lunchtime meals waft ing out from kitchens to the sounds 
of the television news and glimpses of residents tending to their hanging 
gardens, oases of green amid a dense city colored concrete gray.
Moving through Beirut, one also observes its “half-commercial, half-
industrial” character (Adnan 1982, 9). Th e sight of tower cranes putt ing up 
high-end residences in and adjacent to the city’s historic and geographic 
core, the downtown area,5 gives evidence of the fact that the commercial 
traffi  c in land is one of the most important sources of private wealth in 
Lebanon.6 In the east, just past the picturesque neighborhood of Ashrafi eh 
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and its late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century French-style archi-
tecture is Bourj Hammoud, an area that was founded by survivors of the 
Armenian Genocide and that expanded mostly during the 1930s,7 where 
scenes of manufacturing and light industry—from furniture and shoes to 
mechanical parts and matt resses—emerge. From there, one approaches 
the junction for the coastal highway heading north at Karantina, where the 
air is thick with the putrid smells emanating from both the city’s waste-
treatment plant and one of the country’s largest slaughterhouses. Th e 
coastal highway, one of the most congested traffi  c corridors in the country, 
is used daily by commuters living in the northern suburbs. Th ese suburbs 
rise upward from the coastal plain to the storied Lebanese mountainside.8 
Moving north and east from the beaches of Beirut, through congestion and 
industry, to the foot of the Mount Lebanon range is thus a route across the 
city’s diverse physical landscape, one that brings to mind a favorite apho-
rism oft en repeated to foreign visitors: “Only in Lebanon can you go to the 
beach and ski in the same day.” To travel along this route in Beirut is also to 
move across diff erent territories, areas of the city that are identifi ed with 
particular sectarian and political groups that have been and continue to be 
adversaries.
In this chapter, I approach Beirut’s physical landscape as a code whose 
deciphering may be undertaken through the study of its “ordinary but diag-
nostic features” (Meinig 1979, 6). Two processes, modes of privatization 
nourished by a laissez-faire market-led model of urban development and 
political sectarian confl ict, have been the key power geometries (Massey 
1994) shaping the city’s space in the modern era. I consider these power 
geometries—by which I refer to the ways in which spatial arrangements, 
access, and mobility refl ect hierarchies of power and control—in this and 
the following chapter. Here, I provide a historically informed overview of 
Beirut’s built, physical, and transport environment that reveals the city’s 
unplanned, informal, and privatized character.
The Rise of Modern Beirut
Lebanon became a province of the Ott oman Empire in 1516, but Beirut 
was an insignifi cant port town for much of the Empire’s rule. It was not 
until the late Ott oman period (1860–1914), when the city was made an 
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imperial administrative center and trading activity shift ed from the interior 
to the coastal region along the eastern Mediterranean, that Beirut came to 
prominence. Along with the emergence of the French-supported silk 
industry in the Mount Lebanon region, which expanded the export sec-
tor and stimulated ancillary enterprises in fi nance, shipping, banking, and 
insurance,9 the city also developed as an outcome of administrative reforms 
instituted by the Ott omans to “modernize” the Empire; these reforms 
encouraged British and French investment in infrastructural projects in 
and around the city.10
Th ese investments increased the economy and att racted rural-to-urban 
migrants seeking not only a bett er livelihood but also refuge from religious 
violence in their villages.11 In the course of the nineteenth century, rural 
migrants transformed Beirut from a small town of six thousand  people 
spanning a quarter of a square mile into a major seaport city with a popula-
tion of one hundred twenty thousand by the century’s end (Fawaz 1983, 
1). While many of the these new residents in the city retained ties to the 
villages they left —and the building of roads that extended across the 
mountains and faster carriage service facilitated these connections—rural 
migrants to the city were, by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, becoming Beirutis. Th ey became Beirutis in a civic sense, as residents 
of an urban polity governed by a municipal council rather than through 
the charitable institutions, sectarian communities, and private property 
owners that collaboratively supervised villages (Abdou-Hodeib 2011, 
478). But, in another sense, these rural-to-urban migrants, many of whom 
entered the trading milieu and constituted part of the city’s burgeoning 
middle class of merchants and salaried professionals, were also becom-
ing Beiruti through their participation in new kinds of public and social 
practices.
During this time, the city became both “the project and object of the cos-
mopolitan desires of an Ott oman-Arab bourgeoisie to belong to a distinctly 
modern epoch” (Hanssen 2005, 14). Th e interest of this urban middle 
class in taking leisure in the public realm gave rise to cafes, theaters, balls, 
evening dances, clubs, public gardens, horse racing viewed from within a 
European-style hippodrome, and roads designed specifi cally for owners of 
automobiles.12 In the park squares, coff eehouses, art galleries, and theaters 
of turn-of-the century Beirut, new forms of public sociality took shape 
that brought the people of Beirut together both by chance as well as along 
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class-based lines. With the appearance of these kinds of places, the removal 
of its medieval city walls, and its newfound status as an imperial capital, 
Beirut changed profoundly during the late Ott oman period; a modern city 
was inaugurated, one characterized by a vibrant, middle-class public sphere.
Figure 1.3. Cafe at a Beirut public garden during the late Ott oman period, ca. 1900–
1920. (Courtesy of the Library of Congress, LC-DIG-matpc-01186.)
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Allied victory in World War I brought the dissolution of the Ott oman 
Empire.13 Following the declaration of independence in 1920 by an Arab 
Congress and its provisional recognition by the Allied Powers, France 
invaded Syria and, working together with the British, divided the Arab Near 
East of the Ott oman Empire into a number of separate states subject to 
colonial control. While the British Mandate administered Palestine (mod-
ern Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip), French mandatory control 
was established over six states that divided Lebanon and Syria.
Th e decision to create a State of Greater Lebanon—whose borders are 
those of the country today—which was separated from the states of Syria, 
had several important consequences. First, it further strengthened France’s 
historic alliance with Lebanon’s Christian communities, especially Maronite 
Catholics,14 and expanded the political infl uence of these groups.15 Second, 
the choice to create a Greater Lebanon in particular and French mandatory 
policy more generally confi rmed the fi nancial and commercial hegemony 
of Beirut over the mountain regions and the development of a patt ern of 
economic activity in which agriculture and industry became ever more sub-
ordinate to banking and trade.16 Th e legacy of this center-periphery mode 
of development is evident today in the considerable infrastructural, health, 
educational, and income disparities between the Beirut and Mount Lebanon 
regions and the south, Bekaa Valley, and the north.17 Some have even gone 
so far as to argue that Beirut not only is the capital of Lebanon but, given its 
role as the country’s economic and demographic center, has come to consti-
tute a city-state.18 Finally, the establishment of a French-controlled Greater 
Lebanon entrenched political sectarianism, an important development that 
I discuss further in the following chapter. French offi  cials ruled through 
paternalistic power that distributed—and rescinded— benefi ts to the 
“ruled” through a mediating elite.19 Although this elite brought Sunni, Shi‘a, 
Druze, and Greek Orthodox leaders into its fold, it reinforced the notion 
of a sectarian-based political order.20 As historian Philip Mansel (2010, 300) 
observes, even municipal appointments in the government of Beirut were 
apportioned according to sect, a practice that entrenched a sense of diff er-
ence among residents of the city rather than integration.
As in France’s other colonial territories, the French administration 
in Lebanon was a technocratic one that emphasized vast infrastructural 
projects such as the laying out of a cross-country road network, the mod-
ernization of the ports and postal service, and the creation of a telephone 
 Th e Privatized City 25
network, hospitals, and sanitary services (Picard 1996, 38). In Beirut, pub-
lic space was made French through commemorative practices that named 
streets and squares for French military fi gures and that erected monuments 
and statues in the honor of French government fi gures and military men 
and also through the design of the built environment. Th e city’s down-
town center was a particular focal point for the mandate authorities, as it 
was intended to be the showpiece of French urban planning in the Levant. 
Th ere, Haussmannian Paris was re-created.21 A symmetrical patt ern of long, 
straight, and wide avenues took the place of the Ott oman-era labyrinthine 
network of narrow alleys, open-air souks (markets), and crowded quarters. 
Streets radiated out, in a star-shaped design, from Place de l’Etoile (Square 
of the Star).22 Th e construction of public buildings and residential struc-
tures also gave other parts of Beirut—like the Ashrafi eh neighborhood on 
the east side of the city, for example—a distinctly French character.
Th rough its colonial cultural policy, the mission civilisatrice (civilizing 
mission), the French made Beirut the center of French culture and language 
in Lebanon. Secular and religious schools in Beirut—including Muslim 
ones—many of which had been opened along with American and British 
missionary schools during the nineteenth century, served as an ideal stag-
ing ground for this enterprise.23 Eff orts to cultivate French language and 
culture in Beirut, those that began well before the mandate era but intensi-
fi ed during the colonial period, have endured until the present. In today’s 
Beirut, not only are aspects of French culture, foods, and fashion, for exam-
ple, commonplace, but also French is widely spoken and the Lebanese 
Arabic used by Beirutis is peppered with French words and phrases.
In the late Ott oman and French colonial periods, Beirut developed from 
a backwater imperial holding into a fl ourishing trading center with a lively 
middle-class public sphere. In the following sections I explore how mod-
ern Beirut has taken on an unplanned physical form characterized by state- 
supported processes of private investment, shrinking public space, and 
vehicular congestion.
Lack of Planning and Informality
Beirut’s Ott oman and French history are both evident in the city’s built 
environment today, as part of an eclectic architectural mix that has late 
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nineteenth- and early twentieth-century European styles mingling with 
1960s modernism and the faux-tradition of the city’s recently redeveloped 
downtown.24 Th e diverse architectural styles provide evidence of the peri-
ods of the city’s growth and are but one feature of the patchwork character 
of the urban landscape as peddlers pushing carts loaded with seasonal pro-
duce share the street with global conglomerates like Starbucks and H&M 
and newly constructed high-rise luxury buildings rise up on narrow blocks, 
dwarfi ng their two- and three-story neighbors. “In Beirut, it’s anything 
goes,” one architect told me; “the city has just sprung up in every direction, 
there is no plan.” Although its development has been the object of care-
ful and comprehensive state-sponsored planning since the mid-twentieth 
 century,25 these plans for Beirut were never realized, and, as a result, the 
city’s physical texture is a pieced-together one.
Th e urban planners, architects, and engineers I spoke with in 2004–
2005 about the organization and design of a city that is oft en described as 
haphazard, unplanned, and unregulated26 drew links between the lack of 
a comprehensive vision for the city and the political infi ghting for which 
Lebanese state institutions are well known.27 Th e massive development 
project under way in the city’s center, undertaken by the Solidere corpora-
tion,28 was cited by several planners and architects as an example of how 
the private sector has been a more effi  cient player than the state in planning 
and improving urban space. During our conversation in spring 2005, archi-
tect Robert Saliba, for instance, described how the “corporate approach to 
urban design has proven to be more eff ective in Beirut in comparison with 
the ineff ectiveness of the traditional, governmental approach.” Th is privati-
zation of urban planning and development, a process that in the Arab world 
has seen the state selling off  publicly held lands to the highest bidder with 
litt le regard for the public interest,29 is understood by some, in the context 
of Lebanon’s fractious politics, to be a redemptive one. For example, at a 
public lecture in May 2005, Amira Solh, senior urban planner at Solidere, 
spoke about how having urban planning in the hands of the private sector 
is “safer” in Lebanon because sectarian and political tensions always take 
over in the public realm and then “everything devolves into these [political] 
conversations, debates and disputes and becomes stalled.”30
Like Solh, architect Nabil Gholam described the private developer as 
being free from the polarized politics that undergird municipal governance 
in Beirut. “Th e municipality’s plans for the city,” he said during an interview 
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in November 2004, “are not planned at all; they’re spontaneous. Even 
 single owners can change the city’s space. . . . Just down the street from 
here, there’s a small company and they just took a strip of land in front of 
their building and completely changed the sidewalk!”
Th is lack of planning and standardization is also linked with the prob-
lems in the traffi  c infrastructure. In a summer 2010 meeting with planners at 
Majal, an urban planning institute, one staff  member explained to me that 
the municipal government is well known for its complete lack of planning: 
“Th e municipality comes to us for technical assistance, but they always 
come when it is too late. Once an area of the city has a problem—like now 
with Gemmayzeh, they are aware that it is too crowded, no service [taxis] 
will go through there, no buses are able to get through—that is when they 
come and try to fi nd a solution. But there is no planning ahead.” Similarly, 
in our conversation in spring 2005, transportation engineer Youssef Fawaz 
described how there is no set patt ern of design or implementation for infra-
structural elements like speed bumps and parking bollards. He continued, 
“Th ese things should be standard, but there’s no big picture. Th ere are 
no  specs [specifi cations]; there are all diff erent sizes, shapes, and colors. 
I know a group of residents who were just able to install their own bollards 
on their street; . . . the municipality agreed that they can make them what-
ever shape and size they want!”
Drivers and pedestrians experience this lack of planning and standard-
ization in their everyday mobility. Th e fact that setbacks are not regulated 
(building owners can build any distance away from the main road and 
from the edge of the sidewalk) produces inconsistent streetscapes.31 Curb 
and manhole-cover heights are variable and so, to avoid stumbling while 
on foot or damaging a vehicle while driving, a certain vigilance when get-
ting around is required. Cars block sidewalks and force pedestrians to walk 
in the street, and landmarks are used to navigate the city and to give direc-
tions because of the lack of standardized names for streets, the absence 
of numbered street addresses, and the inadequate signage.32 Another 
example is a service road that runs parallel to and off ers an alternative to 
travel along the oft en-congested coastal highway. Traffi  c changes direction 
during diff erent times of day along this road, but these times are neither 
posted nor standardized. In short, drivers cannot plan ahead to take the 
alternative road but instead must cross over to it to fi nd out which way 
traffi  c is fl owing.
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Th is kind of unpredictability is also a feature of public transit. In neigh-
borhoods with narrow one-way roads, drivers behind buses become 
incensed, laying on their horns, waving their hands, and leaning out of their 
car windows to shout for the buses to move. Th e fact that there are no fi xed 
bus stops—an inherent aspect of the bus’s informality—is a benefi t to the 
bus passenger, who can board and disembark anywhere along the bus route 
rather than worry about having to reach and wait at a “formal” and marked 
bus stop. But, for other vehicles on the road driving behind the bus, the lack 
of fi xed stops—and the absence of lanes where buses could move out from 
the fl ow of traffi  c—is a nuisance.
Various other kinds of ad hoc practices constitute the city’s physical, 
transport, and built environment. As part of the process of informaliz-
ing state structures in the contemporary era, urban development in cities 
across the globe has increasingly moved away from state legislation and 
public deliberation toward behind-closed-doors agreements arbitrated 
between state and private actors.33 In Beirut, the expansion of informal deci-
sion making and the allowance for exceptions to the law with regard to the 
built environment since the turn of the new century have brought about 
a relaxation of the state’s regulations regarding maximum building height, 
construction permits, and the acquisition of property by non-Lebanese.34
Th is state-supported process of planning by informality has freed up 
more and more of the city’s space for high-end—and high-rise—real 
estate aimed primarily at buyers from the Gulf Arab and Lebanese expa-
triate communities.35 Th ese are short-term, typically summer, residents; 
Rahif Fayad, an architect and cultural critic, described them in our inter-
view in spring 2006 as having “no stake in our society.” Housing production 
is not only an arena for profi t making, however, but also an opportunity 
to expand and affi  rm political constituencies. In the wake of the summer 
2006 war with Israel, for instance, Hizbullah’s rebuilding of the Haret-
Hreik neighborhood in the southern suburbs vis-à-vis its newly established 
private development agency, Wa‘ad, demonstrated the central role that 
nonstate actors play in shaping the physical and political geography of 
Beirut, particularly at a time when national sovereignties and political 
identities are increasingly contested.36
Informal sett lements that developed along the city’s periphery begin-
ning in the 1940s are another feature of Beirut’s landscape. Built in violation 
of urban and building regulations (Fawaz 2009b), these sett lements became 
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home to rural migrants from poor (predominantly Shi‘i Muslim) parts of 
the country who acquired land, built housing, and accessed services in 
less desirable and undeveloped areas of the city. Residents in these areas, 
however, now fi nd themselves increasingly displaced because of increased 
land prices and the territorial expansion of urban-development projects. 
Informal housing and infrastructure are also in plain view at some of the 
city’s construction sites where mainly Syrian laborers are employed. Some 
of these laborers live where they work, sett ing up semi-permanent encamp-
ments just beyond the construction façade in parts of unfi nished structures. 
Signs of residence, like laundry hanging over the construction walls to dry, 
are a common sight at these incomplete buildings. Th e tangles of power 
wires that haphazardly drape over street blocks throughout Beirut, to give 
another example, are suggestive of residents’ practices of informal energy 
hawking by hooking into power lines and by meter pirating.37
In this way, a range of actors and processes come together to produce 
Beirut’s informal urbanization. Th ere are the private power holders who 
informalize modes of urban development by using their infl uence to bend 
state regulations to their will—for example, by bringing about legislative 
changes regarding maximum building height and construction-permit pro-
cedures. Th ere are also the ordinary and underserved users of the city who 
establish housing and hook into infrastructural services through illegal and 
informal means. And, through its rebuilding of the Haret-Hreik neighbor-
hood, Hizbullah has employed informal channels, such as word-of-mouth 
communication to residents about reconstruction procedures and options 
(Fawaz 2009a, 326–327), to enhance its authority as a private urban plan-
ner and developer, thereby consolidating its territorial base in and claims to 
parts of the city in the process.
Automobility and Public Space
Th e hegemony of the private automobile is another dimension of privatiza-
tion in Beirut’s built and physical landscape. Beirut’s public tramway lines, 
which fi rst appeared in the early twentieth century, were dismantled in the 
mid-1960s to allow the ever-increasing number of automobiles greater free-
dom of movement. Th e disappearance of the tramway in the 1960s was fol-
lowed, later in the 1980s, by the demise of rail transport, which had aided in 
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the shipping of freight from the port of Beirut.38 Th ese changes in the trans-
port scene only intensifi ed vehicular congestion in a city that had already 
been described, in 1963, as having “a very acute traffi  c problem caused by 
the increase in the number of cars and the small number of new streets” 
(Riachi 1963, 111). Once championed as a boon to the country’s tourism 
sector,39 cars were, by the 1960s, thought to detract from the pleasures of 
visiting Beirut so much that the special Tourist Brigade of traffi  c policemen 
charged with fi ning drivers for the misuse of their horns was formed.40 Th is 
was a time many consider to be Beirut’s golden age, when the city att ained 
the moniker “Paris of the Middle East.” Beirut became in the 1960s not only 
a fashionable destination for European and American jetsett ers and a city 
of pleasure for those seeking the sun and nightlife but also the literary, pub-
lishing, and entertainment capital of the Arab world. As the end point of 
the Trans Arabian oil pipeline, the city had begun to benefi t from its links 
with the newly oil-rich Gulf. But it was also an increasingly congested city, 
one whose population doubled between 1955 and 1965. By 1973, the bus 
played only a minor role in gett ing people around, as most daily journeys in 
the city were completed in passenger cars.41 By the 1970s, then, Beirut had 
developed an urban culture dependent on cars.
When I spoke with people about the roots of the city’s traffi  c problem, 
they oft en commented, “there are too many cars” and “there is not enough 
good public transportation.” Th e Ministry of Public Works and Transport 
estimates that about three million daily motorized trips occur in the Greater 
Beirut area with trip mode split among private cars (68 percent), shared 
service taxis and private taxis (15 percent), minibuses (11 percent), and 
buses (6 percent).42 Complaints I heard about buses in particular always 
had to do with their low frequencies, slow and variable and unreliable travel 
times, and poor geographic coverage, as a traffi  c-policy report also found 
(Aoun et al. 2013, 53). Maya, a young woman in her early twenties, told me 
that when she took the bus from near her home in the northern suburbs to 
her high school in Ashrafi eh, she did not mind that it took so long. “I would 
just bring my books with me and study the whole way, so it wasn’t so bad. 
But it was so slow, I can see why no one wants to take the bus!”
Congestion not only is produced by Beirutis’ reliance on passenger cars 
but is also an outcome of the city’s narrow roads and lack of underground 
parking. In summer 2013, in a sign that the traffi  c had only worsened since 
my last stage of research in 2010,43 service drivers oft en refused to take me 
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as a passenger when my destination was in an area where they anticipated 
heavy traffi  c. Or, they would ask me to pay service-ayn—a double fare.44 
To get where I needed to go, I oft en told service drivers a destination that 
was close to where I was going but on the periphery of a very high-density 
corridor—awal Hamra (at the beginning of the Hamra neighborhood) 
instead of just Hamra, for instance—so that the driver would agree to 
take me. Th e city’s vertical expansion, through the development of high-
rise towers, has only exacerbated the problem by increasing the number of 
city residents (with cars) per unit area of land and reducing the number 
of vacant lots that can be used for parking.45 Although a new law mandates 
that new buildings provide underground parking for their residents, it is 
doubtful, as architect and urban planner Gregoire Serof conveyed in our 
interview in 2010, that this law is being strictly enforced. Congestion caused 
by irregular modes of on-street parking—double and even triple parking 
are common—further reduce road space and hinder vehicular movement. 
According to the Ministry of the Environment, in 2001 the average vehicle 
speed in Greater Beirut was around 20 kph (12 mph), and free-fl ow travel 
time was typically doubled or tripled because of delays (Aoun et al. 2013, 53).
Th e traffi  c of private cars not only contributes to the feeling, as one 
respondent put it, “that there is no place to breathe” but is also a key feature 
of Beirut’s privatized urbanism. Together with the takeover of public space 
by cars and state disinvestment in public transportation, there is a lack of 
free and open public spaces—playgrounds, sanitary public beaches, desig-
nated sports areas—that enhances the everyday experience of congestion 
in the city. Residents use the Corniche, a fi ve-kilometer seaside boardwalk, 
like a park. In the cooler morning hours, when the air is clearer before the 
onset of traffi  c, it is a pathway for fi tness walkers and joggers. On warm eve-
nings, the Corniche becomes crowded with leisurely amblers of all genera-
tions, with others perching along the promenade with their argilehs (water 
tobacco pipes) and deck chairs in a circle. But parks in the sense of green 
areas that off er trees, distance from traffi  c, and safe play areas for children 
are scarce.
Th e largest green space, a lush landscape of pine trees known as the 
Horsh (forest), has never fully reopened to the public since its restora-
tion aft er the protracted civil and regional war that ended in 1990. While 
a nascent movement to enhance existing gardens and green spaces led 
by NGOs and private foundations is pressuring the state to build new 
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parks,46 the city in fact looks like it perhaps will become less, rather than 
more, green in the near future: in June 2103, the municipal government 
announced plans to demolish—and later replace parts of—a park known 
as the Jesuit Garden in Geitawai, a neighborhood of winding, narrow lanes 
on the eastern side of the city, in order to build a parking garage. Vigorous 
Figure 1.4. Th e Corniche. (Photo by author.)
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protests against the project ensued and, as of this writing, have led to its 
delay as the municipality undertakes an environmental impact study it says 
will be reviewed before a decision is made about moving forward.
Th e state’s emphasis on establishing more parking rather than parks and 
its leaving the creation of a more effi  cient bus system at the bott om of the 
list of priorities shape not just the urban landscape but also how people 
live. Air and noise as well as environmental degradation threaten residents’ 
health and quality of life.47 Th e cityscape’s consumption by the car also 
threatens civic life, as a decline in parks and public spaces reduces opportu-
nities for diff erent groups of people to come into contact with one another. 
As was the case in the 1960s, when the tramway was eliminated, state agen-
cies in Lebanon today continue to support transformations of Beirut’s 
built and physical environment, like the construction of multilevel parking 
garages and new highways, to accommodate the private car.48
“The Growth Machine”
“In Th e City, this center of all prostitutions, there is a lot of money and 
a lot of construction that will never be fi nished. Cement has mixed with 
the earth, and litt le by litt le has smothered most of the trees. If not all” 
(Adnan 1982, 9). Th ough writt en more than three decades ago, Etel Adnan’s 
description of Beirut in her civil war novel, Sitt  Marie Rose, is still apt, for 
the city exists in an enduring state of construction. New buildings go up 
everywhere, soaring taller and taller in the quest to off er their residents 
unblocked sea and mountain views. Some new buildings fi ll in the city’s 
few vacant spaces while others take over lots where now-demolished older 
buildings and homes once stood. Tower cranes are a fi xture of the city’s 
skyline as processes of state-supported privatized and market-let urban 
development “grow the city” in pursuit of real estate investment and value.49 
Led by both private and public actors, the city’s growth has materialized 
through unplanned and informal means and has produced an urban physi-
cal landscape in which the hegemony of the car has gone unchallenged. In 
continuing to choose highways and parking garages over the preservation 
of the city’s historical social fabric, the planners of Beirut, in the words of 
Lebanese architect Hashim Sarkis (2014), “reveal an outdated understand-
ing of the contemporary city,” in which the municipal administration aligns 
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itself with the developers in opposition to local citizens.50 While the city’s 
growth in high-end real estate and highways is almost always portrayed by 
power holders as benefi cial to everyone, the uneven distribution of this 
growth has reinforced inequalities between central Beirut and its outlying 
areas and, moreover, has positioned aff ordable housing, public transporta-
tion, and free public spaces as low urban-development priorities for both 
the municipal and national governments. In these ways, the state has acted 
neither as a regulator of Beirut’s physical landscape nor as a public benefac-
tor, and it has diminished ordinary people’s right to access the city in the 
process.51
As is clear from the discussion above, the physical space of modern 
Beirut has been signifi cantly shaped by modes of privatization involving 
deregulated and informal building practices, the diminishment of public 
lands, and the dominance of the automobile. As one of the city’s key power 
geometries for organizing spatial access and mobility, these modes of priva-
tization refl ect hierarchies of power and control and have created a city 
congested with traffi  c and beset by ongoing construction projects, a city in 
which residents say it is increasingly diffi  cult to fi nd space to breathe and 
room to move. Political sectarian confl ict has also played a central role in 
shaping the way that Beirutis experience urban space. Th is confl ict is the 
focus of the next chapter.
35
2 • THE SPACE OF WAR
At the National Museum of Beirut, built during the French 
Mandate, glass-encased objects lead visitors through a telling of the 
city’s ancient geopolitics, one focused on a chronology of conquerors 
and empires. Beginning with the Bronze and Stone Ages, the museum 
charts the city’s role as a maritime coastal trading post during Canaanite, 
Hellenistic, Phoenician, Roman, Persian, Byzantine, Arab, Crusader, 
and Mamluk eras, creating what art historian Heghnar Watenpaugh calls 
an “invented tradition of cosmopolitanism as a national trait” (2004, 200).1 
But on my visit to the museum, another more lively account of Beirut 
as a Mediterranean “crossroads of civilizations” was also visible. Upon 
entering, I encountered fi ft y or more schoolgirls in their early teens. Dressed 
in hijabs and olive green ‘abayat—an Islamic garment that covers the 
length of the body—the girls were excitedly hurrying around the place in 
groups of twos and threes. Th ey would stop in front of a display case or fi g-
ure for only a brief second before shuffl  ing off  to another down the corri-
dor, chirping and giggling while en route. I asked two of them what school 
they att ended, and they told me that it was near the airport in Dahiya, the 
predominantly Shi‘i Muslim southern suburbs of Beirut. Heading up  the 
stairs to the second fl oor, I passed a nun in a blue habit and children in 
school uniforms, ostensibly students from a Catholic school. Upstairs, 
I came upon another group: boys wearing t-shirts and sneakers with a 
type of baggy black pants (shirwal) and white cap (tarboush) that is the 
traditional att ire of Druze males, a religious minority community in 
Lebanon.
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While both depict a city vibrant with diversity, the antiquities told of an 
ancient “before” whereas the schoolchildren seemed to represent a mod-
ern “aft er.” And yet neither text of the city made immediately available to 
the observer the painful story about a place that has been made vulnerable 
not only by conquests, defeats, and natural disasters but also by the com-
ing apart of the diverse nation that Lebanese novelist and sociologist Halim 
Barakat once argued “was a mosaic composed of several diff erent groups 
that lacked consensus on fundamental issues” (1973, 301).
When the violence that evolved into a period of protracted confl ict 
broke out in 1975, the National Museum’s narrative of Beirut was tragically 
upended; the city characterized as the crossroads of civilizations became 
a crossroads of war. Situated on the Green Line, which divided a mainly 
Christian East Beirut and a majority Muslim West Beirut during the fi ght-
ing, the main road next to the museum became one of the few crossings 
where people could traverse from one side of the city to the other dur-
ing times of truce. Th e Mathaf-Barbir Crossing, as it was known, stood at 
a strategic location along the front and thus became too a site of killings 
and kidnappings. Occupied by various militias as well as the Syrian and 
Israeli armies, who used it as a bunker, as barracks, and as a staging ground 
for shelling and sniper fi re, the museum was badly damaged during the 
fi ghting.2 In this way, the museum not only fell victim to the war but also 
became, like other public spaces in the city, its instrument.
Although it is oft en called a civil war by scholars and analysts, the war in 
Lebanon was in fact a multinational one fought by members of Lebanese, 
Palestinian, Syrian, Israeli, U.S., and other foreign militia groups and state 
armies.3 Given its domestic and as well as regional dimensions, following 
Sami Hermez (2012), I use interchangeably the terms Lebanon’s war, the 
long war, and the civil and regional war rather than civil war to refer to the 
prolonged period of confl ict (1975–1990) that made the country a strategic 
batt leground for both internal as well as regional power plays. During the 
war, Beirut was spatially divided along sectarian and party lines, and mili-
tias, who held divergent ideologies and claimed affi  liation with particular 
sectarian communities, governed, and enforced the boundaries of, parts 
of the city. Today, more than twenty years aft er the end of Lebanon’s war, 
the neologism Beirutization still serves as a metaphor for the dissolution of 
community and the territorialization of a space into warring parts. Inhabit-
ants of this space, as the metaphor also conveys, are unable to move freely 
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as their movement is caught up in a geography of closely guarded boundar-
ies that mark off  friendly and enemy territories. As shorthand, Beirutization 
and its proxy, Balkanization, are spatial renderings of complex histories of 
political confl ict and violence.
In this chapter, I explore how the war and postwar reconstruction have 
shaped the city’s built environment as well as residents’ experiences and 
interpretations of Beirut’s urban space. To explore the spatial politics of this 
confl ict, I draw considerably on scholarly work that is specifi cally focused 
on the war in Lebanon and its memory. During my research, I did not gen-
erally interview people about their experiences during the war, although 
the subject oft en came up in the context of talking about the current politi-
cal violence or their patt erns of mobility through diff erent parts of the city. 
In this sense, the war did not frame my questions, but it oft en emerged in 
people’s responses.
The Context of War
Because of its multifaceted character, it is diffi  cult to summarize the war 
as a series of precise and delimited causes, events, and results. What I will 
att empt to do here instead is to outline some of the regional and domestic 
political tensions that were developing in the years prior to the outbreak 
of armed confl ict in Beirut in 1975. By providing this brief outline of the 
complex national and regional geopolitics during this historical moment, I 
seek to displace the notions of inevitability that are oft en used in describ-
ing how and why this war happened. At times, in talking about the war in 
Lebanon with people in the United States, I have heard versions of the senti-
ment “those people have always been fi ghting with each other” aired. Th is 
idea expresses something of the conception of Arabs and Muslims as vio-
lent, driven by primordial desires, and unquestioning when it comes to their 
political allegiances. A historicized perspective of the war challenges under-
standings of political sectarian confl ict in Lebanon as both timeless and inev-
itable. Rather than a story about the timelessness of sectarian confl ict in the 
Middle East, Lebanon’s war was the outcome of a convergence of issues at a 
particular historical moment that triggered sectarian and political hostilities.
Th e 1926 constitution of the French Mandate of Lebanon declared it a 
republic rooted in individual rights and liberties and political and juridical 
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equality as well as communal rights and representation among the various 
sects.4 At the time of national independence in 1943, an unwritt en agree-
ment called the National Pact, which was considered the political corner-
stone of Lebanon, was declared. A compromise among the country’s ruling 
elites, it stipulated that Lebanon was a sovereign state, both Western and 
Arab in character.5 It divided parliamentary seats according to the relative 
population of each sect based on the outdated 1932 census fi gures (the only 
offi  cial census in Lebanon’s history), which counted Christians as 52 per-
cent of the total population and Muslims as 48 percent.6 Th e principal polit-
ical and administrative roles went to the six largest communities: Maronite, 
Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Sunni, Shi‘i, and Druze. Th e president 
and commander of the army would be Maronite, the prime minister Sunni, 
the head of the parliament Shi‘i, and the vice president of the parliament 
Greek Orthodox.
During his presidency, George W. Bush oft en cited Lebanon to legiti-
mize the U.S. invasion of Iraq. A fl ourishing democracy is possible in Iraq, 
he reasoned, because one exists elsewhere in the region of the Middle East, 
in Lebanon.7 What the National Pact reveals instead, however, is the limits 
of Lebanon’s democracy. Th e balance achieved by the pact made no provi-
sion for making adaptations to the apportionment of power in accordance 
with demographic changes but rather represented a partnership between 
the president and the prime minister that was intended to increase the par-
ticipation of Muslims in the power-sharing apparatus of the state in order 
to redress the legacies of Maronite, and generally Christian, dominance 
in the public service. It was a partnership that made no commitment to 
popular consensus and preserved “sectarian-ness” as part of the nascent 
nation’s political foundation. In time, the power-sharing framework of the 
National Pact would become vulnerable to collapse in the face of growing 
domestic tensions that were inextricably caught up with regional political 
developments.
In 1958, the National Pact was challenged by a political crisis that esca-
lated into a civil confl ict claiming an estimated two thousand to four thou-
sand lives (Picard 1996, 74). Th e confl ict emerged from various domestic 
tensions including political patrons’ dissatisfaction with the corrupt rule of 
President Camille Chamoun, popular demands for greater state-sponsored 
social services like a social security system, and, most signifi cant, the clash 
between two competing visions for Lebanon’s identity. Post–World War II 
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events in the Arab world, such as the Arab defeat in the war for Palestine 
and the founding of Israel in 1948, the rise of pan-Arab nationalism her-
alded by Nasser’s leadership in Egypt, and the military coup in Syria in 
1949, took place amid increasing U.S. intervention in the political aff airs 
of the region as part of the Cold War foreign policy to hinder Soviet infl u-
ence. Th ese developments produced increasingly stark ideological batt le 
lines in Lebanon between the conception of Lebanon as an Arab nation 
that should ally itself with the pan-Arab political movements in the region 
and the idea of Lebanon as being primarily affi  liated with Western inter-
ests. With the establishment of the United Arab Republic (1958–1961), a 
union of Syria and Nasserist Egypt, the pan-Arabists in Lebanon began to 
demand that their country join the union while the majority of Maronites 
and other Christian communities called for Lebanon to remain aligned 
with Western powers. A military coup of the pro-Western Iraqi monarch 
led President Chamoun to call for U.S. assistance in defeating the pan-Arab 
opposition. More than ten thousand U.S. Marines and Army paratroopers 
were deployed in Lebanon—famously landing on the beaches of Beirut—
and the forces in opposition to the government were suppressed. Although 
this moment of civil confl ict and foreign intervention in regulating domes-
tic tensions was brief, it was a harbinger of things to come.8
Although the 1960s are remembered as the good times, this was also 
a period during which economic inequalities intensifi ed. Th e oligarchy 
that ruled both the political and the economic systems was character-
ized by class solidarity across sectarian lines. Th e poor were also a mixed 
(sectarian) group, although the Shi‘a were the largest impoverished com-
munity and were concentrated mostly in the historically underdeveloped 
and mainly agricultural southern and eastern Bekaa Valley regions. With 
litt le to no government eff orts to redistribute wealth or protect wages and 
no national policy for agricultural subsidization, an increasing number of 
Lebanese left  their agricultural villages for Beirut in search of bett er oppor-
tunities. In other words, the blessings of this “golden era” were bestowed 
neither on all Lebanese nor on all Beirutis. Structural inequalities created 
by the country’s service-oriented economy created an underemployed 
and disaff ected urban population. Between 1967 and 1975 the cost of living 
had doubled, and, on the eve of war’s outbreak in 1975, the unemployment 
rate was 15 percent, and 5 percent of the population controlled 50 percent 
of the GNP.9 In this sense, as anthropologist Suad Joseph observes (1983), 
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the coming crisis was a form of political and economic opportunity for the 
disenfranchised and displaced inhabitants of Beirut.10
During the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and following the establishment 
of the state of Israel, nearly one hundred thousand Palestinians fl ed to 
Lebanon. Lebanon granted citizenship to thirty thousand of them, most 
of them Christians.11 Th rough the work of the United Nations Relief and 
Work Agency (UNRWA), most refugees were sett led in fi ft een camps on 
the edges of the cities of Beirut, Tripoli, Saida, and Tyre.12 Twenty years 
later, aft er the Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel and Black Septem-
ber in 1970—an armed confl ict between Palestinian militant groups and 
the Jordanian army—tens of thousands of Palestinians came to reside in 
Lebanon.13
Having been driven out of Jordan, the armed resistance group the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) established its new base in 
Beirut. In the Lebanese refugee camps, the PLO and other Palestinian 
militant groups and organizations grew in strength, visibility, and number 
and began to clash regularly with Israelis along the border. One front of the 
war, then, had been opened before 1975, for, as historian Elizabeth Picard 
observes, “between June 1968 and June 1974, the Lebanese army counted 
more than 30,000 Israeli violations of their national territory” (1996, 83).
Th e myriad weaknesses of the Lebanese army were exposed during this 
period. Small and poorly equipped, the army appeared passive in the face 
of both devastating Israeli incursions and the activities of the Palestinian 
resistance groups that threatened the nation’s security. Th e kinds of domes-
tic cleavages and debates that had persisted since national independence, 
about the positioning of Lebanon vis-à-vis the West, on the one hand, 
and pan-Arab nationalism—which now supported the Palestinian armed 
struggle—on the other, intensifi ed under these conditions. As a tiny coun-
try with a weak military, a sectarian political structure, and Syria and Israel 
as its neighbors, Lebanon appeared unable to prevent itself from being 
destabilized.
Th e specifi c event that is said to be the catalyst for the war took place 
in the southern suburbs of Beirut, an area where both Christians and 
Muslims lived. Th ere, a shootout occurred between members of the 
Lebanese Phalange (a Maronite Christian–affi  liated party), a supposedly 
Palestinian armed commando, and a bus carrying about thirty Palestinians 
who crossed the city suburbs to travel between refugee camps. While even 
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today there is no commonly agreed on version of this event and its details 
remain contested, it is clear that this event set off  a chain of fi ghting that 
evolved into the long war. Once the Lebanese army came to be dominated 
by the Phalange and fought against the Palestinian resistance fi ghters in 
early 1975, more and more Lebanese began to take either the side of the 
Phalange or that of the Palestinian resistance and to form factions of their 
own. In this way, the confl ict expanded outside of the realm of Palestinian 
versus Maronite. In her novel Sitt  Marie Rose, Adnan describes the scene 
in 1975 Beirut: “Many factions participate in the general terrorism, but 
the principal protagonists remain the Christian right and the Palestinian 
refugee-militants, that the former seems to want to eliminate entirely. Very 
rapidly the combat takes on the aspect of a civil war, and one that will last. 
Th e April air is perfumed and warmth mixes with freshness. Th e artillery 
booms. Th e local militia has even greater fi re power than the regular army” 
(1982, 12). Th e ensuing war had many phases and fronts,14 but in the 
following section, rather than provide a detailed summary of its many 
stages, I off er a sense of how the war transformed civic, spatial, and daily 
life in Beirut and its signifi cance for the city’s residents.
The Transformation of Civic, 
Spatial, and Daily Life
During the war, political parties and organizations developed into mili-
tias and Beirut’s neighborhoods became recruiting grounds. During my 
research, I met a man who told me that he had fought in the war. He looked 
to be about my age or younger, so I began doing the simple math to deter-
mine how old he might have been at that time. Sensing my thought process, 
he volunteered that he had been about thirteen when he fi rst joined the 
Communist Party’s militia.15 “I had a friend,” he said, “a guy from my neigh-
borhood; he was a few years older than me, someone I looked up to. He was 
killed, and that’s when I decided that I had to fi ght.” He added that he was 
Shi‘i, but that the Communist Party’s militia had soldiers from all diff erent 
sectarian backgrounds. His comment was a reminder that sectarian back-
ground and political affi  liation were not one and the same during the war 
or before or aft er the confl ict. In other words, to essentialize sectarian iden-
tity in Lebanon, to assume that this category wholly constitutes and defi nes 
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individuals and communities, leaves one with an incomplete and oft en 
imprecise picture of the complexity of Lebanese politics and the political 
lives of ordinary people. Th e groups and militias involved in the war were 
numerous, and some, like the Communist Party, were founded on a poli-
tics that was, in part, pan- or antisectarian. It is also important to note that 
the fi ghting was not between the communities in the country, but between 
militias and armies. Some of these groups proclaimed that they represented 
particular communities, but this assertion in no way meant that all mem-
bers of a community were in support of that militia. And, moreover, a great 
number of clashes during the war even took place between militias that 
identifi ed with the same sectarian group .
As the nation became a contested terrain, host to soldiers both domes-
tic and foreign engaged in a batt le to determine to whom Lebanon would 
belong and through which rival regional powers it would be sponsored, 
Beirut’s geography and that of the rest of the country were divided into dis-
tinct political zones. Each “canton,”16 maintained its own network of foreign 
relations and enforced the borders of its territory. Th e most infamous of 
these borders was the Green Line of Damascus Road, which began down-
town near the waterfront and extended southward dividing the city into 
two sides: a mostly Muslim west and a mostly Christian east. Lina, a uni-
versity professor in her mid-thirties, grew up during the war. Aft er graduat-
ing from college, she went to the United States to pursue a master’s degree. 
She described to me how she lived in West Beirut, but regularly crossed the 
Green Line during times of truce to play and have sleepovers with friends 
who lived in Ashrafi eh, a predominantly Christian neighborhood just on 
the eastern side of the dividing line. She recounted how the experience of 
crossing the Green Line was evoked during a graduate school orientation in 
New York City:
During the war, I would cross over [to the east] at the mathaf [National 
Museum] crossing, and, to keep out of sight of snipers, we’d walk as close as 
possible to the buildings along the street, and we’d avoid being near other peo-
ple; we’d be kind of moving along the walls of buildings. Th en, in New York, at 
the orientation for international students, the police came to talk to us about 
how we should stay away from the walls and buildings along the street when 
we were walking alone. Th ey said, “Keep away from walls, at night especially.” 
Th is was exactly the opposite of what I did during the war! And then they 
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went on about the park near the school; they said, “Don’t walk across that 
park at night, you’ll never make it out alive. You won’t reach the other side.” 
I couldn’t believe what I was hearing, and I was coming from Beirut!
As Lina describes, ordinary movement during the war required particu-
lar kinds of spatial and embodied practices in order to avoid danger in a 
territorialized city occupied by sniper positions. As militias took control 
of territories that ranged in size from sectors, which were no more than a 
block of buildings, to entire neighborhoods, the mobility of residents was 
circumscribed under their authority. Entry and exit points were patrolled 
by and subject to the will of armed militia members. Th ese checkpoints 
became deadly during some moments of the war. If individuals could not 
prove to be persons permitt ed entry or could be identifi ed—on the basis of 
the national identity card, for instance—as members of an “enemy” politi-
cal sectarian group, they might be killed. Hence, “whatever the wealth and 
diversity of their backgrounds, social status, profession, class, ideological 
or  political orientation, individuals came to be identifi ed exclusively by 
membership in a particular sectarian group” (Picard 1996, 148).
During the protracted confl ict, everyday life was subject to the episodic 
fi ghting that erupted among the militias. Dana, a young woman in her early 
twenties, recalled how the war disrupted her schooling. “For one year I didn’t 
go to lycée [French secondary school] because the violence was so bad; my 
Mom homeschooled me. School would open and close all the time. . . . 
Every night we would just watch the news to fi nd out if we were going to 
school the next day.” Once, she said, students could not leave school—on 
whose grounds tanks were parked—because nearby fi ghting had intensi-
fi ed. “We just slept over there, in the sports stadium. . . . It’s weird to say it 
now, but we were kids; . . . we thought it was fun. Aft er the war was over, 
near the gymnasium, my friends and I found a whole room stored with 
Kalashnikovs.” Militias had used the school to store weapons, she said.
Both the public and private built environments were shaped by daily 
fi ghting in Beirut and acquired new geopolitical meanings. Exterior walls 
of buildings became the protective cover for residents trying to stay out of 
the line of sight of snipers, and inside these buildings metal vault-like secu-
rity doors were affi  xed over the doorways to the apartments. During the 
war’s worst phases, life became entirely insular, as residents left  the streets 
for the safety of the interior. On nights of bombing, families would sleep in 
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their hallways to avoid proximity to windows. Or, they would join the other 
residents in the building for a night in the basement, which would serve as a 
bomb shelter. Th e war had a distinctive provincializing eff ect on social rela-
tions as it not only drove residents inside and limited the possibilities for 
civic life but also broke down trust and associations between people from 
diff erent political and sectarian groups.
Th e war continued from 1975 until 1990. Th ere were moments during 
which fi ghting would stop, and ordinary life would return—a school term 
without interruptions, for instance. And then this normality would be cut off  
again. Sustaining oneself through these many years of violence, the intervals 
of war and not-quite peace, an existence rife with unease and trepidation, 
required endurance and resolve. Th e stopping and starting of the hostilities 
necessitated just that, the ability to stop and then start again, the strength 
to rebuild, reopen, to reinforce optimism in the face of devastation. People 
who had the means to leave the country did, and wartime exiles fl owed from 
Lebanon. Th ere were those who had the kind of connections that furnished 
visas to the United States, Canada, Europe, and Australia, and there were 
others who left  for African nations or the Arab Gulf. In some cases, men set 
up their families near relatives or other Lebanese in these locales and then 
returned themselves to Lebanon to keep businesses and shops going in spite 
of the war. Some of the wartime exiles returned to Lebanon later, in the 
1990s and aft erward, while others remained sett led in their new countries.
Along with the Syrian incursion and engagement in the war that began 
in 1976, there was signifi cant foreign participation in and contribution to 
the confl ict. Th e Israeli invasion of 1982, and the massacres of thousands of 
Palestinians committ ed under their army’s direction at Sabra and Shatila in 
southern Beirut in the same year, marked an exceptionally horrendous and 
horrifi c moment in the war. Th e Israeli occupation especially transformed 
the lives of Lebanese in the south. Many stayed, many resisted, and many 
left  to sett le in Beirut’s southern suburbs. Moreover, the Israeli occupa-
tion, which lasted until 2000, ten years aft er the end of the war in Lebanon, 
brought increased support to Hizbullah and the organization’s politics of 
resistance against Israel.
One of the militias that emerged during the war, Hizbullah, a Shi‘i resis-
tance movement with transnational links to Iran, was formed in the wake 
of the Israeli invasion and arrival of the U.S. military in 1982. Founded to 
defend Lebanon against the incursion of foreign occupiers, the group 
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gained adherents and fi ghters from the largely Shi‘i south and, later, from 
the southern suburbs of Beirut. And “while most militias either gave up 
their weapons or hid them in basements and village storage sheds and then 
transformed or retransformed themselves into political parties at the end 
of the war, Hizbullah maintained its weapons, with the blessings of most 
Lebanese, in order to fi ght the ongoing Israeli occupation in the South” 
(Deeb and Harb 2013, 39).17 Lebanon’s long war thus marked merely the 
group’s fi rst iteration, as it has become, in recent years, arguably Lebanon’s 
most powerful political group, a power increasingly measured in parliamen-
tary seats—the group became a formal political party in 1992—but also in 
popular support both from and also beyond the nation’s Shi‘i community, 
in growing institutional and charitable activities in areas such as media, in 
social welfare services, and in urban development, as well as in military 
might and acuity, as demonstrated in the summer 2006 war with Israel.
According to the most reliable statistics, around ninety thousand people 
lost their lives during the war, with tens of thousands kidnapped or disap-
peared and assumed dead, nearly one hundred thousand badly injured, 
and close to a million people, or two-thirds of the Lebanese population, 
displaced.18 But fi gures like these are cold and abstract and in fact do litt le 
to convey the injuries, devastation, and suff ering of war. I had interviewed 
May, a woman in her fi ft ies, several times before she raised the topic of the 
war. When talking about how she keeps in touch with her adult daughter in 
Europe mainly by e-mail, she added, “I don’t like talking that way, by e-mail, 
because I can’t sit in front of a computer screen for very long. I don’t know 
why, it must be from the war, but I can’t concentrate for long anymore. . . . 
I get anxious.” Th is is just one example of how the suff ering and violence of 
war endure in people’s bodies and souls long aft er the fi ghting has ceased. 
As the central theater of the war, Beirut was physically devastated aft er 
 fi ft een years of confl ict, and the city’s postwar recovery has been an uneven 
project of physical as well as national reconstruction.
“They Have Rebuilt the Stones, 
but They Have Not Rebuilt the People”
Aft er the Lebanese experienced one of the most deadly phases of the war 
in the late 1980s, an Arab League initiative, backed by the United States, 
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brokered a ceasefi re in Lebanon and organized a meeting of the Lebanese 
parliamentarians in the city of Ta’if in Saudi Arabia. Aft er a month of delib-
erations, they agreed upon a Document of National Understanding known 
as the Ta’if Accord.19 Th e accord reproduced the sectarian system but 
changed the distribution of parliamentary seats, which had been divided 
on a 6-to-5 ratio of Christians to Muslims since 1943, by establishing par-
ity between the two groups and further subdividing among sects based 
on their estimated population size.20 Sectarian quotas were abolished in 
civil service posts, the judiciary, the army, and the police, with the excep-
tion of the general directors of ministries, where parity and rotation were 
to be applied so that these positions would not be reserved to a fi xed sect 
(Traboulsi 2007, 244). Essentially, the war’s end brought the restoration of 
civil order, the reestablishment of a central government, and the disarm-
ing and disbanding of militias, but militia members were in fact absorbed 
into the army and police force and the sectarian framework of the political 
structure was preserved.
Unlike other postconfl ict nations, Lebanon did not undergo any kind 
of offi  cially sanctioned truth and reconciliation process;21 as an alternative, 
the government issued in March 1991 a general amnesty for war crimes that 
was intended to move the nation forward and away from the war. More-
over, because so many of the leading postwar political fi gures both within 
and outside of government were active protagonists and participants in the 
war,22 they had litt le interest in launching an inquiry into the nation’s violent 
past, and none have accepted personal responsibility for any suff ering or 
misdeeds. Th is offi  cial politics of forgett ing is also demonstrated by school 
history textbooks that stop narrating the nation’s history in 1946, with the 
withdrawal of the last French troops.23 In short, a telling of Lebanon’s war, 
at least in any offi  cial capacity, has not yet taken place.
Although some Lebanese emphasize the need for collective forgetful-
ness by stressing that delving into the past drains the energy and resources 
necessary for building a new civic order,24 others, like cultural and literary 
critic Saree Makdisi, argue that the “general reluctance to engage system-
atically with the war and embark on a collective historical project to digest 
and process its memories and images is partly a matt er of public policy and 
partly a matt er of a widespread popular will to deny” (2006, 204). However, 
by arguing that an absence of what he calls “memory culture” at the state 
level does not tell the full story of how Lebanese have engaged in the work 
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of remembering the long war, Sune Haugbolle (2010) provides a critique of 
this notion of collective amnesia. His research highlights instead the ways 
in which Lebanese “memory makers”—artists, intellectuals, architects, and 
the like—have worked against the state-level processes of amnesia about 
the war through their cultural production.25
At a more everyday level, the phrase “they’ve rebuilt the stones but 
they have not rebuilt the people,”26 which several of my respondents used, 
registers a popularly held sentiment about the power holders’ att ention 
to rebuilding infrastructure and reviving the economy rather than to the 
postwar project of social repair; that is, Beirutis understand well that the 
charged social and political landscape of the present refl ects the damage 
done by a recent and volatile past, in which war was waged not only by for-
eign armies but also by “intimate enemies” (Th eidon 2013, xiii): neighbors, 
co-workers, and friends. As the saying about the stones suggests, a social 
recovery involving a collective—and state-sponsored—reckoning with the 
war’s past among these intimate enemies has yet to occur.
“Why Live with Ghosts?”
For ten years aft er the war’s end, the physical presence of Syrian army 
troops, not withdrawn from Beirut and its surrounding areas to the east-
ern Bekaa Valley region along the Syrian border until 2000 (and later from 
Lebanon entirely in 2005), was a reminder of the enduring Syrian infl uence 
over Lebanon.27
On a bright and cool early spring morning in 2006, I walked with Hania, 
a mother of two in her early forties, uphill along the Corniche seaside board-
walk in Raouché. Off  to the side of the walkway was an empty patch of over-
grown grassy land where a family with young children was picking yellow 
wildfl owers. In this high-rent part of the city, known for its upscale apart-
ment buildings, luxury hotels, and cliff -side cafes, it was unusual to see an 
undeveloped no-man’s land. In contrast to the idyllic scene of children frol-
icking in the wildfl owers was rusted barbed wire around the area’s perim-
eter and a wooden guard booth. Hania told me that that the area had been a 
Syrian army position. “It’s strange seeing this place empty,” she said; “for so 
long I had gott en used to seeing a Syrian soldier here.” We talked about how 
much had changed in just one year’s time, with the full withdrawal of the 
48 chapter  2
Syrian army from Lebanon in 2005 aft er nearly thirty years, and she com-
mented that “Hariri’s assassination changed everything; they [the Syrians] 
would have been here for another thirty years. . . . But now they really need 
to do something with this land right here; they need to change things now 
that the Syrians are gone.” Aft er a pause, she added, “Why live with ghosts?”
Across the physical landscape of this wounded city, ghosts of Lebanon’s 
war do indeed remain. Buildings with bullet and shell holes are a part of 
the everyday geography, especially in neighborhoods near the Green Line, 
where fi ghting was most intense. A badly damaged and hollowed out 
Holiday Inn that was used as a staging ground for fi erce batt les during the 
fi rst years of the war still sits just behind, and in juxtaposition with, the 
fi ve-star luxury Phoenicia Hotel, which overlooks the Mediterranean. In 
diff erent parts of the city, plaques, banners, and images commemorate the 
“martyrdom” of fi ghters and political leaders who were killed during the 
war.28 In this way, making one’s way through Beirut constitutes an encoun-
ter with physical reminders of the war. Th ese traces of the war confi gure the 
city’s space both for those who lived through it—just as the seaside area 
with the empty guardhouse and fl owers triggered memories for Hania of 
the Syrian occupation in the city—and for the youth generation who have 
no fi rsthand memories of the war but nonetheless live in a society where 
memory of the war shapes both the present and ideas about possibilities 
for the future.29 And, in downtown Beirut, traces of the war were removed 
to make way for a multibillion-dollar reconstruction project—which would 
become one of the largest urban-development projects in the world—that 
articulated a particular vision of the city.
In the wake of the war’s destruction and disorder, Hariri, a billionaire 
businessman who made his fortune in the Saudi construction industry, 
seized the opportunity to redevelop and reimagine the city’s center. As 
prime minister from 1992 to 1998 and again from 2000 to 2004, Hariri imag-
ined that Beirut could become a “Hong Kong of the Mediterranean”—a 
fi nancial and service center that would rival the emerging Gulf cities of 
Dubai, Doha, and Abu Dhabi. He charted Beirut’s postwar recovery along a 
path of urbanism characterized by the privatization of government services, 
real estate development, and the enhancement of high-end tourism zones, 
all in the name of att racting fl ows of capital.
Situated along the Green Line, which split the city into rival sides, the 
downtown area was a strategic terrain for militias and, as a stage for the 
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worst of the violence, was signifi cantly damaged during the war.30 In 1977, 
during a lull in fi ghting, the fi rst offi  cial plan for what to do with downtown 
was commissioned by a newly established government agency, the Council 
for Development and Reconstruction (CDR). Th e plan was to rebuild the 
city center along the lines of its prewar layout and to restore its centrality in 
the life of Beirut in part by ensuring that it retained its prewar character.31 
But the war soon resumed, and later, in 1983, OGER Liban, a private engi-
neering fi rm owned by Hariri, took over from CDR the project to rebuild 
downtown and commissioned the development of a master plan. Later that 
year, and again in 1986, unauthorized demolition destroyed some of the 
area’s most signifi cant surviving buildings and structures as well as several 
souks (traditional outdoor marketplaces with stalls) and large sections of a 
residential quarter.32
In 1991, the plan for the development of downtown commissioned by 
Hariri and his fi rm OGER was made public. It called for the nearly total 
demolition of existing structures in the city center, required the creation of an 
island off shore near the port, and made few provisions for property owners 
and tenants.33 In 1992, amid parliamentary elections, a series of laws was passed 
enabling the creation of Solidere, a joint-stock company of which Hariri was 
the principal shareholder. With the establishment of Solidere, the expropria-
tion of tenants and owners, and the widespread demolition of old buildings, 
Hariri’s reconstruction plan became “irreversible” (Schmid 2002, 245).
Although its inaugural marketing slogan was “Beirut: An Ancient City 
for the Future,”34 Solidere in fact revived the French colonial era in the city 
center. Reconstruction began in what the company refers to on its website 
as the “historic core,” which I described in chapter 1: the star-shaped area 
of Place de l’Etoile and its radiating streets, which had been developed dur-
ing the mandate period. Th e buildings’ sandy brown stone reveals tones 
of orange and pink when the sun hits at certain moments of the day and 
contrasts with the fl at gray that clothes much of the city. Traditional stone 
arches lead to cobblestone streets, most of which are closed to vehicular 
traffi  c. Carvings adorn the buildings and dark wood-slatt ed shutt ers and 
balconies frame the windows on the fl oors up from the ground level. Th e 
area is dominated by retail, much of it off ering global and luxury brands 
priced out of reach for the ordinary Lebanese. Outdoor seating and the 
pedestrian-dedicated corridors make the area a popular destination for 
 seeing and being seen as well as for families with small children, who pedal 
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around on toddler bikes. In my meeting with Angus Gavin, director of 
Solidere’s Urban Development Division, and other Solidere offi  cials in 
spring 2005, they noted that this outdoor use of space distinguished Beirut 
from its “competitors.” “Th e climate in the Arab Gulf,” Gavin said, “does not 
allow for this kind of urban public space.”
In fact, it was precisely this type of public space, which feels and looks 
essentially like a high-end shopping mall, that drew the ire and criticism 
of so many of Beirut’s residents, intellectuals, architects, and artists; they 
denounced the private takeover of public space as well as the development of 
an exclusionary city center that reduced individual rights to the city to prac-
tices of consumerism and corporate citizenship, as evinced by Solidere’s early 
marketing slogan: “Buy a share in the reconstruction of your city” (Yahya 
2007, 247). Many Beirutis I knew shared the sentiments of Lamia, a gradu-
ate student, who expressed a sense of loss about downtown’s reconstruction: 
“Downtown doesn’t have a Lebanese spirit—look at it. Th ink about what 
was there before. It doesn’t seem like a Lebanese place at all. It seems like 
something from France. It’s only a place for tourists; it’s not for us. It’s for the 
Saudis, and the Hariri-types, the VIPs; you can’t aff ord anything there. . . . 
Th ere were souks there before, real souks, not like what’s there now.”
Indeed, as Lamia’s comment highlights, much of the popular and schol-
arly discourse and debate about the Solidere project has focused on its era-
sure of the past and the ways in which the company’s destruction of the 
downtown built environment was also a destruction of the city’s social fab-
ric and memory.35 Sociologist Nabil Beyhum, for example, has observed, 
“What the fi ghting had not managed to destroy of the urban memory 
and the national heritage, the bulldozers of those reconstructing the city 
destroyed far more radically” (1992, 52). Critiques of the Solidere project 
emphasize how the war’s urbicidal dimensions—that is, its dismantling of 
Beirut’s heterogeneity into antagonistic enclaves constituted by political, 
sectarian, and ideological diff erence—were but a fi rst stage of the city’s 
undoing.36 As Aseel Sawalha argues, not only did the postwar reconstruc-
tion of the city’s downtown bring about considerable destruction, but its 
top-down planning produced socioeconomic ruptures that dislocated the 
war’s displaced one more time, forcing them to create new squatt er areas on 
the outskirts of the city (2010, 132).
Th e Solidere phenomenon of cultivating a sanitized, uncontroversial 
branding of the city that avoids references to histories of confl ict can be 
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seen in other postconfl ict cities. In these sites, urban-development projects 
have not only played a crucial role in plans for economic revitalization and 
att racting tourists and media att ention from around the world but have also 
been instrumental in eff orts to remake the image of cities long associated 
with violence and war. In Bosnia, for example, the formation of a new post-
war multicultural Bosnian identity has been engendered through the recon-
struction of the Ott oman-era Mostar Bridge—also situated along a Green 
Line that divided the city along religious and ethnic lines. In Belfast, which 
scholars call a once and still divided city, upmarket bars, boutiques, sport-
ing venues, and must-see att ractions like the shipyard that built the Titanic 
have been developed to paper over enduring problems of social exclusion 
and sectarian segregation.37 In hopes of corralling tourists in “new” parts of 
the city—exemplifi ed by the “Beirut Is Back” tag line so popular in travel 
writing following the war—that bear few reminders of past violence, devel-
opers and planners in postconfl ict cities aim to signify urban and national 
recovery and to market their cities as residential, tourist, and investment 
destinations.
For Hariri and Solidere, the “geographical axis of competition that pits 
cities against cities in the global economy” (Smith 2002, 447) meant that 
postwar downtown Beirut would take on a particularly Dubai-like charac-
ter. Th is objective—to achieve a kind of Mediterranean Dubai—was both a 
refl ection of Dubai’s rise to prominence as a tourist and business hub during 
the decades of Lebanon’s war and an outcome of the signifi cant increase in 
tourism to Lebanon by Gulf Arabs, whose travel to the United States and 
Europe declined aft er 9/11 because of the inaccessibility of visas and con-
cerns about discrimination and hostility.38 Th is vision of Beirut as Dubai in 
the postwar era left  many Beirutis cold however. For instance, during our 
conversation in spring 2006, architect Rahif Fayad commented that “we’re 
not Dubai, we’re not those other cities. We have an urban history, we have 
urban traditions; . . . this same thinking can’t apply, it shouldn’t be applied. 
We have a deep history as a city; we’re not a new city, and we’re not a 
Bedouin one.” For Fayad, the notion that Beirut could be treated as a tabula 
rasa and modeled aft er Gulf cities in the postwar moment was less a vision for 
the future, as Hariri and his corporation advocated, than a violation of the past.
While many of Solidere’s critics decried the erasure of the city’s history 
of confl ict, the continuing and deep divides in the Lebanese political land-
scape in fact came to confi gure the space in early 2005. Killed in a car bomb 
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assassination in front of the seaside Phoenicia Hotel on February 14, 2005, 
Hariri was buried downtown across from a vacant area known as Martyrs’ 
Square, where a statue that commemorates the nationalists hanged by the 
Ott oman Turks in the early twentieth century is situated. From the time of 
his funeral and for months aft erward, a line of people wanting to visit his 
burial site extended out into the street, and Martyrs’ Square became a tent 
city for demonstrators with signs demanding al-haqeeqa (the truth) about 
the identity of Hariri’s assassin.39
As the tenor of politics grew increasingly tense in the wake of Hariri’s 
assassination, tens of thousands of pro-Syrian, pro-Hizbullah protes-
tors gathered in another part of downtown named for the statue of Riad 
al-Solh, Lebanon’s fi rst prime minister aft er independence. In a speech 
there, Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah thanked Syria for its support of 
the resistance against Israeli occupation. Six days later, on March 14, 2005, 
an estimated million people assembled at Martyrs’ Square and called 
for the Syrian army’s withdrawal from Lebanon. On these days, the 
nation’s two most powerful political unions of the post- Hariri era—the 
Figure 2.1. Tent City: Downtown protestors demand the truth about who killed Hariri 
and independence from Syrian control, spring 2005. (Photo by author.)
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March 8th coalition and the March 14th alliance—were born. As the spring 
continued, the media-termed and heavily youth-based Cedar Revolution, 
which supported the politics of the March 14th alliance, seized the area 
around Martyrs’ Square as its own: banners, graffi  ti, and fl ags adorned the 
area around the tents. Journalists from around the world descended, and 
fi lmmakers took footage for documentaries. Downtown, in this moment, 
did not remind anyone of Dubai. Rather, it was a space imbued with 
Lebanon’s enduring political polarization, a site on which Hariri had once 
cast his vision for the postwar city but on which he was now laid to rest.
Not Yet Peace
During the war, our eyes were always fi xed on what we were sure would be 
the halcyon days of the future aft er it ended. Let the war end, we thought, and 
all would be well. We would emerge from the abyss into the light. Historical 
quarrels and divisions would mutate into a harmonious and productive unity 
based on justice. In this vision of the future, I think, we felt somehow that the 
best of the past would be preserved, the worst purged by our travails. We had 
paid a heavy price for the evils of the past, and we deserved a bett er world. But 
the future is now, and it is a hard reality, shorn of these illusions. Th ere was to 
be no reward, aft er all, for the suff ering. (Makdisi 1999, 257)
Writt en by Jean Makdisi in 1999 in the aft erword to her memoir about 
Lebanon’s war, these words also capture the sentiments of most people 
I knew during my research in Beirut. Although the war may have ended, not 
only did its eff ects endure, but other wars also began. Beginning in 2005, 
amid the emergence of the two competing political camps—the March 
14th and the March 8th coalitions—near monthly car bombs exploded in 
Beirut that killed or att empted to kill political fi gures and journalists. During 
summer 2006, in response to Hizbullah’s capture of two Israeli soldiers 
along the border, Israel engaged in a full-scale military assault that aff ected 
the whole country but mainly killed civilians and destroyed infrastructure 
in Shi‘i-majority areas: the southern parts of the country, the eastern Bekaa 
Valley, and the southern suburbs of Beirut. In addition to the more than 
nine hundred killed, thousands were wounded, and nearly one million were 
displaced from their homes—one quarter of the country’s population.40 
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Entire villages in South Lebanon were fl att ened during the att ack as were 
whole neighborhoods in south Beirut. Unexploded ordnances from the 
war continue to threaten the population.41
Th e rancor between the country’s two main political groups increased 
during 2005, worsened aft er the summer 2006 war, and developed into an 
economic and political deadlock in 2007. Contention surrounding who 
would succeed Emile Lahoud as president deepened the rift , and in May 
2008 civil war threatened when street batt les and the seizure of several 
West Beirut neighborhoods by Hizbullah fi ghters ensued aft er a standoff  
between Hizbullah and leaders of the March 14th coalition. Th e fi ghting 
ended only aft er a deal was reached between Hizbullah and government 
offi  cials. Since the intensifi cation of the Syrian confl ict in late 2011, escalat-
ing political tensions, a humanitarian crisis created by the arrival of nearly 
one million Syrian refugees, and armed confrontations in various parts 
of the country, Lebanon is once again being described as “pushed to the 
brink” (Mudallali 2013).
Given this context, applying the periodization of “postwar” to contem-
porary Lebanon must be called into question. Like Belfast and  Bosnia, 
political, spatial, and social divisions induced by past civil confl ict are 
 relevant aspects of urban life in the present. But, unlike these other cities, 
Beirut is shaped not just by a past war but also by ongoing armed confl icts 
fueled and sustained by transnational networks that extend beyond the 
nation and region. I thus share anthropologist Isaias Rojas-Pérez’s con-
cern about the usefulness of postconfl ict as a category for the analysis of 
societies that have experienced confl ict. “Before” and “aft er” scenarios, he 
observes, can obscure the specifi c ways in which violence repeats itself 
(2008, 255). In this regard, it is important to consider how conditions of 
war both past and present shape everyday life in the contemporary space 
and society Beirut.42 Th e shelled Holiday Inn that housed militias during 
Lebanon’s war, for instance, sits just down the street from where a car bomb 
that exploded in front of a downtown offi  ce building killed several people, 
including former Finance Minister Mohammad Shatah, and injured scores 
of others in December 2013. Sites of political violence from various periods 
of history—from decades ago to very recently—commingle in the city’s 
urban environment.
Political violence has been one of the key power geometries, along with 
modes of privatization, shaping the city’s space in the modern era: spatial 
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organization, access, and mobility have not only refl ected confl ict among 
political groups but have also been tools used by political groups to gain 
and expand power.
In the next chapter, I explore how residents move through and under-
stand this precarious urban space, oft en with hopes for a diff erent and 
peaceful future not yet realized.
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3 • POLITICS AND 
PUBLIC SPACE
“Th e Green Line, you know, it still exists in people’s minds.” 
When Mounir, a recent university graduate, spoke about the Green Line, 
which divided Beirut into a predominantly Muslim West and mainly 
Christian East during the long war (1975–1990), he drew att ention to the 
fact that the spatial repercussions of the war, now more than twenty years 
in the past, endure. Th e confl ict played out in public space and created a 
polarized city in which neighborhoods that were identifi ed with particular 
sectarian groups carried assumed affi  liation with certain political parties 
and ideologies. In this chapter, I explore how, in the 2004–2006 period of 
renewed political confl ict and violence, ideas about and practices of mobil-
ity were shaped by—and also shaped—this fractious political geography. 
Here, I aim to present a picture of what residents’ uses of the city can tell us 
about the workings of political sectarianism in the city.1
Like other divided cities, Beirut’s spatial polarization has been con-
nected with issues concerning the very legitimacy of political structures 
and the struggle over access to governance and state institutions.2 In one 
sense, this characterization aptly describes the events of the 2004–2006 
period, when struggles between the two main political camps, the U.S.-
backed anti-Syrian March 14th alliance and the Iranian-backed pro-Syrian 
March 8th coalition, involved competition for power and infl uence both 
within and outside the government by, for instance, gaining seats in parlia-
ment and expanding social-welfare institutions.3
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At the same time, this understanding of the city’s space as being polar-
ized in connection with issues of control over and access to the formal 
political system does not adequately capture the ideological tenor of every-
day geographies in Beirut. For example, in the days following the March 
8, 2005, assemblage at Riad al-Solh (a square in downtown Beirut) of an 
estimated half a million people who gathered to support Hizbullah and the 
pro-Syrian stance, women at the small fi tness center I patronized urged me 
to join them for the counter-protest on March 14th. Th e counter-protest 
was to take place in another downtown site, Martyrs’ Square, where anti-
Syrian protestors demanding al-haqeeqa (the truth) about who killed Rafi q 
Hariri had set up encampments. Assuming that I was politically aligned 
with the U.S.-supported March 14th group, Karine, one of the owners of 
the gym, was resolute in her appeal: “You have to come,” she said. “We all 
have to go down there and show them [Hizbullah and its supporters] that 
they are not Lebanon; we are Lebanon.” In the weeks, months, and years 
following the two March 2005 protests, this us-versus-them sentiment of 
rival political ideologies came to prevail over the space of downtown so 
much that by 2007, as Ward Vloeberghs describes, “one literally had to 
‘choose sides’ in order to access the restaurants and retail in the city center; 
either entering through an area of tents installed by March 8th supporters 
or by passing by Hariri’s burial site adjacent to Martyrs’ Square and thus 
paying respects to the March 14th camp” (2012, 160). In this way, while 
political polarization is not a phenomenon unique to the space of Beirut, 
the ways in which politico-ideological issues spill over into space and are 
set off  by domestic and regional geopolitical events gives everyday use of 
the city particular meaning.
I begin the chapter by outlining some of the spatial dimensions of 
political sectarianism in the city and then focus on one specifi c historical 
moment, that of the period of protest in early 2005 throughout the Arab 
world against the Danish newspaper cartoon depicting the Muslim prophet 
Mohammad, to illustrate how events can trigger violent responses that 
abruptly transform urban spaces and create dividing lines between them. 
Next, I draw on my research with young people whom I defi ne as socioeco-
nomically “privileged”4 because of their educational backgrounds and lev-
els of disposable income to show that although leisure pursuits in particular 
can encourage mobility to diff erent parts of the city, sociospatial boundar-
ies that constrain this mobility can also be reinforced during moments of 
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heightened political tension. Conceiving of these young people as social 
agents and competent urban actors in their own right, I consider what 
their movement in the city reveals about the spatial aspects of social class 
and political sectarianism. To begin, however, it is important to present a 
 picture of the appearance of politics and sect in the city’s public space.
Political Sectarianism and 
Boundaries in Urban Space
Although few neighborhoods in Beirut are entirely homogenous in the 
sectarian affi  liation of their residents and very few areas are completely 
mixed, expressions of these affi  liations are a part of the visual and acous-
tic fabric of the city.5 For instance, while walking through neighborhoods 
near my apartment when the Islamic calendar reached its fi nal month 
(dhou al-hija), I would see colored streamers draped across verandas 
in celebration of those who have returned from the pilgrimage (haj) to 
Mecca, one of the pillars of Islam; I came across glass-encased boxes along 
streets in parts of the majority-Christian areas of eastern Beirut that held 
Virgin Mary fi gurines; throughout the city, the sounds of ringing bells and 
calls to prayer emanated from churches and mosques. Once, while in the 
mainly Shi‘i Dahiya, I walked past a Husseiniya, a gathering place and site 
of the commemoration of Imam Hussein’s martyrdom that is erected dur-
ing Ashura, the Islamic month during which Shi‘a mourn the martyrdom 
of Hussein in the seventh century. Expressions of sectarian and religious 
affi  liation also take sartorial forms that are publicly visible, from necklaces 
with dangling crosses to the diverse range of Islamic head coverings and 
outer garments worn by both men and women. Th ese kinds of sights, 
sounds, and symbols do not necessarily function as borders keeping 
people out or as gates keeping people in, but they can and do territorially 
express sectarian belonging.
As I described in the fi rst two chapters, politics and sect come together 
in Lebanon as religious sect has historically served as the basis for politi-
cal identity and representation. Sectarian affi  liation is no longer indicated 
on national identity cards, and, since 2009, it is not required on civil reg-
istry records, but the sectarian dimensions of the power-sharing political 
and electoral structure have remained unchanged since the signing of the 
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Syrian-Saudi-sponsored Ta’if Accord, which ended the protracted war in 
1990.6 State institutions continue to be under the helm of individuals with 
links to elite families from the diff erent sectarian communities, and the 
state’s allocation of welfare resources, rather than being distributed on the 
basis of need, is tied to both the sectarian distribution in the country and to 
the rewarding of political activism that emerges from sectarian-based politi-
cal groups.7 In short, sectarian identity remains salient in matt ers of politics, 
civic life, and even livelihood, as connections to and building networks (in 
Arabic, wasta) with one’s sectarian community and its associated elite fami-
lies continue to enhance individuals’ access to social services and provide 
avenues for socioeconomic mobility.
Expressions of sectarian identity in Beirut’s built environment can also 
be politicized. In 2004, during a conversation about the ongoing downtown 
reconstruction with Howayda al-Harithy, a professor of architecture and 
urban planning at the American University of Beirut,8 she drew my att en-
tion to what, in her understanding, was a sectarian dimension of the area’s 
built environment. Speaking about the building of the Mohammad al-Amin 
mosque in the downtown area, a blue-domed behemoth of a building, she 
thought about the mosque as a public demonstration of Sunni identity, the 
sectarian affi  liation of its developer and fi nancer, former prime minister 
Hariri. “Building it in such an Ott oman style, there are no other mosques 
that look that way in Beirut, . . . and the Ott omans represent the height 
of Sunni power in the Middle East. Th at is the connection that comes 
to my mind.”9
As founder and part owner of Solidere, the company at the head of the 
downtown area’s postwar redevelopment, Hariri, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
intended the mosque not only to proclaim his role as the za‘im (commu-
nal leader) of the Sunni community but also as a tribute to Sunni heritage 
in the region. For Sawsan, a university student, the mosque was overbear-
ing not only because, as she put it, “it takes up so much of downtown” but 
also because it was understood as a political claim to space cast in religious 
terms: “I don’t think this,” she said, “but I do know people who are annoyed 
by it [the al-Amin mosque]; they drive by it and say, ‘Th ey just put that here 
to show that it’s a Muslim country.’” In this sense, while Solidere was active 
in eff orts to recover the downtown area’s many religious landmarks, both 
Muslim and Christian, in the wake of the long war—in 2006, for instance, 
seventeen religious structures were being restored or reconstructed in the 
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area10—the expanse of the al-Amin mosque along with Hariri’s identi-
fi cation with it and his steering of downtown’s development were under-
stood by some as a political sectarian assertion. Just as Lucia Volk (2010) 
describes in her examination of Lebanese public memorials and monu-
ments, the built and spatial environments are important venues through 
which elites in Lebanon lay claim to the space not only of Beirut but also of 
the nation as a whole.
Iconography also mobilizes political sectarianism in the spatial realm 
as portraits and photographs of political leaders visually inscribe relations 
of kinlike loyalty between members of a sectarian community and their 
“custodian.”11 As a common phenomenon in the symbolic practices of 
Middle Eastern politics,12 these images, fastened to building walls, affi  xed 
to posts, and hanging across streets, “amplify the leader into a mythical 
hero by idealizing him as the protector of his community and its sectar-
ian interests” (Maasri 2009, 57). Alongside the cult of personality created 
by these images, other types of visual displays—fl ags, murals, graffi  ti, and 
banners—mark out political turf and territorialize neighborhoods as 
belonging to particular political parties.
In Beirut, sometimes it is not even the symbols or slogans on the fl ags 
and banners that express political affi  liation, but their colors, for the most 
powerful political parties carry associations with one or more colors. 
During spring 2005, for example, amid the protests following Hariri’s assas-
sination, it was common to see people with light blue ribbons pinned to 
their shirts in the style of the red AIDS awareness ribbon. Th e light blue 
color signifi ed support for Hariri’s Future Movement political party, the 
leading member of the March 14th coalition. Th roughout the city’s public 
spaces and along highways and roads in other regions of the country, these 
colors signify the various political teams and the leaders to whom their sup-
porters profess allegiance. In the U.S. tradition of baseball trading cards, 
the marketing potential of these associations was seized on by the Safi na 
Group, which began selling, in June 2007, “Parties and Colors” collectible 
sticker albums and stickers depicting the leaders and fl ags of the Lebanese 
political parties.
In the predominantly Shi‘i southern suburbs of Beirut, the yellow and 
green fl ags of Hizbullah adorn the streets, as an Islamist militant politics 
of resistance to Israeli claims and Western intervention in the Middle East 
prevails over the landscape. Dahiya, as the area is known (literally, “the 
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Figure 3.1. Lebanese “Parties and Colors” albums and stickers. (From www.safi nagroup
.com, captured 1/11/08 by author.)
suburb” in Arabic), is an assemblage of multiple municipalities and neigh-
borhoods.13 In the early twentieth century, the land where it is situated was 
rural, but by 1970 (Deeb 2006, 47) it had become part of Greater Beirut, 
mainly because of the wave of rural-to-urban migration in the 1950s and 
1960s, which I describe in chapter 1. During the years of Lebanon’s war, 
Shi‘i refugees from the northeastern suburbs, the south, and the Bekaa 
Valley arrived in the area, and these consecutive waves of migration altered 
the sectarian makeup of the southern suburbs from being a mix of Shi‘i 
Muslims and Maronite Christians to being predominantly Shi‘i. Although, 
in many ways, the neighborhoods in Dahiya are unexceptional, resembling 
other neighborhoods in Beirut, especially working-class ones, the area is 
set apart by its population density and the morphology of the built envi-
ronment.14 Although, as Mona Harb writes, Dahiya is just another Beirut 
neighborhood managed “by a sect-based political actor,” by reserving for 
itself the right of armed resistance to Israel—a claim some Lebanese see as 
a threat to the legitimacy of the state—the group constitutes the southern 
suburbs as a realm distinct not only from other parts of Beirut but from the 
rest of Lebanon (Harb 2007, 13).
In her ethnography about expressions and understandings of piety 
among the Shi‘a living in Dahiya, Lara Deeb describes the area’s public 
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space as a “mix of politics and piety with temporal, visual, and aural textures 
that contribute to a collective sense of community” (2006, 48). Dahiya is 
marked as a pious space by commemorative images associated with the 
Islamic resistance, such as martyrdom posters of fallen soldiers (which 
also appear in other neighborhoods) and other spatial forms of sacraliza-
tion such as banners and fl ags that mark the cycle of the Islamic calendar, 
residents’ clothing and conduct, as well as leisure and entertainment ven-
ues that adhere to Islamic notions of respectability.15 Hizbullah also eff ec-
tively maintains its own security forces in Dahiya, and foreign researchers I 
knew had been stopped and questioned by members of these forces about 
their reasons for coming into the area during the tense 2004–2006 period. 
However, in other neighborhoods, too, there are visible forms of extrastate 
security whereby local residents (mostly male) appoint themselves protec-
tors of their politically sectarian neighborhood, reconstructed generally as 
a sectarian territory, and question those perceived to be outsiders about 
their reason for being in the neighborhood.16
Friends and acquaintances of mine who were politically aligned with the 
March 14th coalition, which opposed Hizbullah, were oft en surprised and 
sometimes concerned when they learned that, at one point during my fi eld-
work, I was regularly going to meet with a research participant who lived 
in Dahiya. In the contentious 2004–2006 political atmosphere, which drew 
sharp lines of enmity between supporters of the March 8th (Hizbullah and 
allies) and the March 14th groups, Dahiya, because of its identifi cation with 
Hizbullah, represented a defi nitively adversarial territory for the March 
14th coalition. In this way, I found that among people I knew avoidance of 
Dahiya and even negative associations with the area had mainly to do with 
their own political positioning. But Lebanese are reluctant to go to Dahiya 
for other reasons. Service taxi drivers would oft en refuse me as a passenger 
when I was headed there or ask for me to pay a double or triple fare because 
of its traffi  c congestion. Other Lebanese have trepidations about going 
there because of an apprehension that stems from unfamiliarity about what 
it would mean to be in a Hizbullah-controlled area.
Once, when fi nishing up an interview at a Lebanese NGO, I asked two 
members of the staff  how to take public transportation to the airport area 
as I had to pick up a package being held at a post offi  ce near there. To go 
such a distance from the offi  ces of the organization in Hazmieh, a sub-
urb near the Damascus Highway, I knew that I would probably have to 
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take more than one bus or service taxi and wanted to fi gure out where I 
should make transfers. Th e staff  discouraged me from using anything other 
than an expensive private taxi that would take me directly to my destina-
tion because, they warned, I would have to go through and perhaps stop in 
Dahiya en route. “I’m sorry,” a staff  member named Aline said, “I just can’t 
let you take a service there. . . . I wouldn’t let my own sister do that! We’ll 
call a private taxi for you.” When I asked her why she thought I should not 
go through Dahiya, she said, putt ing an end to the conversation, that the 
area was “unsafe.” Aline’s eff orts to discourage me from going through the 
area illustrate the kinds of boundaries that mark Beirut’s urban space.
Th ese boundaries, I learned, were spatial in more than one way, for they 
had to do not only with the delineation of diff erent urban territories but 
also with the mode of transportation itself. At one point during my fi eld-
work, aft er having ridden on both of them many times, I asked a Lebanese 
friend why there were two diff erent types of larger public buses that charged 
the same fare: the red and white Lebanese Commuting Company (LCC) 
buses, which had a more offi  cial feel replete with a machine that automati-
cally dispensed a receipt aft er you handed the driver your payment, and the 
less formal white buses, whose drivers were regularly changed along the 
route. “Well,” she replied, “I’ve heard that the LCC company is owned by 
Hariri and the white buses are run by Berri.” Nabih Berri, the speaker of the 
parliament, Lebanon’s third most powerful political position, is the leader 
of the political party Amal, which is associated with the Shi‘i community 
and is a member of the March 8th alliance, which opposes the March 14th 
coalition, led by the Hariri’s Future Movement party. In other words, Berri 
and Hariri are members of opposing political camps. When I asked others 
the same question, a few respondents said they were not sure who owned 
the white buses—many thought that individual owners and not Berri oper-
ated them—but they too presumed that the LCC line was one of the Hariri 
family’s bott omless assets.
Th e veracity of the notion notwithstanding, what is striking about the 
comment about one bus company being owned by Berri and the other by 
the Hariri clan is the way in which it depicts the public bus system itself as 
a fi eld of competition between two diff erent political factions with att ach-
ments to particular sectarian communities. Th is notion of the “sectarian-
ness” of the very means of mobility emerged too in people’s talk about 
service taxis. For instance, when speaking about the routes service taxi 
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drivers choose to circulate along in their hunt for passengers, Amal, a secre-
tary in her fi ft ies, commented that “it is true that if they [service drivers] are 
Muslim, then they drive through the western part of the city, and if they are 
Christian they stay mostly on the eastern side—this is from the war [min 
asl al-harb]. Th ey are just used to driving around their part of the city; . . . 
it’s a habit from the war.” Amal’s idea that service drivers prefer to drive 
through areas with which they feel a sense of political sectarian belong-
ing emerged in many of my other conversations with the city’s residents. 
When I asked several service drivers while riding as a passenger in diff erent 
parts of the city about the routes they took, most described adhering more 
or a less to a loop through areas situated on either the eastern or western 
sides of the city. One driver I spoke with, a man who said he was sixty-seven 
and had been driving a service for forty-fi ve years, talked about the route 
he stayed on, which started from Bourj al-Barajneh in Dahiya and ended 
in Hamra and then back again: “Of course I will take someone where they 
need to go in Ashrafi eh [in the east] or wherever,” he replied in a frustrated 
tone to my question about driving off  the route he described. “But then I 
go back to my route.” In this way, ideas about and practices of public trans-
portation in the city are shaped by past and present everyday geographies 
enmeshed in notions of politics and sect. Th e politics of sectarianism are 
made public and visible in the city by various means, from the hanging of 
fl ags and banners in support of sectarian-identifi ed political groups through 
the interpretation of monumental architecture as a political sectarian claim 
on parts of the city to understandings of public transportation as being in 
the pockets of leaders of sectarian-affi  liated political parties. In these ways, 
Beirut is territorialized by—and the city’s space is made an active agent 
in—the processes of political sectarianism.
The Anticipation of Violence
What is at stake in everyday navigations of this political sectarian landscape 
I have just described? For one, talk about politics is an ordinary topic in 
day-to-day life, even among strangers gett ing around town. Service taxis, 
the most widely used form of public transit, nurture this discourse as they 
serve as a kind of moving town hall in which Lebanese from diverse back-
grounds come into contact, and conversation, with one another. Karim, a 
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student at the American University of Beirut, said he usually avoids taking 
the front seat of a service taxi if one in the back is open: “It’s just annoy-
ing because . . . if I take the front seat, then the driver ends up talking to 
me the whole time, and always about politics. I don’t know why, but there’s 
this thing about shabab [young men/young people]: the drivers think that 
we’re the ones they can talk to about anything!”
Although not all Beirutis are politically engaged, politics, as Karim put it, 
cannot be avoided, even when just making your way around the city. When 
Nadine, a recent college graduate, talked with me about her participation in 
the spring 2005 protests against Syrian involvement in Lebanon, I asked her 
if she could remember when she fi rst began taking an interest in politics. 
She looked at me curiously. “Politics is simply a part of being Lebanese,” she 
said succinctly. Indeed, just as most Lebanese newspapers and television 
stations are aligned with a particular political perspective—if not directly 
produced and fi nanced by a political party—the news radio station a ser-
vice taxi driver chooses to listen to communicates to passengers something 
about his political orientation even before any conversation in the vehicle 
begins. In the post-2004 era especially, when fault lines between diff erent 
political and ideological camps became increasingly entrenched, a taxi 
driver’s choice to listen to a news broadcast on the Hizbullah-sponsored 
al-Nour station, the Hariri-led Radio Orient, or the Phalange Party’s Voice 
of Lebanon,17 for instance, could set the tone for any potential political con-
versation in which coming and going passengers might participate. While 
politics might play a dominant role in public discourse between strangers in 
many other parts of the world, in Beirut the stakes of politics are immediate 
and ever-looming not only because of the existence of what Sune Haugbolle 
(2010) refers to as “multiple memory cultures” surrounding Lebanon’s long 
war of the past but also as an outcome of how politics regularly change the 
course of one’s daily activities, and feelings of safety, in the present.
During the 2004–2006 period, when political tensions ran high amid 
the series of assassinations and the consolidation of the opposing March 
8th and March 14th coalitions, even events that occurred outside Lebanon 
could serve as fl ashpoints for protest and violence that would, if only for a 
time, transform the city’s space. Aft er fi rst being published in the Danish 
newspaper Jyllands-Posten in September 2005, cartoons ridiculing the 
Islamic prophet Muhammad were reprinted in January 2006 in newspapers 
in more than fi ft y other countries. Protests against the cartoons, some of 
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which escalated into violence—with protestors destroying European build-
ings and burning fl ags, and police fi ring into crowds—ensued throughout 
the Arab and Muslim world. On February 4, demonstrators in Damascus 
stormed and set afi re the Norwegian and Danish embassies. A day later, 
on Sunday, February 5, I gathered with friends for brunch at an apartment 
in Zarif, a neighborhood in central Beirut, on the western side of the city, 
just south of one of Beirut’s only public parks, Sanayeh Garden. A friend 
received a text message saying that we should turn on the television to see 
what was happening just a mile and a half east of us. We turned it on. Live 
news coverage showed men running and shouting through Ashrafi eh and 
surrounding neighborhoods on the eastern side of the city that are gener-
ally identifi ed—as they had been during the civil and regional war—as 
“Christian.” Flames shot from garbage dumpsters and vehicles, debris lined 
the streets. Aft er att acking the Austrian and Danish consulates, the protes-
tors went on to destroy property along the adjacent streets.
From the television, it looked awful. As if Beirut would burn. Th e report-
ing on the station we watched identifi ed those participating in what was 
happening as Palestinian, Syrian, and Shi‘i. Th e men were thus understood 
to be Muslim, and their acts were thus defi ned as anti-Christian aggres-
sion. As we watched the live news coverage, we heard cars driving by with 
loud music blaring and voices shouting through megaphones their support 
for the protestors. It was uncanny to be watching the events unfold at the 
same time we were hearing these caravans driving through the neighbor-
hood because there was no time lapse between the protests taking place 
and the deployment in the streets of those who supported the protests; the 
two events were coterminous. Th is kind of temporality, with actions and 
reactions overlapping and no time in between, was one of the disquiet-
ing aspects of the city’s political climate as violent events could spin off  of 
one another very quickly, gaining fervor, leaving residents to suddenly and 
quickly take up positions of defense and seek out places of safety.
We worried that the violence would continue throughout the night or 
provoke the young men who lived in the neighborhoods where the protests 
and violence were taking place in Ashrafi eh to seek reprisals by coming 
over to the western side of the city, where most of us lived, an area still oft en 
conceived—as it had been during the long war—as Muslim: “We either 
need to stay here all aft ernoon or get home now,” my friend Siham warned, 
her eyes fi xed on the television, “because next these guys [from Ashrafi eh] 
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are going to head to Tariq al-Jedeideh [a majority Muslim neighborhood] 
or even come over here to do the same or worse.”
We were not the only ones concerned about such a possibility. Walking 
home that aft ernoon along mostly empty streets, I saw thirty or so army 
soldiers stationed in a vacant lot behind a mosque. Th eir guns were col-
lected in a mass in the middle of the lot propped upright while the soldiers 
sat on the ground or stood around the perimeter of the lot. It looked as if 
they were waiting for something. Th ey might have been stationed there to 
protect the mosque from possible retributive damage or perhaps to defend 
this part of the city from att ackers.18 Th e mosque was situated along Spears 
Street, a major thoroughfare running from western to eastern Beirut. In 
other words, it was the most direct route for anyone from the eastern side 
of the city seeking retribution in the neighborhoods of western Beirut. 
Th ey could come across the line that had divided the city into Muslim and 
Christian sides during Lebanon’s long war and that, now and again, still 
seemed to split Beirut in two.
On that aft ernoon, the near empty streets and the soldiers’ presence sig-
naled an anticipation of violence among city residents as well as the state. 
Th is anticipation, as Pradeep Jegnathan observes (2002), is embedded in 
past experiences of public and political violence. Soldiers are deployed 
quickly, and residents hurry home to safety with effi  ciency because they 
have had cause to do so before. For me, the emptiness that day was remi-
niscent of the hours that followed news of former prime minister Hariri’s 
assassination in February 2005, when all of Beirut seemed to shutt er in a 
mere hour aft er news came of the blast that killed him and his caravan. But 
the emptiness too recalled Jean Makdisi’s writing about life in the city dur-
ing the civil and regional war: “Suddenly, gunfi re exploded on the street 
outside, and dozens of people scurried into the café to take refuge from 
the batt le. . . . Th e street was suddenly deserted. Beirutis have broken all 
records for gett ing out of the way on time. It is incredible to see how quickly 
a street swarming with people can be transformed into ghostly emptiness. 
Shopkeepers close their doors and pull down their iron shutt ers, mothers 
scoop up their children and run, vendors scutt le away with their carts, and 
aft er an even more than usually furious beeping of horns, the traffi  c jam 
evaporates in no time at all” (1999, 86).
In this way, temporal fi elds of both remembrance of the past and antici-
pation of the future overlap in Beirut’s fraught political landscape as the city 
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is a terrain where residents’ experiences of earlier political violence become 
entangled with concern about the violence that is to come. Violence is 
anticipated as an outcome of deductions made by residents as well as by 
state and privately hired security personnel and can be based on interpreta-
tions of the current level of political tension that is conveyed through the 
daily tenor of news broadcasts as well as through the intensity and vocabu-
lary of political debates by news commentators.19 Th ese calculations of dan-
ger are also made from what city dwellers detect to be an intensifi cation 
of security, which is demonstrated through, for instance, the rapid deploy-
ment of armed soldiers to a particular locale, as was the case on that day 
of unrest over the Danish cartoons in February 2006. Th rough this beefi ng 
up of security in public space, residents fi gure out that the members of the 
security apparatus are gearing up for a potentially volatile situation, and, as 
a result, residents anticipate not only the possibility of violence but also the 
necessity for altering their daily movements through the city.
Crossing Borders
In 2005, amid the growing rancor between the March 14th and the March 
8th political camps and the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon 
at the end of April 2005, a series of bombs exploded around Beirut. Th e 
bombing targets were mainly journalists and political fi gures allied with the 
March 14th coalition and its anti-Syrian stance, but some were also deto-
nated in industrial and commercial areas of the city with predominantly 
Christian populations. In this sense, the patt ern of violence that emerged in 
spring 2005 was one that overlapped political and sectarian identifi cation as 
both people and places identifi ed with the March 14th coalition of leading 
Sunni Muslim and Christian political parties were targeted.
Th is mapping of the space of the city concerned Layla, a mother in her 
early forties, and infl uenced her decision making about where and when 
her teenaged children, a boy and a girl, would be allowed to socialize: “I 
don’t want them going to ABC,” a newly opened high-end shopping mall 
in Ashrafi eh, a predominantly Christian neighborhood where the Danish 
cartoon protestors had unleashed their fury. “No one knows for sure where 
the next bomb will go off , but ABC is a likely target,” she thought. “I would 
rather they [her children] stay close to home; they can do shopping here, 
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they can just go to see a movie here, in this part of the city. No bombs 
have gone off  here.” At the ABC shopping center, women’s handbags were 
checked and men were patt ed down by security offi  cers stationed at the 
mall’s entrances, while at the Dunes shopping plaza, around the corner 
from Layla’s residence in Verdun, an affl  uent neighborhood in western 
Beirut, these kinds of security measures were not a regular practice. But the 
Dunes shopping complex, built in the 1990s, was a far less desirable rec-
reational destination for Layla’s son and daughter, who, like many other 
young people, wanted to go with their friends to the newest hangouts with 
the most up-to-date cinemas and retail outlets regardless of where in Beirut 
they were to be found.20
While Layla set parameters for her children’s movements through the 
city according to her construal of the potential dangers created by politi-
cal violence, some young people had a diff erent att itude about Beirut’s 
geography of risk. In 2006, I arranged to meet Rana, a student at a French-
language Jesuit university. At a McDonald’s near campus, Rana spoke about 
her notions of safety in gett ing around the city. When I asked her about 
whether she had changed her routes or destinations since the spate of 
bombings had begun a year earlier, she gave a remarkable response: “No, I 
haven’t changed anything; I still go out. But, actually, it’s funny, aft er some-
thing has happened, I mean aft er there has been an explosion somewhere, 
that’s when I feel like I can go to that place since it’s already had an explo-
sion. My friends and I feel like, ‘Well, they’ve already put a bomb there, 
now it’s safe to go out there!’”21
Rana, a young woman from an upper-middle-class background who 
lived in the northern suburbs of Beirut, was furnished by her parents with 
a car, spending money, and consent to go out prett y much when and where 
she pleased—usually, she said, this was to meet up with friends at cafes, 
restaurants, and pubs. For her, the city seemed not to be mapped so much 
by the affi  liations and outcomes of political sectarianism as by certain kinds 
of lifestyle practices; she and her friends sought out trendy places that were 
distinguished by their American and European branding.
A common, if not clichéd, summing up of Beirut highlights its para-
doxes: a coastal urban playground abounding with nightlife, boutiques, 
and joie de vivre coexists with the threat of violent political confl ict.22 For 
Rana and her friends, living with this paradox meant developing a rationale 
for judging places or areas to be safe. Rather than being shutt ered inside by 
70 chapter  3
the wave of bombings, they sought out locales that had already been the 
site of an att ack, on the presumption that sites were rarely targeted twice. 
Th is rationale, as a means of asserting control over the violent phenomena 
produced by political instability and confl ict, is an example of the way in 
which some Beirutis make sense of and respond to the everyday forms of 
public violence that surround them. And for residents with the means, like 
Rana and her friends, middle-class consumer lifestyle practices perhaps 
even serve as a kind of salve for the anxieties engendered by living with the 
anticipation of violence, as they seemed to do for Mounir. “Th e thing is,” 
he related, “we’re not going to let politics get in the way of going out. Th at’s 
what they want, they want to stop everything and shut life down, . . . but we 
want to live, we want to have fun. Even with the bombs, we’re not going to 
stay home.”
Moreover, for middle-class youth with the disposable income to sup-
port regular leisure activities, the city’s divisive political geography was no 
match for having a good time. Young people who had the money to spend 
on eating out at places like the American-style Roadster Diner, seeing the 
latest Hollywood fi lms, shopping at European-owned retail clothing chains 
like Zara, Mango, Jack Jones, and Vera Moda, or going to one of Beirut’s 
numerous nightclubs with US$20 entry fees and US$12 cocktails would 
travel to any and all of the city’s neighborhoods to seek out these experi-
ences with litt le thought given to the political or sectarian association of the 
area to which they were headed. Mounir, who left  Lebanon for Denmark 
as a child but had recently returned, identifi ed himself as a Muslim but 
said he would oft en go out with friends to Gemmayzeh or a neighboring 
area, Monot (nightclub areas in predominantly Christian neighborhoods). 
“I don’t avoid those areas because they are Christian areas because this is 
where everyone is going out right now; . . . so this where my friends and 
I want to be. It doesn’t matt er that it’s a Christian area.” In this sense, the 
everyday mobilities of the middle-class youth I spoke with seemed to be 
motivated mainly by cultural and consumer sensibilities and leisure prac-
tices, and these sensibilities and practices led them to cross the territo-
rial boundaries of the city’s political sectarian geography. In the words of 
Mounir, these were young people who wanted to be “where everyone was 
going out” regardless of a destination’s political and sectarian identifi cation.
I also met young people who sought out parts of the city that repre-
sented a melding of boundaries as a matt er of principle. Zeina, for example, 
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an American University of Beirut student from a family that left  to live in 
Australia during the long war and returned to Lebanon in 1995, told me 
that she preferred to go out in Hamra (a neighborhood and consumerist 
paradise in West Beirut) because “it feels the least sectarian.” “What do 
you mean by sectarian?” I asked. “I mean,” she said, “Hamra just feels like a 
neighborhood that doesn’t belong to any one sect, it’s so diverse; . . . that’s 
why I prefer it. I used to like going downtown too, when all the reconstruc-
tion was going on and there were ruins. . . . I used to go there, but then 
that became a sectarian place. I don’t mean it became known as a place that 
belongs to a certain sect; I mean it became where people go to show that 
they are a part of this sect or that sect. So now I don’t like going there. I 
don’t know, when I go out, I’m looking to get beyond the problems we have 
in this country. I don’t want to be reminded about them.”
As a means of trying to move beyond what she saw as the sectarian-ness 
of the city’s public spaces, Zeina sought out areas where she thought sec-
tarian sentiments and identifi cations were less demonstrable. For Zeina, 
choices about leisure had to do with more than locating the trendiest and 
most popular spots; they involved locating spaces that aligned with what 
she described as her “antisectarian” orientation. Her concerns about how 
to navigate Beirut’s politicized space are not unlike those of the city’s pious 
youth that Deeb and Harb (2013) write about, youth whose day-to-day 
negotiations about where to go out in public and socialize involve eff orts 
to have fun while striving to adhere to religiously informed moral values. In 
other words, the pursuit of fun, for some of Beirut’s young people, involves 
satisfying both consumerist and recreational desires as well as those relat-
ing to moral, religious, and political views.
Th e urban mobilities of the privileged young people I spoke with, all 
of whom had been or were full-time university students with the fi nancial 
backing of their parents, showed traversals of Beirut’s political sectarian 
geography. With their shared cultural sensibilities situated around a glo-
balized “cosmopolitan cool,” it oft en seemed that the class, rather than the 
political or sectarian, dimensions of their mobility practice were primary. 
Th ese crossings resemble those of the upper-class youth in Cairo whom 
both Mark Allen Peterson (2011) and Anouk de Koning (2009) describe. 
In both Beirut and Cairo, class-specifi c leisure destinations like upscale U.S. 
and European coff ee shops, such as Starbucks and Costa, and local outlets 
styled aft er these global chains are sites through which privileged young 
72  chapter  3
people “express and construct their cosmopolitan identities” (Peterson 
2011, 169). For most young Beirutis I met who had money to spend, deci-
sions about where to go in the city were thus motivated by lifestyle choices 
shaped by class and cultural positioning.
In some ways, this was an unsurprising fi nding about a group of young 
people whose geographic mobility was a constitutive feature of their class 
position. Lesser privileged youth—those, for example, whom I met as a 
volunteer with the Lebanese agency running the U.S. State Department’s 
English-training Access program for teens from economically disadvan-
taged areas of the country—had traveled minimally within Lebanon and 
none had traveled outside the country. In fact for some of the kids I spoke 
with, participation in the Access program brought about their fi rst-ever visit 
to Beirut, even though they were from villages just four hours away from 
the capital. Rana and her friends, however, moved through not just Beirut 
but also the country in pursuit of various leisure activities from “clubbing” 
to visiting beach resorts in the summer and ski resorts in the winter. Th ey 
also had opportunities to leave Lebanon, as young people whose family’s 
fi nancial capital aff orded them the possibility of being approved for a visa 
to go barra (outside Lebanon). Th ey went for a touristic vacation or a visit 
with a relative to countries in Europe, North America, and the Arab Gulf. 
Sabine, for example, a recent graduate of the city’s Jesuit French-language 
university, talked with me about her and her friends’ study-abroad experi-
ences in Grenoble, France, while Noura, another university student, spoke 
about having visited her relatives in Canada on several occasions.
Th e mobility of the privileged youth I spoke with was also unconstrained 
in several other ways. First, they bore litt le, if any, fi nancial responsibility 
for themselves or their families. Unlike laboring youth, whose movements 
around the city were related primarily to livelihood—mobility that has to 
do with seeking employment or heading to and from work, for instance—
the mobility practices of the young people I discuss here were motivated 
by leisure; none were expected to be fi nancially independent or contribut-
ing to family household expenses. While many were or had recently been 
full-time university students, they did not talk as if there was an expecta-
tion on the part of their parents that this fi nancial dependence would shift  
soon aft er graduation. Second, for these youth, both the young men and the 
young women, the rite of going out with friends, even until the early morn-
ing hours, was one socially sanctioned and fi nancially supported by their 
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families. Finally, their mobility and public behavior were unconstrained 
by state authorities, in contrast, for example, with other young people, like 
Syrian migrant laborers, who endure extra scrutiny by the state police and 
armed forces as they move around the city.23 In short, for the young Beirutis 
I spoke with, various forms of geographic and urban mobility were a criti-
cal feature of their class habitus: being spatially mobile was in fact a way of 
being middle and upper class in values, disposition, and lifestyle.
Thickening Borders
In the 2004–2006 period, there were moments, one that even stretched 
for months, in the period following former prime minister Hariri’s assas-
sination, during which the tides of everyday life were altered by a sense of 
doom and uncertainty wrought by the series of bombings and the unstable 
political situation. It was during this time that Nicole described how “right 
now, because of what’s going on, when I get into a service taxi, I just feel 
more comfortable if I see that the driver has a cross [taxi drivers oft en hang 
religious icons from their rearview mirrors or along the dashboards of their 
cars]. I know it sounds strange, but right now, with everything that’s going 
on, I just feel safer, . . . more comfortable. I feel like this person is a part of 
my community; it makes me feel safer.”24 Nicole’s words spoke to the fact 
that in gett ing around a Beirut under stress, certain kinds of sectarian seams, 
which are deeply enmeshed and play out in politics, oft en become thicker.
One aft ernoon in summer 2010, I visited the offi  ces of an NGO and, as 
is not an unusual occurrence during the research process, the person I had 
arranged to meet was not there. Another member of the staff , Nabil, who 
looked to be in his early forties, brought me to a small conference room and 
shared some information and literature about the organization. Our conver-
sation turned at some point away from the organization itself as he began to 
volunteer his thoughts about the current political situation in Lebanon. As 
a foreigner, I was oft en told, even in casual conversations with taxi drivers 
and shopkeepers, that I didn’t understand the problems in Lebanon. Oft en, 
aft er I was told that I didn’t understand how Lebanese politics worked, 
strangers would inform me by talking about corruption and Lebanon’s sta-
tus as a pawn in the geopolitics of the region. In this conversation, however, 
talk of Lebanese politics and society took a familial turn.
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Th e problem in Lebanon, Nabil started out, “is that we do all this label-
ing. We want to fi gure out what someone’s background is; we do this even 
from their name. Okay, this is your fi rst name, that might tell me some-
thing about you; now I want to know your family name so that I can fi nd 
out more.” Indeed, I had observed how some Lebanese posed a series of 
questions when meeting someone for the fi rst time, questions that took 
the form of assembling clues—such as fi rst name, family name, neighbor-
hood residence, father’s village—that might help to sort out an individual’s 
sectarian and sometimes class (through family name and residence) back-
ground.25 I also met Lebanese who did not engage in this line of questioning 
and demurred when the questions were asked of them. One middle-aged 
professor had told me that some people thought that these inquiries, by 
diff erentiating people into sectarian types, were one of the everyday and 
seemingly banal—but extraordinarily powerful—ways of giving support 
to the broader structures of political sectarianism.26 Ramzi, the professor, 
had said, “I refuse to play this game of talking about where my parents and 
family are from so that people can try and fi gure out what sect I belong 
to. . . . In my view, I do not belong to any sect. Th is is a game we play that 
keeps sectarianism alive and well.”
According to Nabil, however, this mode of “labeling,” as he termed it, was 
a way of determining whom you can trust. Essentially, he said, “it’s a form of 
survival.” But, in speaking about his two “tween”-aged sons, Nabil was more 
sanguine. As he described it, the globalization of media and the internet, as 
well as the pull of global consumer culture, shaped not only the activities and 
aspirations of his children but also their raison d’être in ways that seemed 
to bring to the fore generational diff erences among younger and older 
Lebanese. As one example, he said, his sons were far less likely than older 
generations had been to take up arms and fi ght to defend their sectarian 
community: “My sons see everything on TV and on the internet, they have 
their basketball, their rap music; they want to go out with girls and buy the 
newest car. . . . Th e men my father’s age, when they were young, they didn’t 
have anything going on in their lives. . . . When the leader came and said, 
‘Join us and fi ght,’ they did. But my sons, the young people now, if war broke 
out and the leader came and said, ‘Join us,’ they’d say no; they’re more inter-
ested in the things they want to buy, their music; these are their concerns.”
Nabil’s comments were reminiscent of the fi nding in a UNICEF-
sponsored report that Lebanese youth “were infl uenced by the rise of 
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global youth culture and enriched by the intensive global communication 
networks and the mass media at the same time that they felt stuck in paro-
chial practices that entrap them in confi ned milieus” (Khouri 2011, 14).27 
In a conversation with Dania, a project offi  cer for a civil-education NGO, 
she described these “parochial milieus” in much blunter terms: “I have a 
three-year old, and I want to keep him away from all of it [Lebanese party 
politics]. Th ey are all liars. In my job, what we want to do is to create an 
active citizen instead of one who blindly follows the leaders. For me, as a 
mother, . . . I don’t want my son to go with any party.”
But how does one reside on the outside of politics in a place divided by 
both a past war and one people anxiously feel is yet to come? When speak-
ing about what it means to live in such a contentious political environment, 
which gives rise to occurrences of political violence and creates feelings of 
anxiety about the possibility of large-scale war, Nabil went on to draw me 
a rudimentary map of Beirut that outlined some of its neighborhoods. Th e 
safest thing for people to do is to avoid living along the borders of the dif-
ferent neighborhoods, he said, because of the risks. “You have to live in the 
heart of the territory because, in times of war, you need to be in the middle 
surrounded by the same community. Th at’s where we live, in the center,” 
he said as he marked the spot on the map that represented his neighbor-
hood in a suburb of Beirut. He continued, “It’s just safer this way.” His 
point recalled the ways in which, for residents of places mapped by confl ict, 
knowledge of the geography not only is a way of living a normal life but can 
also be understood as a matt er of physical safety.
Nabil’s remarks about the dangers of the city’s political sectarian geog-
raphy and his vision of Lebanese youth as being captivated by consumer-
ist desires and global forms of media and entertainment were also striking 
on several other levels. First, his words told of how these seemingly incon-
sistent or incompatible activities, of global consumerism on the one hand 
and the machinations of political sectarianism on the other, might come 
together, in fact, to shape the everyday lives and mobilities of young people 
in Beirut. Although his sons may be absorbed with video games and rap 
music, their lives are also shaped by what their father described as the need 
to protect themselves in a place where the possibility of the eruption of 
armed political sectarian confl ict and urban warfare is very present.
Second, Nabil’s perspective about safety being constituted among one’s 
own community was reminiscent of the way Nicole described her sense of 
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security, which came, during times of heightened political tension, from 
riding in taxis driven by drivers she knew were from the same religious 
background as she. Both Nabil and Nicole described how shared commu-
nal affi  liation was understood to be a site of shelter.
Finally, Nabil’s narrative about his sons’ consumerist-driven and medi-
acentric lives resonated with one of my own fi ndings about the youth I 
spoke with who traveled around the city in order to pursue consumption-
based leisure experiences. For many of these young men and women, the 
city was open for their exploration, a fact that spoke not only to their sta-
tions of privilege but also perhaps to their generational inclination to be 
less concerned with—or constrained by—the boundaries between people 
and place that were produced by the experience of living through the long 
civil and regional war. For Layla, the mother who wanted her two teenagers 
to stick close to home and hang out at a shopping mall in their neighbor-
hood rather than one across town that she thought was a potential bomb-
ing site in 2005, the war had taken a clear toll on her geographic mobility. 
“I fi rst started driving when I was twenty,” she told me, “and it was during 
the war. It was a time when I was so stressed out and my refl exes were ter-
rible. Aft er I got into a small accident, I just decided I couldn’t take it. I gave 
up driving then. I really do blame the civil war for the fact that I do not 
know how to drive!” When I spoke with her, she was driven around pri-
marily by a hired driver whom her family also employed as an assistant for 
their business. Layla had thus established patt erns of work and family life 
that restricted her daily mobility to just a few neighborhoods on the west-
ern side of Beirut, and she wondered aloud why her kids needed to go to 
 diff erent parts of the city.
In one sense, Layla’s comments reminded me of the archetypal parent-
teenager relationship, with the teenager straining against limits set by the 
parent. Yet, in another way, her children were experiencing life in a city 
where political sectarianism was very much still a geographical force but 
also one increasingly marked by the apparatus of consumer capitalism. 
In Layla’s view, her children were caught up primarily with the process 
of consumer capitalist culture and showed less concern about the politi-
cal sectarian mappings of the city—and their relationship to potential 
violence—than she did. In short, given her experience of living through 
Lebanon’s long war, the city was mapped diff erently for Layla than it was 
for her children.
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Looking closely at the mobility practices of youth in Beirut off ers a win-
dow into important aspects of both political sectarianism and class, key cat-
egories of social diff erence in Lebanon. What these youth mobilities make 
visible is a complex set of social and spatial relations, characterized by the 
privileging of class and cultural positioning, that cross politics and sect dur-
ing times of low political tension, on the one hand, and a kind of shoring 
up of political sectarian solidarity that is manifest during periods of height-
ened political tension on the other.
Diverging Roads
In March 2005, amid the heated contention between the just-formed March 
8th and March 14th political camps, I took a taxi out toward the airport to 
see traffi  c signs that had appeared overnight along the median of the high-
way. Th ey were, in fact, faux traffi  c signs that used the commonly recognized 
symbols and vocabulary of traffi  c control to express political sentiments 
Figure 3.2. Traffi  c sign: “No foreign intervention! 1559 prohibited from passing.” 
(Photo by author.)
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against U.N. resolution 1559, which called for the complete physical and 
political withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon and criticized foreign (read: 
U.S., Western) intervention in Lebanese political aff airs.
While no group took credit for installing the signs along the highway 
median, their viewpoint belonged to the March 8th coalition of Hizbullah 
and its allies. Beyond the challenge of crossing the busy highway on foot 
to reach them, what struck me about the signs was how they illustrated the 
ways in which the theater of politics plays out in urban space. If the city, 
as theorist of space Henri Lefebvre conceived it, is a “place of encounter” 
([1968] 1996, 158), then in Beirut even a routine trip to the airport can 
entail a spatial confrontation with the fervent messages and symbols of 
sectarian-based party politics. Moreover, while political polarization is not 
a phenomenon unique to the space of Beirut, the ways in which politico-
ideological issues spill over into space and are incited by domestic and 
regional geopolitics—like the passage of U.N. Resolution 1559, for 
instance—gives everyday use of and movement through the city particular 
meaning. While Beirut is no longer precisely divided into warring fronts, as 
it was during the protracted civil and regional war, the mobility of the city’s 
residents is still shaped by—and also shapes—Beirut’s divided and some-
times volatile political sectarian geography.
In this chapter, I hope to have accomplished several things. First, I have 
tried to show that political sectarianism is an enterprise that takes form in 
urban space in various ways, one of them being the marking of territories 
through visual means such as banners, fl ags, and graffi  ti, as well as through 
the appearance of political violence. Second, while class and status are oft en 
understudied in analyses of political sectarianism in Lebanon, I consider 
what the urban mobilities of privileged youth show us about the complex 
relations of class, politics, and sect that characterize everyday life in Beirut. 
In so doing, I have sought to highlight some of the ways in which residents’ 
uses and understandings of urban space play a critical role in producing the 
city’s public and political landscape.
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4 • SECURING BEIRUT
I heard the fi rst bomb go off  on October 1, 2004. I had arrived 
just weeks before to begin research and was staying at a residential hotel 
when I heard the blast—a blast I thought was coming from one of the 
many construction sites near the downtown waterfront area. It was in fact 
the explosion of Marwan Hamadeh’s car on a sunny Friday morning. He 
was being driven along the seaside road in Ain el Mreisse, a central neigh-
borhood adjacent to downtown, when a bomb ripped through the front 
of the vehicle. His driver, Sgt. Ghazi Abu Karroum, was killed instantly 
and Hamadeh and his bodyguard survived with injuries. Like other 
political fi gures with ties to prominent Lebanese sectarian-identifi ed kin 
groups, Hamadeh, the outgoing minister of economy and trade and future 
minister of telecommunications, had cycled through a number of pow-
erful government positions during his career. In the months prior to this 
att empt on his life, Hamadeh had been vocal in his opposition to the Syrian 
regime’s eff orts to amend the Lebanese constitution in order to extend the 
Lebanese presidential term and, in so doing, lengthen the presidency of 
Emile Lahoud. Lahoud was thought by many to be a Lebanese fi gurehead 
for the Syrian regime.
Th e att empt to assassinate Hamadeh marked the return of violence to 
the streets of Beirut more than thirteen years aft er the end of the civil war. 
Th is return was announced by the horrifi c spectacle of exploding bombs 
that killed political fi gures and journalists when they entered their cars and 
turned the ignition key, or, later, when they were driving or being driven in 
the city. Aft er the bombs went off , various kinds of security confi gurations 
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would be set up throughout the city, but particularly near the homes, work-
places, and leisure areas of political VIPs. As a result of this intensifi cation 
of security to protect political fi gures and public buildings, the city became 
increasingly militarized, and gett ing around involved particular kinds 
of spatial and social negotiation.1 As elsewhere in the world, processes of 
securing the city involved the reconfi guration and management of every-
day mobility in public space. Eff orts to organize and control movement in 
Beirut produced, as they have in the post-9/11 United States, for example, 
certain types of insecurity engendered by fear but also, importantly, by the 
conditions of security themselves. During the 2004–2006 period, amid the 
series of bombings in Beirut, most of which were targeted assassinations, 
mobility was regulated by a security apparatus comprised of both privately 
hired security personnel and the state’s police and armed forces, who cre-
ated lines of defense intended to protect particular people and places from 
harm. Residences, luxury hotels, offi  ces, and governmental structures in 
which an overlapping group of class and political elites lived, worked, and 
played were the main sites of securitization.
One type of use of public space in particular was understood to be most 
suspect and to pose the greatest threat to forces of security: driving. During 
this time, as during the protracted civil and regional war (1975–1990), the 
vehicular bomb was the signature means of violence: in almost all cases, 
individuals were killed or injured while driving, being driven, or passing 
by cars. With every car imagined as a possible bomb, “the rules of the road 
changed” (Packer 2006, 379).2
In this chapter, I explore how processes of securitization shaped daily 
experiences of gett ing around Beirut during the 2004–2006 period. 
Security measures transformed not just the city’s built environment but 
also the mobility practices of its residents, as motor vehicles and, in some 
sites, pedestrians were deemed a potential threat to a select group of peo-
ple, namely political fi gures, while they were at home, work, leisure, or in 
transit themselves. Focusing on the ways in which mobility was circum-
scribed through the sett ing up of barriers, blockades, and checkpoints and 
the rerouting of traffi  c fl ow, I explore how security installations adopted 
mainly by and for the power holders created conditions of unevenness 
in the urban landscape. In seeking to eff ect order in and around certain 
urban spaces, security made gett ing around the city disorderly. My study of 
security builds on explorations of how security is spatialized in the urban 
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environment. Scholars have investigated a diverse range of topics that high-
light the importance of urban space as a locus, medium, and tool of security 
strategies: the global ascendance of gated and privately secured forms of 
residence; the role of surveillance in the fragmentation of the urban envi-
ronment and the rise of private security forces; and the emergence of vigi-
lante groups that provide extrastate security to protect citizens from crime 
and violence.3
Th e fact that security is oft entimes a joint private and state enterprise 
in Beirut, a phenomenon that has been referred to as “multiagency polic-
ing” or “plural policing,” is not unique.4 However, the Beirut case appears 
distinctive because of the extent to which the city’s “securocracy”5 spa-
tially represents Lebanon’s multiple sovereignties of state and nonstate 
actors—or what geographer Sara Fregonese (2012) refers to as a “hybrid” 
sovereignty—rather than one coherent state sovereignty. In other words, 
the multiple secured areas around which city residents have to navigate, 
where privately employed bodyguards, domestic police forces, and national 
army soldiers work alongside one another, exemplify not just one of the 
means by which public space is increasingly being privatized, a topic I dis-
cuss in chapter 1, but also the blurring of the lines between the state and the 
nonstate that are an important part of the makeup of Lebanon’s physical 
landscape.
The Zig-Zag and Other Assorted Barriers
On an evening in February 2006, one year aft er Hariri’s assassination, I sat 
in a taxi heading from Verdun, a neighborhood in central Beirut, as the 
driver slowly weaved back and forth in a zig-zag motion around a series 
of metal barriers. Set up for a distance of about 20 or 30 meters, the barri-
ers were a temporary and sudden obstacle to be overcome by drivers. To 
keep from crashing into them, the taxi driver had to adopt a back-and-forth 
motion, turning the steering wheel to the left  and then to the right. When I 
asked the driver why the barriers were there, in this section of the road only, 
he said it was because of security, and he pointed out that we were driving 
past a police station.
Barriers set up in a zig-zag patt ern were among the types of security 
installations suddenly and temporarily erected in response to a sense of 
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heightened vulnerability surrounding particular places and people. In 
spring 2005, as I described in the previous chapter, a patt ern seemed to 
be forming amid the spate of bombings that followed the killing of for-
mer prime minister Hariri: predominantly Christian parts of Beirut were 
repeatedly the site of bomb blasts, and high-profi le journalists and political 
fi gures associated with the anti-Syrian March 14th alliance were targets for 
assassination. As a result of the emerging patt ern of att acks, security was 
thus built up throughout the city at locations that bore affi  liation—actual 
or perceived—with the politics of the March 14th group.
On Good Friday in March 2005, for example, a few blocks from my 
apartment building in Koreitem, I came upon yellow police tape surround-
ing a Catholic church. Extending for about 30 meters along the sidewalk 
directly in front of and across from the church, the tape, and the soldiers 
with machine guns positioned adjacent to it, obliged pedestrians to walk 
for a ways in the street. Like other security installations, this one around the 
church was many-layered: the yellow police tape, though made of fl imsy 
plastic, clearly demarcated areas of restricted access, and this cordoning 
off  of public space was butt ressed by armed soldiers with machine guns at 
the ready. Th is security set-up was in position only for the duration of the 
Easter weekend, a time when the perceived threat of att acks on Christian-
associated sites in any part of the city was intensifi ed given the symbolic 
value of the holiday and the large numbers of att endees at church services.
Yellow police tape also appeared in spring 2005 to cordon off  the front 
of the luxury seaside Mövenpick hotel. At the hotel, the rich and power-
ful both worked—it was regularly the site of meetings of political dignitar-
ies as well as the meeting place for U.N. investigators looking into Hariri’s 
death—and played, as it was equipped with one indoor and three outdoor 
swimming pools and several tennis courts, among other amenities. Because 
of its use by political elites, both domestic and foreign, the hotel was consid-
ered a potential target for violence. Th e barrier created by the yellow police 
tape went over the sidewalk and extended into the busy seaside boulevard 
that passes by the hotel. Th us, in going around the barrier, pedestrians had 
to leave the sidewalk as they approached the hotel and walk in the street 
alongside speeding cars. Th e tape was not a temporary fi xture, as the one 
bordering the church had been; it remained for more than a year. A staff  
of armed security guards near the hotel’s vehicle entryway formed a sec-
ond line of defense, just behind the yellow police tape, and their presence 
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ensured that walkers accepted the limitation imposed by the barrier by 
exiting the sidewalk and continuing in the street.
Security installations diff ered not only in their material composition 
but also in their temporal and spatial dimensions. While some forma-
tions of security, like the metal barriers set up in a zig-zag patt ern and the 
deployment of soldiers at the church on Easter weekend, were enacted on 
a short-term basis and could be easily dismantled, other formations were 
semi-permanent and became more fi xed into the built fabric of the city; 
they overlaid public space with a political gravity, as Ochs (2011) remarks 
about the context of everyday security in Israel. Because parked cars were 
the most frequent vessels for bombs, the prevention of vehicular parking 
was a chief aim of security eff orts, and barriers to parking appeared in vari-
ous forms. Steel bars soldered together into what resembled enormous and 
fearsome toy jacks were set up along the roadside adjacent to a building 
that housed the offi  ces of the Future Movement, the party led by the Hariri 
family and a leading member of the March 14th alliance. What looked like 
painted concrete shark fi ns fi xed onto the street provided another type of 
barrier that restricted parking alongside edifi ces. In the downtown area 
that was home to both high-end retail stores as well as the parliamentary 
offi  ces parking regulations that had gone unenforced were suddenly given 
att ention, according to Elie Helou, a transportation project manager for the 
state-affi  liated Council for Development and Reconstruction. He described 
how “what oft en looks like traffi  c enforcement is actually security. . . . Before 
February 14 [the date of former prime minister Hariri’s assassination], there 
was lots of parking on that main street downtown, Bank Street. And now 
the police are sweeping the street and enforcing the no-parking rules on 
that street, but this is because of security issues, not because of an interest 
in managing the traffi  c situation overall.” In this way, security became an 
integral, even prioritized, aspect of broader urban planning processes that 
shaped how the city’s public space would be used and managed.
Still other security formations might be best described as neither tem-
porary nor permanent but, rather, itinerant. A regular sight in public life 
are caravans of security personnel accompanying political VIPs en route 
for business or pleasure. Th ese caravans use vehicular and verbal means to 
suddenly storm and clear streets in order to allow for their breakneck and 
unhindered passage. In their harnessing of mobility itself as an instrument 
of power, these vehicular convoys demonstrate both the portability of and 
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Figure 4.1. Shark-fi n barriers. (Photo by author).
the impromptu aspects of security. Typically consisting of black SUVs with 
blacked-out windows that oft en bear no license plates, the convoys are only 
sometimes led by a police vehicle with fl ashing lights or a siren. More oft en, 
they appear without warning to take over the fi eld of drivers. Th undering 
past motorists frantically trying to get out of their way, the convoys activate 
 Securing Beirut 85
state power and its roving security project in public space through their 
mode of mobility but also, in their towering height, bulk, and “unmarked-
ness,” these vehicles go beyond the bounds of the state to represent a more 
generalized form of elite untouchability.
Once, on the highway just outside of Beirut, men in vehicles that were 
part of a convoy moving at breakneck speed leaned out of the windows of 
their SUVs gesturing and yelling at the driver of the car in which I was trav-
eling. Th ey appeared incensed that she had not moved from their path fast 
enough, although their cars had surged from behind at such a rapid speed 
that there had been litt le time to react at all. A second later, a car hastening 
to move off  to the side as the convoy came upon it crashed into the highway 
barrier. We caught just a glimpse, but as the convoy continued on, we were 
able to see that while the front of the car was badly damaged, the driver was 
thankfully unhurt.
Th e crash illustrated the ways in which vehicular behavior on the part 
of agents of the state and its proxies produced spatial—and uneven—risks 
in the public environment. While acting to secure public space to allow 
for the swift  and unconstrained movement of the powerful, the convoys 
and the “extrahard exoskeletons” (Miller 2007) of their SUVs create physi-
cal dangers for other drivers on the road. At the same time, by making the 
movement of ordinary users of the street disorderly and secondary to that 
of the VIPs and their need for a secured and mobile buff er zone, the con-
voys engender a kind of class injury through the means of automobility.6 As 
a fl oating form of security that glides over the city, the convoys are part of 
the broader private takeover of public space that has characterized Beirut’s 
urban development in the rebuilding era following the protracted civil 
and regional war. Unlike the barriers, which prevent mobility by stopping, 
halting, and prohibiting, vehicular convoys place mobility at the service 
of security in order to allow elites to live a cocooned existence that takes 
them, by means of protective SUV capsules, from one secured urban space 
to another.
Private-Public Security
While the manipulation of the urban built environment as a means of 
regulating mobility and as a technique of crime prevention is not a new 
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phenomenon, scholars of urban space have tracked its intensifi cation 
around the globe in the late twentieth and early twenty-fi rst centuries. One 
area of this scholarship examines how middle-class fears about and percep-
tions of the violence and crime that dwell in urban areas have given rise to 
new forms for securing domestic and residential realms. By fortifying their 
residences and neighborhoods with features such as surveillance technolo-
gies, gates, walls, and fl oodlights, property owners seek to create a commu-
nity that “includes protecting children and keeping out crime and others 
while at the same time controlling the environment and the quality of 
services” (Low 2004, 230).
Th ese mechanisms of homegrown security also mark certain pub-
lic spaces—the streets that border or run through residential areas, for 
instance—as the province not only of the homeowners and their guests 
but of a raced and classed set of “insiders” who do not arouse suspicion. 
“Outsiders” are unwelcome and are oft en subject to scrutiny or worse. 
Secured spaces, intended to protect their denizens, thus operate with a 
racial, class, and gender logic that works from ideas about who belongs and 
who does not, who is threatening and who is not. In parts of the suburban 
United States, for example, private home and commercial-property owners 
seeking to protect and secure their surroundings and assets work in collabo-
ration with community policing and neighborhood-watch groups to report 
suspicious activity to law-enforcement agencies. Security is enforced, on 
the basis of this logic, with sometimes deadly consequences, as armed resi-
dents aim to weed out threatening “others” from their terrain.
In Beirut, this kind of residential and neighborhood-based security, 
which draws on and collaborates with state-level policing agencies, was also 
in evidence. Although during the 2004–2006 period security installations 
surrounded the sites of work, leisure, and residence of high-profi le individ-
uals and thereby represented modes of privatized security being mapped 
onto a public landscape used by all, these individuals were protected by 
privately hired security guards as well as by members of the state’s police 
and armed forces. What is important about this fact, that security was an 
endeavor that joined together staff s of private bodyguards with state forces 
of policemen and soldiers, is the ways in which it made visible in the city’s 
space the blurred lines between state and privatized provisions of security. 
Th e intersections of public and private security, themselves rooted in the 
overlaps between Lebanon’s class and political elites, brought into sharp 
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relief the kinds of challenges to notions of the common good that inhere in 
Beirut’s civic space. In other words, the activities of the ordinary citizen in 
urban life were in a precarious position vis-à-vis the public-private confi gu-
rations of security that transformed the rules and routes of spatial move-
ment. Th ese enactments of state and class power, moreover, through their 
imbrication of public and private security, engendered a particular politics 
of social and spatial exclusion.
Security Profiling
Nearly all residents engaged in modes of spatial and social negotiation in 
order to navigate the barriers and blockades that regulated the vehicular 
and pedestrian movement of most—while at the same time making open-
ings for the movement of a select group of others—but dimensions of 
inequality shaped the dynamics of these negotiations as certain kinds of 
residents were subject to a heightened degree of scrutiny as they moved 
through the city.
During the period of political crisis and violence in 2004–2006, opposi-
tion to the Syrian administration and the presence of its army in Lebanon, a 
long-standing sentiment that had endured since the time of the long war at 
the onset of the Syrian occupation, reached fever pitch as a result of widely 
held beliefs that Syria was behind Hariri’s assassination. Th is opposition to 
the Syrian regime, which constituted the basis of the platform of the March 
14th alliance, spilled over into att acks on Syrians themselves. As a visible 
underclass linked with what some Lebanese understood to be an enemy 
state Syrian workers constituted a socially vulnerable—and visible—group 
moving through public space. Construed as potentially threatening in an 
anxious political climate, as well as powerless, they were uniquely regulated 
by security forces.
“Even if I am nizami [law-abiding], I get pulled over by the police,” 
one Syrian laborer who worked delivering fast food by motor scooter told 
me. Even though in possession of updated driver’s licenses and properly 
maintained vehicles, Syrian delivery workers I spoke with described being 
detained at roadsides, at police stations, and having their vehicles fre-
quently seized. One restaurant worker thought that Syrian delivery  drivers 
on motor scooters were most suspect because he had heard rumors that 
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“they [security forces] think that it might be a scooter loaded with explo-
sives that is sett ing off  some of the bombs.” “But they’re not sure,” he added. 
While the mobility of Syrian workers was subject to an increased level 
of scrutiny by the security apparatus even prior to Hariri’s assassination 
because of their status as a disenfranchised population, the political tone 
and precariousness of the post-Hariri period exacerbated their vulnerabil-
ity. Indeed, the bodies of the workers were profi led by Lebanese security 
services in ways that bore similarities with U.S. security agencies’ profi l-
ing of African Americans, Middle Easterners, and South Asians engaged 
in practices of mobility. As part of the U.S. vernacular, tongue-in-cheek 
expressions like “driving while black” and “fl ying while Arab or Muslim” (in 
the post-9/11 era) reference the policing that is generated by these profi ling 
practices. Th ese kinds of practices, like those the Syrian workers encoun-
tered, are initiated by suspicion of certain raced and classed bodies. In this 
way, while the order implemented by security in Beirut disrupted  mobility 
for many, it oft en rendered others, like the Syrian workers on motor 
scooters, immobile.
In techniques of securitization, risk is anticipated not only on the basis 
of ideas about race, gender, class but also through biometric technologies of 
profi ling that purport to identify and detect likely, future, off enders through, 
for example, reading and analyzing minute aspects of the body such as 
facial expressions that betray criminal intent. Studies of the global regime 
of mobility that consider technologies of security in the post-9/11 era high-
light the use of biopolitics, which examines and interprets bodily gestures in 
seeking to surveil, to assess the risk presented by, and to manage the move-
ment of individuals. Th ese programs of behavioral profi ling, unlike the zig-
zag barrier or steel blockade, bear a futurist temporality that creates what 
geographer Ben Anderson calls “geographies of anticipatory action” (2010). 
By acting upon individuals “on the basis of behavioural potentialities rather 
than on the basis of how they have actually acted” (Bell 2006, 160), these 
technologies of security bear a distinctively preemptive character.
In Beirut, security also acts on the basis of behavioral potentialities, 
but in a way that makes central social standing as opposed to aff ective and 
bodily gestures. For example, the barriers that require the zig-zag move-
ment are oft en set up this way in order to slow cars and allow guards to take 
a longer, more substantive look at a vehicle’s occupants. Suspicious drivers 
are told to pull over and thus enter a second, verbal and more discerning, 
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stage of inspection. Th ough the criteria for and assessment of who and 
when someone is deemed suspicious is contextual, it draws signifi cantly on 
the inextricably linked dimensions of social status and potential criminality 
rather than on the kinds of technologically sophisticated forms of spatial 
surveillance employed in many other sites around the world.
In Beirut’s public space, a labor force of armed guards typically mea-
sured people’s behavioral potentialities. Members of security, whom I 
observed to be exclusively male, seemed to identify and detect the level of 
threat posed by an individual or group according to both broad and local-
ized notions of social hierarchy and identifi cation that ranked and sorted 
persons by making use of various sensorial registers including the visual 
discernment, verbal communication, and mental determination of charac-
teristics such as class, gender, age, and religious and national background. 
Arabic accents, the wearing of religiously identifi ed clothing such as the 
headscarf, and one’s status as a Western foreigner are all features of the 
complex matrix that is the basis for the calculation of threat level.7 Indeed, 
as Fawaz, Harb, and Gharbieh observe about threat detection in Beirut, 
even the wearing of plastic shoes like fl ip-fl ops, which are thought by many 
Lebanese to be inferior-status footwear appropriate only for the interior of 
the home, might give security personnel enough reason to conduct a more 
thorough going-over (2012, 182).
Sara, a mother of two in her thirties, related to me how, in her verbal 
interactions with members of Beirut’s security forces while driving (a 
Volkswagen), she always tells them that she is in a rush and “needs to get 
through” (if there is a barrier or blockade) in order to pick up her children at 
their friends’ home. She recalled how this tactic of emphasizing her role as 
a mother trying to reach her child oft en proves successful at gett ing around 
the constraints security might otherwise place on her mobility. Sara’s iden-
tity as a woman, a mother, and upper income (driving a stylish German 
car) is recognized by the localized regime of mobility administered by 
the security forces as one that is entitled to greater freedom of movement. 
In this sense, amid an urban social space structured by patriarchy, under-
standings of gender and class come together to create a kind of mobility of 
entitlement whereby the upper-class mother is confi gured as both powerful 
and, in a certain sense, powerless by the fi rst line of security. In negotiating 
for access, Sara was able to draw on a form of power that stems from her 
elevated class position and, at the same time, gendered notions of women 
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and mothers as unthreatening and in need of male guidance and protection. 
Her access to urban space stands in stark contrast to the experiences of the 
Syrian worker on the motor scooter, who held low status in Beirut society 
and was deemed possibly threatening by certain political groups. His move-
ment was circumscribed by security. Th is inequality in access produced 
a stratifi ed mobility whereby movement through the city by some urban 
residents, like the upper-income woman in transit to pick up her child, was 
less suspect and more unrestrained than that of others—the male foreign 
laborer, for instance.
Navigating Security: Tactics, 
Strategies, and Competence
In Beirut’s realms of security, social class, national origin, and gender are 
important facets of the complex social matrix upon which decisions about 
spatial access are made. However, these features of social identity are not 
the only factors that go into determining to whom spatial access should or 
should not be ceded. One’s ability to negotiate with security forces can also 
shape the outcome of one’s experience in and around a secure area. Th e 
security encounter, like other interactions in Beirut’s public life, might be 
navigated through familiarity or by successfully mobilizing one’s social cap-
ital through perceived, proclaimed, or demonstrable affi  liation with well-
placed individuals, oft en kin members, or institutions.
Once, while riding as a passenger in Maya’s car while she ran errands 
around the city, she entered a parking lot that sat across from the building 
housing a prominent NGO. She had picked up and dropped off  documents 
at this building many times, and the men who staff ed the parking-lot secu-
rity gate knew her, she said. Th is time, the security guard chatt ed with her 
and told her that although he was supposed to check under her car—using 
the wheeled search mirror he was holding—he was not going to bother her 
with this check, and he gave her clearance to go ahead and park.
Reminiscent of Erving Goff man’s dramaturgical perspective of urban 
public life as an arena in which individuals present their “familiar” and “con-
nected” selves (Hannerz 1980), Maya’s mode of gaining spatial access in a 
city characterized by various forms of security highlights the signifi cance 
of face-to-face interactions in Beirut’s urban environment and challenges 
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assumptions about cities as spaces with high levels of both anonymity and 
anomie. Moreover, the cultivation of the “familiar” and “connected” self 
highlights the harnessing of certain sets of skills and tactics that residents 
use in gett ing around the city.8 If, as anthropologist Ulf Hannerz (1980) 
notes, we conceive of the “city as theater,” the security encounter is a scene 
through which residents as actors display, or hope to display, a kind of “user 
competence” (Fawaz, Gharbieh, and Harb 2009, 2) that enables them to 
navigate past social and material security barriers. Th e privileged, in pos-
session of a greater level of user competence, oft en, but not always, fi nd a 
means of access.
In February 2006, I escorted a group of students, who happened to all be 
women, from a colleague’s anthropology course at the American University 
of Beirut (AUB) onto the busy commercial street adjacent to the university 
to participate in a classroom exercise about taking fi eldnotes. Th e univer-
sity’s picturesque and gated campus, replete with red-tiled roofed build-
ings boasting Mediterranean views, is an oasis of green amid the concrete 
of Beirut. With its English-language curriculum and costly tuition, AUB 
enrolls students primarily from privileged backgrounds.
It was a rainy morning, and although we had planned to focus on com-
pleting the classroom exercise, matt ers of security prevailed. We exited 
the campus, heading past one of the several entrances around the cam-
pus’s perimeter staff ed by guards, and stood under the awning of a restau-
rant to take notes. Th is section of the street was dott ed with soldiers, and 
in front of them cars moved along the one-way corridor zigzagging back 
and forth between a corral of metal barricades. Th e then-prime minister, 
Fouad Senioura, lived in an apartment building on this block. Passing along 
in front of his building was a meandering, vehicular caravan overseen by 
a group of soldiers. A minute or so aft er the students began taking notes, 
a soldier came to ask us what we were doing. Th e students took the lead, 
responding that they were from the university and were doing an assign-
ment for class. Th e soldier left , and we continued observing and writing. 
A few minutes later, another soldier, this one more imperious, approached 
our group. “Could you move?” he asked rhetorically. Flustered, we made 
the collective decision to fi nd another location to complete the exercise. 
In their fi eldnotes, the students wrote about what happened. One wrote: 
“What I was thinking about during this conversation [with the soldier] is 
that, are we a kind of threat to them? Are we a threat to security? Aren’t the 
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streets for the public? Aft er this experience with the solider, I felt uncom-
fortable to stay there; we were violating the rules of the public space that is 
now part of several private spaces: the restaurant and Senioura’s property.”
Other students also commented that the soldiers’ telling us to move 
demonstrated the insidious expansion of the private at the expense of 
the public. Th eir notes voiced not only resentment about this takeover of 
public space but also uneasiness about having their freedom of movement 
curtailed by the soldiers, in particular, I surmised, because they were unac-
customed to being viewed or treated as threatening in public space. One 
student, for instance, spoke in her write-up about how the stares of both the 
soldiers and passersby made her feel as if she was doing something wrong. 
“Were we a threat?” she wrote, “I hope not. I don’t want to get arrested just 
for writing notes.”
I shared the students’ sentiments insofar as I too found the encounter 
both surprising and unsett ling. Having come and gone from the univer-
sity on a regular basis, I was, as I am sure the students were, aware of the 
increased security along the block where Senioura lived, but I presumed, 
mistakenly, that our behavior on the street would be perceived as harmless. 
What is more, I thought that our association with the university, a province 
of the privileged, would grant us access to the street that others might not 
be permitt ed. I thought this association furnished us with the social capital 
that would enable us to move freely in the public-cum-privatized space, as 
the one student summed it up, that this block of the street had become.
But security encounters are variable and, as such, one can predict nei-
ther the course of action of an encounter nor its outcome. For example, it 
might have been our act of writing notes that bothered the soldiers, just as 
the taking of photos on a public street near a blockade—or even the carry-
ing of a camera—might incite a confrontation with security personnel. But 
we also might have tried to negotiate with the soldiers by claiming that we 
had permission from the university administration to conduct a classroom 
exercise and to record information there on the street. Th is claim of autho-
rization from high-ranking authorities, a demonstration of our competence 
as users of Beirut’s urban space, could have thrown off  the soldiers and 
entrenched our position. However, in the context of security, mobility and 
access are contingent on a myriad of factors including, but not limited to, 
the moods and whims of the soldiers and guards, the time of day, and the 
prevailing scale and dimensions of political tension.9 In Beirut, there are no 
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state-issued red or yellow alerts indicating the level of threat,10 but the ebbs 
and fl ows of political crisis, which in turn shape security measures, play a 
key role in the management and regulation of spatial movement.
Moreover, what is particularly interesting about the nature of Beirut’s 
installations of security during the 2004–2006 period is the way in which 
they demonstrate the hegemony of party politics over the interests of 
the public or common good. As urban studies scholars Fawaz, Harb, and 
Gharbieh note (2012, 188), security deployments in Beirut show not only 
disregard for the common good, as the comings and goings of a select group 
of infl uential individuals curtail and alter the movement of the majority of 
the city’s residents in various ways, “but actually the absence of a claim for-
warded in the name of a ‘common good’ to justify these deployments.” In 
fact, it would seem that the securitization of key political fi gures and eff orts 
to maintain their unhindered mobility through the city to home, work, and 
leisure outweigh not only the public interest but also what Michel Foucault 
understood to be the key aspect of the city’s spatial order: making possible, 
guaranteeing, and ensuring the circulation of people, goods, and money 
(2007, 29). Th e clout of those whom security surrounds is such that their 
circulation across “archipelagos of privilege and power” (Graham 2010, 96) 
is given priority over the routinized activities of public and commercial 
life. Th e workings of security, in this way, have an exclusionary eff ect in the 
urban environment.
Enclavization
Security reconfi gured mobility in Beirut in both the short term, as weaving 
back and forth between barriers was suddenly required, and also in more 
lasting ways, as residents had to fi nd new routes from home to work or from 
school to home because of road closures and the rerouting of traffi  c fl ow in 
areas near VIP residences.
Among the most heavily fortifi ed spaces in Beirut aft er February 2005 
was that surrounding the home of former prime minister Hariri, a pala-
tial block-long structure in the west Beirut neighborhood of Koreitem. 
Following Hariri’s assassination, the street passing in front of the home was 
turned into a one-way thoroughfare with checkpoints at both ends; secu-
rity was later intensifi ed, and vehicular access was denied entirely. Here, 
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both personnel employed by the Hariri family and Lebanese armed forces 
managed security.
Th e order enforced by the security near the Hariri palace, and else-
where in the city, created a kind of disorder for many residents, especially 
drivers. On many of the occasions when I met with Maya, a professional 
whose workplace was adjacent to the Hariri palace, or rode as a passen-
ger in her car, she complained about how the street’s being changed to a 
one-way route added time and stress to her commute. In fact, not only was 
traffi  c fl ow on the main thoroughfare that passed by the palace disrupted, 
but also circulation along the smaller, connecting streets was managed by 
guards and signs announcing that the streets were closed except to those 
who needed to conduct business at the palace. Also, sections of a busy road 
down from and parallel to the one in front of the Hariri palace were lined 
with yellow police tape that read “police line” in English and displayed 
numerous “no parking” signs.
Maya’s everyday driving patt erns were caught up in the development of 
security enclaves throughout Beirut. Similar processes of enclavization have 
shaped the everyday lives of residents in other cities in the Middle East. In 
Cairo, for example, exurban gated communities have been expanded, as 
have urban elite consumer practices that involve patt erns of travel from 
one type of guarded space to another, a phenomenon geographer Stephen 
Graham has termed “passage point urbanism” (2010). Elsewhere in the 
world, fear of crime has led middle- and upper-class residents, in São Paulo 
for example, to fortify their residences and neighborhoods, employ private 
security forces, and seek out modes of urban mobility that enable them to 
pass over, in some cases quite literally through the use of helicopters, the 
urban streetscape and the likelihood of interaction with its lowest-status 
denizens (Caldeira 2000).11 Th ese kinds of classed processes of spatial and 
social segregation link up with the broader global phenomenon of estab-
lishing secure, private, separately administrated, and “globally networked” 
territories within parts of nations (Ferguson 2005).
Navigations of the territories of security in Beirut took place in a pub-
lic space already confi gured by relations of power wherein certain bodies 
are subject to increased scrutiny and regulation. In processes of securing 
Beirut, these inequalities of spatial access and mobility were produced 
in concert with forms of symbolic domination experienced by all. For 
 example, following his assassination, photo billboards of Hariri were put up 
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downtown, in West Beirut, and along major highway corridors surrounding 
the city. His oversize image, draped from verandas of buildings facing one 
another, hung over the center of narrow streets in neighborhoods affi  liated 
with his political party and its supporters. A graphic production company 
with whom Maya dealt for her work told her of the huge profi ts they had 
made printing Hariri posters. It was a continuous source of revenue, they 
said, because the poster images were replaced with new ones every few 
months. Other Hariri displays appeared in electronic form; a digital score-
board adjacent to his downtown burial site and another near the studios of 
the television network his family owned kept a running count of the num-
ber of days since his death. As a political technology visually representing 
and memorializing Hariri’s power and surveilling public life, these pictorial 
and numeric displays constituted territories of security in their own right.
Security enclavization was also a feature of the neighborhood where 
the speaker of the house of parliament, Nabih Berri, one of the top three 
men in Lebanon’s political system, resided. In Ain-al-Tiné, just west of 
Verdun, on the street where Berri lives, security spilled out into the lives of 
residents and passersby. Hania, a woman in her forties, lives with her fam-
ily in a building down and across the street from Berri’s residence. It was 
early 2006 when Hania told me how Berri’s security had recently reduced 
the height of the speed bumps that were staggered along the street. Aft er 
being installed in order to slow vehicle traffi  c from one end of the street to 
the other and thereby enhance surveillance capabilities, Berri’s neighbors 
complained that the bumps were too high and caused damage to their cars. 
But soon, another type of barrier to mobility appeared: a blockade staff ed 
by soldiers was situated at one end of the street. Th e other end of the street 
remained open, but midway up the street a gentler barricade stood: a low 
chain strung between two metal posts blocked cars from passing through.
Walking along this street, one closed to public vehicular traffi  c, created 
an intimate encounter with this barricade. Amid this intimacy, a conse-
quence of the slower pace and bodily aspects of pedestrian mobility, the 
many layers of security were made evident. I met Hania at her building sev-
eral times, and each time I approached the chain, because there were no 
sidewalks on her street, I thought about the ways in which the barrier might 
be breached: I could easily unhook the chain from the metal post or, more 
simply, step over it, for instance. But the chain represented only the fi rst 
layer of security, as armed soldiers stood watch on the side of the street, 
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oft en taking shelter from the sun by standing or sitt ing in a wooden sentry 
box. A cognitive and bodily awareness of this second layer of security made 
me automatically pause just in front of the chain and look over to receive 
a signal from the soldier(s) that I was permitt ed to proceed. Th en, and 
only then, would I step over the chain. If I was not signaled and approved 
of from a distance, this seemingly penetrable barrier became even more 
cumbersome. Verbal communication added another layer to barriers, one 
of social negotiation and the increased possibility that the right of access 
would be denied.
For example, on one occasion, aft er passing the checkpoint at the open-
ing of Hania’s street, I sat on a ledge outside her building to wait for her. 
A soldier stationed in front of Berri’s residence walked over and asked me 
why I was sitt ing there and whom I knew in the building. I gave him Hania’s 
name. In an act that suggested the improvisatory, even arbitrary, nature of 
security, he proceeded to quiz me: “What is her family name?” “What fl oor 
does she live on?” It seemed that he knew all the residents in the building, 
even the fl oors on which they lived, and that I would be given permission to 
remain sitt ing there only if I could prove that I was indeed Hania’s acquain-
tance. I erred a bit, giving Hania’s parents’ family name as I was unable to 
recall her married name, but the soldier was satisfi ed with my answers. He 
relaxed and began to make aff able conversation.
At checkpoints and blockades not only social interactions but the mate-
rial forms of the barriers themselves were unpredictable and required 
tools of negotiation. Th e changing and multilayered nature of the mate-
rial barriers that manifested on Hania’s street, for instance, exemplifi ed 
the shape-shift ing nature of security installations in Beirut: secured areas 
were increasingly and suddenly fortifi ed as barriers took on harder, more 
permanent forms, bollards and no parking zones were erected overnight, 
and streets were unexpectedly closed off  or were reconfi gured, without 
warning, from two- to one-way traffi  c. In this way, processes of securitiza-
tion made daily mobility a challenging and uncertain aff air. “It’s annoying,” 
Hania said of the impediments that lined her street, but “it’s bett er to have 
all of this than not to have it I guess. . . . Although it’s interesting, because 
no one was killed in his house. All of them have been killed a-tareeq [on the 
road].” Indeed, those assassinated had all lost their lives in their cars.
In 2006, friends visiting the home of Karine, a twenty-one-year old 
college student, would encounter a checkpoint on arriving at her street. 
 Securing Beirut 97
Karine’s street in the upmarket northern Beirut suburb of Rabieh was home 
to the residence of General Michel Aoun, a key fi gure during the Lebanese 
civil and regional war who reappeared on the political stage in spring 2005 
aft er returning from living in exile in France. Security forces protecting 
Aoun’s residence, which Karine thought consisted of both privately hired 
guards and state soldiers, issued visitor parking passes to households along 
the street for their guests. “I always tell my friends to call me when they get 
close to my house so that I can come out and give them a parking pass,” 
Karine explained. What happens if you park your car on the street without 
a parking pass? I asked her. “Th ey will tow your car,” she replied.
Along Aoun’s street, two distinct, yet intersecting, types of enclavization 
were at work. One type of enclave, as I discussed earlier, was established 
by mechanisms of security seeking to protect Aoun and his family from 
harm. Th ough not an offi  ceholder, Aoun’s personage generated processes of 
securitization that altered the mobility practices of his neighbors and their 
guests. However, the security enclave was enmeshed with another, that of 
the affl  uent. Situated en route to the mountains but only a twenty-minute 
drive from Beirut, Rabieh is an exclusive neighborhood of luxury hillside 
villas. In a sense, we can conceive of this intersection of enclaves as more 
than merely another example of the overlapping of social and physical geog-
raphies of class and political elites in Beirut. Th e intersection of enclaves 
changed things, if only a bit: wealthy residents accustomed to exercising 
their own forms of security and surveillance in the interest of maintaining 
not just safety but exclusivity found themselves subject to the scrutiny of 
bodyguards and soldiers. Th is change demonstrates not that the mobility of 
all residents was equally regulated and disciplined by Beirut’s installations 
of security in the 2004–2006 period but rather the extent to which, in dif-
ferent ways and to diff erent degrees, security shaped everyday spatial life for 
residents from many walks of life.
According to Maya, who had to reorder her route to work as a result of a 
security blockade near the Hariri palace, exercising control over traffi  c was 
an important way of inscribing power in the urban landscape, especially for 
the political elite. She complained, for example, that the Hariri family did 
not reopen the seaside road, a major traffi  c artery, near the site of the explo-
sion that killed Hariri aft er the one-year anniversary of his assassination: “I 
mean, they could have reopened the road as part of the commemoration of 
his death in February 2006,” she said. “I don’t understand why they couldn’t 
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have done that, instead of just leaving it closed down and creating such a 
bad traffi  c situation for everyone, even aft er a year has passed. Th ey decide 
for all of us how we are going to live in this city!” Here, Maya regarded 
mobility for all as coming under the control of a select few—Hariri’s fam-
ily members, to be precise. Her comment about how things worked in the 
city, about how the infl uence of the billionaire Hariri family extended even 
into the realm of traffi  c and road closures, resonated with everyday casual 
remarks I heard about how the “country is run by a few people.” In this way, 
while the kinds of security assemblages that took shape in the 2004–2006 
period could be viewed as an exceptional state of being, for many ordinary 
residents they represented business-as-usual politics writ large on the pub-
lic landscape: the interests of the ruling class, to modify the classic line 
from Marx, were the ruling relations of space and society in Beirut, espe-
cially in the era following the long civil and regional war. Or as Nathalie, a 
university student, put it, “All the leaders have turned their neighborhoods 
into a thakanat [barracks]—you’re going somewhere and then you fi nd 
that a certain street is blocked and you can’t think of a diff erent route right 
away, . . . Th is is how it is; we’re just forced to adapt.”
Security for Whom?
In 2007, during the question-and-answer period following my research 
presentation at a workshop, a Lebanese woman criticized my analysis of 
experiences of security in Beirut. “You don’t emphasize enough how secu-
rity makes people feel safe,” she said. She was right. I had not emphasized 
feelings of safety that security installations may have fostered for some 
residents. Th inking that I might have overlooked these sentiments about 
 feeling safe and protected as a result of the security measures enacted in the 
2004–2006 period, I went through my research data again.
During the 2004–2006 time frame, violence took the form mainly of a 
series of assassinations of political fi gures and journalists and several bomb 
explosions in largely uninhabited sites in predominantly Christian areas 
of Beirut. Later, in summer 2006, a confl ict between Hizbullah and Israel 
escalated into full-scale war, and, in spring 2008, the deterioration of the 
domestic political situation brought the looming possibility of a return to 
civil war. Amid these two later contexts of crisis, the material formations 
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of security in Beirut continued to surround high-profi le locations, but the 
reach of violence expanded signifi cantly.
But in my fi eldnotes and interview transcripts from the 2004–2006 
period, on which this chapter focuses, I found that residents expressed frus-
tration, ambivalence, and weariness about the installations of security that 
took hold in the city rather than feelings of being protected by them. Nada, 
a young mother who lived in an apartment in Ain el Mreisse, only blocks 
away from the site of the explosions that took Hariri’s life and from which 
Hamadeh narrowly escaped with his, spoke pointedly about politics, and 
security, in these terms: “Th e whole situation is very depressing. Everyone I 
know is depressed, when I call my friends we’ll say that we feel tired, and we 
won’t really say it, we won’t say that we’re depressed. But the political situa-
tion is making us depressed. So when you ask about security, all I can say is 
that it is for the big deal makers who decide the fate of the Lebanese. Th ey 
will decide to either keep peace or to make war, and they. . . . Well, most of 
them have dual nationality—so if a real war does break out, they’ll be the 
fi rst to leave the country.”
For Nada, mechanisms of security not only did not make her feel pro-
tected but were emblematic of the oligarchic dimensions of the Lebanese 
political system, in which a group of elites dominate the realms of govern-
ment and play games of politics whose greatest risks—including the threat 
of full-scale war—are born by the majority citizen population. In fact, the 
security surrounding these “deal makers,” as Nada referred to them, exists 
in stark juxtaposition to the precariousness of lives lived by most Lebanese, 
who must contend with the outcomes of political and economic crises fash-
ioned by the power holders. In this sense, the insecurity wrought by for-
mations of security during the 2004–2006 period represented broader, and 
enduring, experiences of and sentiments about feeling unprotected by an 
unstable and corrupt political system in a region rife with confl ict.
The Inequality of Security
Th e havoc of insecurity and the diff erentiated experiences of mobility pro-
duced by processes of securitization during this time in Beirut recalled 
life during the protracted civil and regional war in ways both semiotic and 
material. It was not just the spectacle and destruction of the car bomb that 
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brought back the war but also the fact that residents’ mobility practices were 
once again regulated by armed forces, barriers, and closures, that territorial 
enclaves took shape, and that party loyalists-cum-foot soldiers working for 
the power holders of the political sectarian structure set up encampments 
throughout the city. And thus, while the order proff ered by security was 
for the few, it created a kind of disorder for the many.
Th e establishment of security enclaves surrounding the residences of 
these individuals reconfi gured the urban landscape in ways that entrenched 
its uneven geographies of power. As a result of these processes of enclaviza-
tion, residents experienced forms of insecurity as they found themselves 
caught up in shift ing and multilayered forms of security. Aft er all, the mobil-
ity of the targets of security—important persons who move from place to 
place—meant that security formations too were mobile and thereby territo-
rialized not only specifi c parts of the city but the city as a whole. Residents 
in the city, gett ing around by car and on foot, were enmeshed in disciplin-
ary arrangements produced by material and social mechanisms of security. 
Th ese mechanisms of security, operated by private nonstate and state actors 
working in concert, created an exclusionary urban landscape and expanded 
the privatization of the public realm.
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5 • THE CHAOS OF DRIVING
In April 2006, I was sitt ing in the back seat of a service taxi 
when a man who appeared to be Filipino told the driver he needed to go to 
Sassine Square, a commercial area in Ashrafi eh. Th e driver signaled for him 
to get into the car and he took the front seat. Right aft er we started mov-
ing, the driver swerved sharply and quickly to avoid hitt ing a car that had 
stopped suddenly. Speaking in very basic Lebanese Arabic, the front pas-
senger made a comment about how crazy driving in Beirut is. Th e driver 
agreed, saying in reply that yes, there is chaos but there are no accidents 
(fi  fowda bas ma fi  accidents).1 Th e passenger didn’t agree: “Of course there 
are accidents; people get hurt all the time” (akeed fi  accidents, fi  mowt, 
fi  kasr). Th e driver asked the passenger where he was from and what he did 
for a living. He was from the Philippines and worked as a cook in a restau-
rant. But these inquiries only led the driver down the same rhetorical path: 
that the chaos on the streets of Beirut is managed, that it is an orderly chaos, 
and, for this reason, there are few accidents:
Driver: Are there a lot of car accidents in the Philippines?
Passenger: Yes, more than here.
Driver: Exactly, there are more accidents there because the drivers are not used 
to sudden things happening on the road. But the drivers here are.
Th e driver is looking back at me through his rearview mirror, seeking sup-
port, agreement from me about the way things are in Lebanon.
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KM (borrowing a phrase I just heard someone use): Well, it’s true that the drivers 
here are clever.
During this conversation between the taxi driver and the front passenger, 
I sat in the back of the taxi silently agreeing with the passenger and refuting 
the driver’s claims. I had seen many accidents in Beirut, and members of 
NGO groups with whom I had met in the course of my research confi rmed 
that traffi  c fatalities and injuries were signifi cant throughout Lebanon.2 But 
I had also become familiar with this particular narrative about driving in 
Beirut, the one voiced by the service taxi driver, of there being a kind of 
orderly chaos on the roads that the city’s skillful drivers knew how to suc-
cessfully navigate. Moreover, no matt er the ensuing analysis, the notion of 
“chaos” almost always emerged in discussions about being mobile in Beirut. 
Aft er telling one service driver that my research was about “traffi  c,” he 
responded, and off ered his approval, by simply saying, “Oh, you mean ‘the 
chaos.’ Th at’s a good topic.”
Th roughout this chapter, I make use of the word chaos, the standard 
translation of the Arabic word fowda, which Lebanese used to describe 
 traffi  c in Beirut. However, I would like to make clear my disengagement 
from the notion that chaos is an objective and essential condition that 
can be empirically assessed and identifi ed. Drivers and nondrivers alike 
spoke of this chaos. In our conversations, residents from diff erent parts 
of the city, those from diff erent socioeconomic backgrounds, men and 
women, young and old, all emphasized the chaotic nature of gett ing around 
Beirut. Th e examples they cited, the evidence of fowda they wanted to call 
my att ention to, were not unique to Lebanon: they were examples of the 
frenetic and anything-goes nature of traffi  c, which resembled that in many 
cities around the world. But as I listened further, I realized that the dis-
course about chaos itself, rather than its practice, was especially signifi cant. 
Amid these narratives of the chaos of driving in Beirut were understandings 
of critical issues in Lebanese social and political life, past and present.
Sharing the Road: The Service Taxi
Although the streets are crowded with various types of vehicles, the ser-
vice taxi dominates the scene. Th ey are the most widely used form of 
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public transit in Beirut. To fl ag one, passengers stand in the street, usually 
along a busy thoroughfare, and lean toward the window of an oncoming 
service taxi and tell the driver a destination.3 In a city where numbered 
street addresses are not used and streets are commonly referred to by a 
variety of names, the destination is a landmark, neighborhood, or inter-
section. Usually, the driver will issue a nonverbal response on hearing a 
passenger’s intended destination: by tilting his head and chin upward, he 
gestures no, or, issuing another form of silent rejection, he simply drives 
off .4 Alternatively, by moving his head in the direction of the front pas-
senger seat or toward the rear passenger area, the service driver issues 
his acceptance of a passenger. A service driver will continue to seek pas-
sengers as the taxi moves along, oft en until the vehicle is at a capacity 
he determines himself. For example, the driver may not pick up anyone 
else or the taxi may end up full, with three passengers in the back and 
one in the front.
Service drivers are always already engaged in the arithmetic of fare ver-
sus fuel costs that shapes their decisions about which passengers to accept 
and which to refuse. With no running meter—they are paid the same fare 
even if stuck in traffi  c—they anticipate possible traffi  c congestion in deter-
mining whether to accept a passenger. Sometimes, to save fuel, they turn off  
their engines while idling in a traffi  c jam. I remember, on several occasions, 
sitt ing in old Mercedes taxis that had trouble restarting aft er their drivers 
shut them off  while standing still at busy intersections. Traffi  c would begin 
to fl ow aft er a time, and as the taxi struggled to get moving again, drivers 
behind us would beep and yell furiously.
In the fi rst phase of my research, 2004–2006, the majority of service 
taxis were aging Mercedes from the 1970s and 1980s with no air condition-
ing; drivers said these cars were more durable and easier to repair than 
others. However, by 2010, many of these Mercedes had been replaced with 
cooled, more fuel-effi  cient Japanese and Korean cars. Indeed, gas costs ate 
up a signifi cant portion of drivers’ earnings, as I learned through informal 
conversations with drivers as a passenger in their taxis, and many told me 
that they made less than US$15 a day. Figuring just below the average per 
capita income level,5 these wages created a strained existence: average 
family-sized apartments rented for between US$300 and $500 a month. 
Apartments in desirable buildings and in central or seaside locations rented 
for considerably more.
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While living in Beirut, I saw only male service drivers, the majority 
middle-aged or older. Th ere are those with and without an education, those 
who speak Arabic, English, and French—the three commonly used lan-
guages in Lebanon—and those who speak only Arabic. Moving around the 
city along a route they have fi xed themselves, the drivers normally put in 
long, ten- or twelve-hour shift s. Beirut’s streets swell with these taxis, and 
as the drivers head down streets beeping at pedestrians to signal that they 
are interested in picking up another fare, they produce one of the signature 
sounds of the city: a short, but signifi cant toot. At fi rst distracting, the toot-
ing of the service taxis fades into the background of the public scene once 
one becomes accustomed to it. It is a poignant acoustic, an itinerant tale of 
trying to make ends meet.
I traveled by service taxi almost daily. Every so oft en, I took the pub-
lic buses if I had the time to spare or wanted to save a bit of money. On 
occasion, I was a passenger in a private taxi or in a car owned by a friend, 
research participant, or the driving school where I went regularly to con-
duct fi eldwork. For foreigners, using service taxis serves as an initiation 
into the geography of the city as well as into the specifi c mores that govern 
this mode of public transportation. For example, choosing where to hail a 
service taxi is crucial, particularly during times of the day when congestion 
is worse. Situating yourself on a street whose one-way traffi  c fl ows in the 
direction of your destination oft en gives you bett er luck in fi nding a con-
senting driver. Likewise, fi guring out how to name a destination for the 
driver that is near enough to where you need to go but that is situated along 
an uncongested route so that the driver will not use up a lot of time and gas 
gett ing you there will also improve your chances of gett ing a ride with the 
very fi rst taxi you hail. Th is kind of know-how about the city’s layout and its 
most crowded corridors is an asset in using this transit system. If you lean 
down and tell the driver a destination that conjures images of bumper-to-
traffi  c with no escape routes, it is not uncommon to fi nd yourself rejected 
by one service driver aft er another, waiting in the street until you fi nd a 
driver who will consent to take you where you need to go.
Like the roadside hand signals Czeglédy (2004) describes being used in 
communications between passengers and drivers of kombi shared taxis in 
Johannesburg, these actions represent localized strategies for navigating 
the service transit system. Adopting these strategies, and speaking pro-
fi cient Lebanese Arabic, thus enables foreigners to demonstrate a kind of 
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“indigenous knowledge” and to represent themselves, whether accurate 
or not, as residents of the city and not merely tourists. As elsewhere in 
the  world, being identifi ed as a resident, rather than a short-term visitor, 
by taxi drivers and merchants of all kinds also serves as a talisman against 
being overcharged.
Making Sense of Chaos: Class
Service taxis play a signifi cant role in the city’s street life not only because 
of their sheer numbers but also because they are the site of intergroup inter-
action in Beirut par excellence.6 Like other forms of public travel, service 
taxis are a social event in and of themselves, one whose mundane activi-
ties, as Paul Stoller wrote of the Songhay bush taxi in Niger, off er insights 
into the complexities of the social action.7 As a locus of casual discussion 
about society, politics, and the nation among individuals from diff erent 
backgrounds, the collective taxi serves as a kind of everyday civic forum 
as well as an example of Beirut’s many scenes of public intimacy, which I 
wrote about in chapter 1. As such, encounters in service taxis are a regular 
conversation piece among residents of the city. And, in some conversations, 
they are also cited as being the chief source and orchestrator of the chaos 
on the streets.
Because services taxis do not pick up passengers at fi xed points along 
the road,8 and because they stop to engage verbally with passengers about 
their destinations when they do pick them up, other drivers cannot antici-
pate when, where, and for how long service taxis might stop. Th e service 
taxi’s movement is characterized by inching along the right side of the road 
in the hunt for passengers and a sudden darting from the left  to the right 
side of the road to do the same. At other times, the service taxi is stationary, 
in the middle of a lane of traffi  c, blocking the fl ow as its driver communi-
cates with passengers standing along the side of the road.
A kind of anxiety is refl ected in the service taxi’s fi tful movement, 
an anxiety born of economic stress. Ali Mohieddine, an offi  cial from the 
Taxi Drivers Syndicate, described to me in summer 2010 how taxi drivers 
were struggling and felt threatened because of the large number of illegal 
taxis on the roads. Th ere were far more taxis than there should be, he said, 
because, “in 1994, the government passed a law allowing for the production 
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of more red [taxi] license plates. So in 1994 there were 10,649 taxis [in 
Lebanon] and  today there are more than 32,000. And this doesn’t even 
include the copies—because the illegal taxis make fake license plates; they 
use the same number six times over!” Hearing these numbers prepared me 
for the estimates provided by Ilham Khabbaz, chief of Land Transport at 
the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, during our meeting that same 
summer. She estimated the number of service taxis on Lebanese roads to 
be about fi ft y thousand “though there should be only about thirty-three 
thousand,” she added. Ms. Khabbaz spoke about how, in the future, decals 
with bar codes would be affi  xed onto the doors of service taxis and would 
eventually replace license plates as the legal requirement for public transit 
vehicles. Th e number of illegal taxis will be quickly reduced, she explained, 
because police will have devices to scan and read bar codes that are almost 
impossible to reproduce.
Th ese issues of economic necessity, legality, and competition between 
taxi drivers were far from Nadia’s mind, a university student in her twen-
ties, when she described her commute to the university as a kind of obsta-
cle course that culminated in—just before reaching the parking lot on the 
campus—an encounter with “the worst nightmare of all Lebanese drivers, 
a service driver: he stopped six times, in order to ask people on the street if 
they wanted to come in. He stopped without any sign, without even mov-
ing his hands up and down from the window to warn me that he was going 
to stop.” In our conversation, another university student who drove her own 
car, Diala, spoke in a frustrated tone about how the service drivers “practi-
cally live on the road.”
In this way, from the perspective of owners and drivers of private vehi-
cles, the service taxi is understood to both incite and confi gure the so-called 
chaos of driving in Beirut. Th ere is a class dimension to this understanding 
that has to do both with the very mode of driving as well as the social status 
of the drivers. For example, the taxi’s movement, the perpetual going and 
stopping along the side of the ride to solicit passengers, is thought to cre-
ate logjams that impede the fl ow of traffi  c. But it is also the lowly position 
of the service driver on the social and occupational hierarchy that makes 
his driving an easy target in explanations of the chaos, particularly from the 
perspective of those who own and drive their own vehicles. Service driv-
ers have a high degree of public visibility—service taxis are recognizable 
by the taxi light atop the vehicle, the red license plate, or the way they move 
 Th e Chaos of Driving 107
around the streets—but, at the same time, they constitute a disenfranchised 
social group. Visible and vulnerable, the driving of the service taxi is classed 
in ways that make them a kind of fall guy, easily blamed for the chaos.
Class also framed other forms of public transit. When I heard Noura, 
a young woman in her twenties who has her own car, say that she never 
takes service taxis, that her parents wouldn’t allow it anyhow,9 and that she 
absolutely never takes the bus because “we have this idea that the bus is for 
the foreign workers, for the Syrians,” I was unsurprised. I had heard upper-
income Lebanese off er this opinion of service taxis and buses several times 
before. Once, a wealthy owner of a publishing company even expressed 
bemusement about my research interest in public transportation as she 
concluded, “I don’t really see why you are working on this topic; I mean, 
aft er all, there is no good public transportation here.” I had my doubts that 
hers was an opinion based on fi rsthand experience using public transit.
Yet, Beirutis I knew who did not own their own cars used service taxis 
almost daily, depending on the sites of their workplaces and schedules, 
to get around the city. Some who did own cars chose to use service taxis 
or even public buses when convenient. Celine, a woman of similar age 
and background as Noura but whom I would describe as more politically 
engaged, had been given a car by her parents when she was a teenager. She 
described how she regularly drove to university but that sometimes she did 
take the public bus from her home in the northern suburbs. “I don’t really 
mind it,” she said; “it’s a long ride, but it’s cheap, and I can use the time to 
study.” She described people she knew who would not ride the public buses 
because Syrian workers ride them. She dismissed these comments by tip-
ping her head back so that her nose pointed upward to indicate that they 
were “snobby,” as she put it in English.
For the owner and driver of a private car, the street—crowded with 
public transportation vehicles—can be seen as a fi eld of impediments 
that constitute a kind of chaos. Th is type of chaos, the chaos that is insti-
gated by stopping is, in this sense, linked with the realm of the less privi-
leged and powerful. For the service driver, stopping involves solicitation, 
and for the passenger stopping involves having to wait on a public street 
for an aff ordable means of transportation. Both service driver and public 
transit passenger surrender some control over their movement through the 
city and directly interface with the open public environment and its myriad 
denizens.
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Maya, however, asserted a kind of agency over her vehicular move-
ment that seemed to contrast markedly with that of the service drivers and 
passengers. Maya, whose navigations of security I described in the previ-
ous chapter, usually asked me to meet her at her offi  ce in the aft ernoons. 
I would then go with her, and we would converse en route, while she ran 
various work-, child-, and household-related errands. To save time, she 
said, because parking in many parts of Beirut is so challenging, we oft en 
remained in the car—a black Mercedes SUV that she wanted me to know 
had been bought used—during these errands. Rather than park, Maya 
would call ahead to an offi  ce and someone would come out to the car and 
bring her what she had requested or needed to pick up, such as airline tick-
ets or documents for work projects. She told me that she also picked up 
groceries in this same drive-by way by pulling up to a small grocery and 
leaning over toward the open passenger window to tell someone inside 
the store what she wanted. Th e items would be brought to her car, and she 
would pay for them there, while sitt ing in the driver’s seat.
Th ese drive-by errands invariably involved double parking, meaning 
she cut off  a lane of traffi  c, but Maya was undaunted. While I had also seen 
other drivers of cars, including service taxi drivers, purchase coff ee or veg-
etables from a street vendor in this same drive-by fashion, the way in which 
Maya called on others to bring things from within stores and offi  ces to the 
car seemed diff erent not only in degree but in kind. Her errand running 
demonstrated her effi  ciency in navigating the physical environment, via the 
insulation aff orded by the private vehicle, to create certain kinds of oppor-
tunities for herself that were linked to the realms of both work and home. 
And what is more, even in her presumption of the possibility of store-to-car 
delivery service, Maya seemed to carry class privilege.
Maya’s way of moving untrammeled through the city was suggestive of 
a diff erent type of chaos from the one thought to be created by vehicles 
like the service taxi. Th ose double parking their privately owned vehicle in 
order to facilitate their consumer and professional activities or those driv-
ing too fast and without regard for others’ safety might also be conceived 
of as chaotic. However, theirs is a chaos associated with privilege. Just as in 
other parts of the world, where the excessive driving speeds of young men 
who race through the streets are discursively constructed as a privilege of 
the elite, the young, male shayfeen haloun (show-off s) who speed around 
Beirut display their ability to move ahead, beyond, around.10 Th ey don’t 
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stop. Th us, in making sense of chaos, the movement of the service taxis and 
private vehicles is a site through which the geography of the city is classed.
Overcoming Chaos: The Project 
of Development
Developmentalist notions that positioned Lebanon and the Lebanese as 
not yet “developed” or “modern” but certainly on the path toward these 
ends were also evoked in discussions of chaos. But it is perhaps at the driv-
ing school Traffi  c where I found ideas about “the chaos” being a signifi er 
of the country’s “development” status to be most conspicuous during my 
research.
Traffi  c, located on the ground fl oor of an offi  ce building in the down-
town area, divided its curriculum into the French-termed théorie and pra-
tique. Th e student-drivers I observed were teenagers, though there were 
also some adult learners at the school. Th e young people were a privileged 
group as evidenced by their English and French language fl uency, their 
comments about traveling outside Lebanon, their stylish clothing, and 
their family’s ability to aff ord private driving instruction.
In the théorie classroom, a loft  space above the offi  ce area reached by lad-
der, I sat with the students watching French driver-education videos. Th e 
instructor stopped the video from time and time to go over fi ner points, the 
students asked questions, and there were moments in which the topic of 
what is specifi c about driving in Lebanon was raised. Th e théorie instruc-
tor would remind the students that once in pratique, they would fi nd that 
French driving theory is oft en inapplicable to the reality of driving in 
Lebanon. Indeed, when I took part in pratique sessions as a rear passenger 
in cars driven by the students, the point most strongly emphasized by the 
teacher was to drive defensively at all times and to expect the unexpected. 
Th ough this instruction did not align with what the students had learned 
from the French driver-education videos, they appeared at ease with the idea 
that France and Lebanon were two very diff erent places in which to drive.
Moreover, in the curricular culture of the driving school, France 
was positioned as a kind of role model and served a teleological func-
tion: French driving habits were situated in a distance that was ahead of 
Lebanon; they were habits that need be acquired in order to move forward 
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and become more “modern” and “civilized.” One driving student, born in 
Montreal but raised in Lebanon, spoke to me plainly about this trajectory: 
“You can see the state of a country in its driving—this refl ects everything, 
the state of things.” He gestured for me to look over at a car att empting to 
parallel park in a haphazard manner: “See, this is what I mean, this is a per-
fect example. You can see everything that’s wrong or right about a country 
when you look at its driving. A country is not powerful because of how rich 
it is; its resources are its people, its organization. . . . Th is is Lebanon’s prob-
lem!” In this young man’s view, even if one could not exist outside of the 
chaos, one could at least—even should—recognize it as unproductive, if 
not a hindrance to national development.
Ziad and Mona Aql, directors of the Youth Association for Social 
Awareness (YASA), took another, less hyperbolic view of the relationship 
between the unruliness of driving in Lebanon and the nation’s develop-
ment. Founded by the Aqls in 1995 aft er the death of a friend in a drinking 
and driving accident, YASA was, at the time of my fi rst phase of research, 
the only Lebanese organization working in the arena of driving and traffi  c 
safety. Th e organization provided educational and outreach services to citi-
zens and the state alike. Th rough various activities including meetings and 
press conferences with government offi  cials, public safety campaigns, and 
educational events staged at festivals and fairs, YASA urged Lebanese to 
slow down, to wear helmets and use child car seats, not to drink and drive, 
and, more generally, to abide by traffi  c laws and signage.
In conceiving of the chaos of driving in Lebanon as a grave public health 
issue that requires the combined eff ort of citizens and the state, Mona 
Aql framed the issue for me in developmentalist terms: “Th e thing is, as 
a developing country, like in all developing countries, traffi  c safety is not 
that big of an issue. It’s not a priority. We have issues with enforcement, 
with accountability, with road engineering, issues of security. . . . We are 
gett ing there but so far injury prevention has not been a top priority. We 
need to lobby more, we need to make the government more accountable 
for this, but the accountability issue, that’s a problem too in all developing 
countries.”
Th e picture of the nation that emerges in Mona’s perspective on chaos 
is one in the process of becoming. For Mona, the disorderliness of driving 
was a signifi er of Lebanon’s development status. Th is idea, that the chaos 
of driving was a behavior that would be overcome by progress, emphasized 
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the everyday dimensions of the broader-scale processes that we normally 
think of as constituting national development.
Th is notion of development as a project related to everyday social 
practice departed from the hegemonic vision of development in the era 
following the civil and regional war (1975–1990). Th is was a vision for 
Lebanon’s progress that focused on economic growth, which was to be 
achieved through the expansion of the banking and services sector and 
the physical construction of high-end commercial, residential, and offi  ce 
buildings. In conversations about the traffi  c situation, some people I 
spoke with voiced criticism about this model for Lebanon’s postwar recov-
ery. What was missing from this recovery plan, according to Dr. Hanna 
El-Jor, a public health consultant and YASA board member whom I spoke 
with in fall 2004, was an “investment in the people.” Th e lawlessness 
one sees in driving, he said, is a refl ection of the failures of the postwar 
reconstruction project.
During a service taxi ride in summer 2010, the driver echoed this senti-
ment. Most service drivers, upon hearing about my research about driving 
and traffi  c, off ered their opinions about the subject readily. Th is driver was 
no exception as he described how “the newer generations learn from the 
older generations so the only way to change things, to change the system, to 
change the ‘chaos,’” he joked, “is by taking away all the people that are here 
and replacing them with a new people!” His comments made me think, 
once again, about the interest people seemed to have in talking and sharing 
their perspectives about driving behavior. Part of this interest might have 
stemmed from the fact that, on the face of it, driving seemed to be a rela-
tively uncontroversial topic that had litt le to do with the contentious sphere 
of Lebanese politics.
But driving also seemed to be an experience rife with emotion, one, as I 
describe in the following section, residents of the city drew on to comment 
on civic life.
The Culture of Chaos: Lebanese-ness
Conversations about the chaos of driving were also linked with national 
culture and identity. Chaotic driving, in short, was oft en described to me 
as a demonstration or performance of Lebanese-ness that was recognizable 
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among Lebanese from all walks of life. In Th e Autostrad: A Mezé Culture—
Lebanon and Auto-mobility (2003), a research project and publication devel-
oped by the Faculty of the School of Architecture, Art, and Design at Notre 
Dame University in Louaize, a northern suburb of Beirut, the disorderli-
ness of driving in Lebanon was even likened to another aspect of Lebanese 
culture: food. Gett ing around, the comparison went, was like Lebanese 
mezé, “a typical Lebanese meal wherein a large number of small hot and 
cold dishes are placed haphazardly all over the table, sometimes even on 
top of each other due to lack of space” (2003, 1). Moreover, in expressing 
their Lebanese-ness through driving, some respondents thought a sense of 
civic and national solidarity was eff ected. For instance, as Ali, a chauff eur 
and assistant for an upper-middle-class family, explained: “Despite every-
thing, despite all of the divisions and the problems in this country, . . . the 
thing is, we [Lebanese] understand each other on the road [nafh am ba‘ad a 
tareeq].”
Ali’s understanding of the chaos of gett ing around was not the only 
one that struck a collectivist tone. Others also described being mobile 
in Beirut in ways that were reminiscent of Anderson’s idea about how 
the nation is conceived, and discursively constructed, as “deep, hori-
zontal comradeship” (1983).11 For instance, when I mentioned to Lara, a 
graduate student in her early twenties, that some people had told me that 
contemporary driving behavior stems from the era of the protracted civil 
and regional war, she disagreed. “No, no,” she said, “it’s the Lebanese way.” 
I asked her what this meant. “We like to be clever [shatreen], driving our 
own way, fi nding a way to the front of the line. . . . We like this. . . . We are 
Lebanese.” She added, “We do it for fun.” She continued by comparing 
driving and standing in line. “When I went to France, I didn’t stand in line. 
I would be at the end of the line, and I would see someone I know toward 
the front and go up and talk to my friend; and then I’d be at the front of 
the line. Sometimes I’d be with someone else and I’d grab my friend and 
say, ‘Let’s go to the front of the line.’” I told her how infuriating this behav-
ior was for me, that I had encountered it at the bank, post offi  ce, phar-
macy, and other places. Laughing, she replied, “I know, I know, but it’s just 
how we are.” But why fi nd a way around, why do people do these things? 
I asked her. “We do it for fun; . . . we do it to show . . . that we are able to do 
it. To fi nd a way around, a way through, it’s the Lebanese way!” Another 
young woman, Dima, concurred with this analysis: “You know, Lebanese 
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complain about the ‘chaos’ but they like it. Th ey like being able to navi-
gate around; they like the challenge, and they especially like not following 
rules!”
I also heard Lebanese driving behavior compared to that in other parts 
of the world in ways that echoed Lara’s celebratory narrative about the 
Lebanese maverick sensibility being observable through driving practice. 
For example, in late 2005 while I was riding in a service taxi, an army sol-
dier entered and took the front seat next to the driver. We stopped at a large 
intersection, where a policeman was managing the fl ow of traffi  c. While the 
traffi  c policeman screamed at the driver of a car that had gone through the 
intersection without being directed to go, the soldier amusingly remarked 
to the service driver, “You know, in America, they stop at the intersection 
even if there isn’t a light!” Th e service driver laughed. Th is commentary 
and others like it seemed to make reference again to a developmentalist dis-
course about where Lebanon is positioned vis-à-vis Western countries but 
in a way that did not express feelings of inadequacy, but rather a kind of 
insider-ness and self-mocking pride.
Samah, a young man in his twenties who was four years old when his 
family emigrated to France during the long war, also spoke about how 
insider-ness/outsider-ness is expressed and cultivated through driving 
behavior. “When I come back to Lebanon, my friends are always saying 
that I’m nizami [orderly/law-abiding] because I follow the [traffi  c] rules.” 
In another example, a social science professor at a university in Beirut, 
inspired by the many conversations we had had about my research, created 
a fi nal exam question that asked her students to discuss driving in Beirut 
using concepts from the course materials. In their responses, many students 
made reference to cultural norms and values, but, more than anything, 
the students wrote about their sense of the sheer chaos on the streets and 
off ered interpretations of its cultural meaning. One student, for instance, 
wrote about how driving behavior was a means of performing Lebanese-
ness: “Even if foreign people are not used to such a way of driving, they 
have to learn how to drive in Beirut. So, by driving between cars, not stop-
ping at a red light, the person who is driving will be described as the ‘real’ 
Lebanese driver even if he/she is not as ‘real’ or from another country but 
he/she will look like ‘real.’”
Sitt ing on a bus returning to Beirut from a summer concert in the moun-
tains in 2005, I listened in on a conversation between what I surmised, 
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as a result of their ease alternating between fl uent Lebanese Arabic and 
American English, were two young Lebanese American men. Like the 
student’s exam answer, they talked about how a certain set of skills was 
required for driving in Lebanon. “Th e thing about driving here,” one guy 
told the other, “is that if you can drive in this country, you can drive any-
where.” In a commentary for the World Aff airs Journal, American jour-
nalist Michael Tott en (2005) elaborated on this sentiment by describing 
driving in Lebanon as a game in which “your reaction time—and there-
fore your driving skill—grows exponentially aft er you’ve played this game 
for a while.”
Th e theme of native or, for nonnatives, acquired, expertise and knowl-
edge about how to transgress was a recurring one in the accounts about 
driving that I gathered during my fi eldwork. As Lara described it, this 
was expertise in fi nding a way around, a way through, a way out. It was an 
expertise born from the cultivation of a particular set of skills of negotia-
tion, in this case negotiation of Beirut’s urban space, which suggested not 
only cleverness but also resilience in the face of challenge. Th ese aspects 
of knowing how to drive in Lebanon went along with the ability to iden-
tify and to make the most of opportunities and with irreverence toward 
forms of state authority that seek to limit or constrain public behaviors 
and practices. Th us, together with social class and the developmental tra-
jectory of the nation, I found that at stake in the talk about the chaos of 
driving in Beirut were matt ers of national culture and identity. In ways that 
evoked Anderson’s (1983) idea of the nation as an “imagined community,” 
in which dimensions of social solidarity, rather than inequality and exploi-
tation, are emphasized, people of varied backgrounds described the com-
petence and skill said to be required for driving in Beirut as expressions of 
Lebanese-ness.12
In hearing these comments about gett ing around Beirut, I began to think 
about how driving, conceived of as practice (in the Bourdieuian sense of an 
action with a history), could also be understood as habitus, a disposition, as 
Pierre Bourdieu wrote, that is “collectively orchestrated without being the 
product of the orchestrating action of a conductor” (1977, 72). In the nar-
ratives about clever and self-determining driving behavior being Lebanese, 
everyday mobility emerged as a medium through which a kind of national 
habitus could be observed.
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The Culture of Chaos: Disorganization 
and Moral and Civic Propriety
Lebanese draw on the notion of fowda not only in their talk about driving 
and traffi  c but also in their descriptions of other dimensions of civic, politi-
cal, and everyday life. Ideas about the chaos of being mobile in Beirut are 
thus situated amid broader understandings of social disorganization. 13 For 
example, I heard activities as diverse as infrastructural improvements, mun-
dane dealings with the bureaucracy, and queuing practices characterized 
as disorganized or chaotic. One respondent described how construction 
projects in Beirut are always ongoing and never quite fi nished because the 
diff erent utility and service companies do not coordinate their installation 
projects with one another: “Th e telephone company digs up holes in the 
street for a month to install cables and then the holes are closed up; . . . 
the next month the electric company comes back and digs up the street to 
install something. So the street is always torn up!”
Religious scripture off ered another lens on the moral and civic sensi-
bilities surrounding driving and public behavior more generally. Grand 
Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, the now deceased leading 
Lebanese Shi‘i Muslim cleric and spiritual leader of Hizbullah, gave the 
subject his att ention. In 1995, he issued a fatwa—or formal legal opinion 
or decree—that called for adherence to the traffi  c law and the preservation 
of public space for safe and unrestricted civic usage. “Compliance with the 
traffi  c system,” he wrote, “will put an end to a chaotic driving which leads to 
the disorderliness of not only public space, but all aspects of people’s lives.”14 
In the same fatwa, he also discussed the necessity of taking care of public 
space so as to ensure the safety of residents by advising, in particular, that 
owners of stores refrain from taking up sidewalk space outside their shops 
so that residents are not forced to walk in the street to get around the dis-
play of wares. He wrote that it was “not permitt ed for one person to behave 
in the streets in a way that creates problems for the movement of others, 
be it [by] parking cars so that streets are turned into garages or by creating 
obstructions that are not due to cases of emergency.” More recently, in 2007, 
Fadlallah issued a decree prohibiting the obtaining of a driver’s license by 
illegal means and, in the context of driving, insisted that Lebanese respect 
their health and safety and that of others.15 Just prior to his death in July 
2010, he met with the traffi  c-safety organization YASA and “affi  rmed the 
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legal Islamic position that requires respect for public order and recalled his 
earlier fatwa stipulating the necessity of respecting the traffi  c laws.”16
Th ese decrees conceive of driving as an act of moral citizenship. And, 
as part of the civic realm, the ways in which residents move through urban 
space—and prevent others from moving through it—are thought to belong, 
in Fadlallah’s words, more to the realm of obligation and responsibility than 
to the arena of rights and entitlements. A sense of constraint that comes 
from within, distinct from the external constraints exerted by the police and 
the state, emerges here: the moral citizen should herself strive for decorous 
driving, rather than expect others to impose it. Th e Islamic conception of 
fi tna, meaning upheaval, disturbance, strife, is brought into play here. Th e 
individual must engage in a moral, internal struggle against fi tna that is con-
nected to a broader, external struggle against a more publicly related fowda.
Along with these religious framings of the disorderliness of driving and 
other kinds of public behavior, many residents of the city off ered under-
standings of the chaos that drew on a secular framework of civic respon-
sibility and ethics. Samar, a project manager at a nonprofi t organization 
focused on citizenship education for children and youth, spoke about how 
upsett ing she found the driving situation in Lebanon. While some seemed 
to celebrate the anything-goes style of driving, she viewed unruly driving 
behavior in a defi nitively negative light: “It really upsets me, and I’m sorry 
to say this because I’m Lebanese, but it really shows me when I’m driv-
ing how the Lebanese are, how they are opportunistic; it shows their eth-
ics.” During our very fi rst meeting, when I introduced my research topic 
to Maya, the working mother who ran errands by driving by, she off ered 
a similar commentary when summarizing what she saw as the core issue 
undergirding the chaos: “We are enemies on the road. It’s a competition. 
Everyone wants to be fi rst, . . . and even professors and people I know who 
supposedly have diff erent ethics about citizenship, about civics, they do the 
same thing on the roads. ‘I have to be fi rst’—we all do it.”
The Chaos of Corruption
During my research, I found that in addition to matt ers of civic responsibil-
ity and ethics, corruption was also a part of everyday parlance linking the 
chaos of driving with broader structural issues of social disorganization. 
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In July 2010, a Lebanese television news program, Al-Fassad (“corruption” 
in Arabic), featured as its main guest Ziad Aql, director and co-founder of 
YASA. Th roughout his interview with the program’s combustible host and 
in responding to questions from callers, Aql drew connections between 
chaotic driving and forms of government corruption. “In a system where 
we have twenty cars driving around with the same license plate number and 
people gett ing driver’s licenses without taking the test,” he argued, “it is not 
surprising that we have ‘chaos’ on the streets. Th e numbers of accidents, the 
problems with traffi  c, these are problems of corruption.”
While the television program Al-Fassad provides a platform for citizens 
to air grievances about corruption in and beyond the realm of traffi  c, the 
Lebanese Transparency Association, a nonprofi t organization, focuses 
on advocating for reform in governance and citizen behavior. In a meet-
ing I had in 2010 with Badri Meouchi, the association’s executive director, 
he detailed their three key steps: raising awareness, doing research about 
how to improve the system, and making recommendations to the decision-
makers about the changes that should be made. When I used the phrase 
culture of corruption, Meouchi bristled: “When you say culture it sounds 
like something that can’t be changed, something that comes from families 
and traditions. . . . It’s bett er to think about it as a question of habits, of prac-
tices. Let’s take the parking meters, having to park inside white lines and 
then get out and go and pay at a machine! I mean, come on, . . . this is some-
thing you couldn’t ever imagine Lebanese doing! But now they are doing it. 
And they like doing it!”
In this sense, to take Meouchi’s point a bit further, the chaos in Beirut 
could be contested through awareness, education, and the incorporation of 
new habits into everyday life. Curiously, in fact, Meouchi’s comments about 
Beirut residents’ reception of the parking meters, particularly given that any 
form of parking serves as a constraint on unfett ered automobility, provide 
a counterweight to the discussions of Lebanese-ness that argue for the cul-
tural authenticity of a mobility that breaks all the rules.
Th e pay-and-display electronic parking meters Meouchi spoke of were a 
recent addition to Beirut’s streetscape. Th e meters, along with the construc-
tion of pedestrian bridges and the installation of traffi  c lights, were part of 
the Urban Transportation Development Project (UTDP), an infrastruc-
tural eff ort funded jointly by the World Bank and the Lebanese Council 
for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) to improve traffi  c conditions 
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in and around Beirut. I met with the manager of the UTDP in Elie Helou 
in 2005 and again in 2010 at what marked, respectively, the early and fi nal 
phases of the project. In 2010, aft er a conversation during which he spoke 
with pride when detailing the infrastructural improvements that had been 
completed and with frustration about the state’s inability to successfully 
manage and administer the traffi  c system that makes use of these improve-
ments, Helou walked me from his offi  ce to the front of the building housing 
CDR in downtown Beirut. Helou, a garrulous presence, waxed contempla-
tive when I asked him about the lessons learned through his involvement 
with the project. Echoing Meouchi’s sentiments about unforeseen citizen 
behavior, Helou paused a bit before saying, “You know, I really thought,” 
then, correcting himself, he continued, “No, we all thought that the parking 
machines were going to be the weakest part of this project, . . . that there 
was no way that people would use them, that people would hate them and 
complain about them all the time. But it turns out they are the strongest 
[part of the project], the most successful part. People really like the parking 
machines.”
Meouchi’s and Helou’s comments about residents’ use of and satisfac-
tion with the parking meters gave support to the idea that the chaos of driv-
ing in Beirut was, at least in part, the outcome of a disorderly government 
that took litt le, or ineff ective, action in ameliorating the traffi  c situation. 
Moreover, the order imposed by the parking meters was one welcomed by 
citizens, perhaps, I want to suggest, because they constituted a transparent, 
effi  cient, and predictable system. Th e locus of the system, in the case of 
the pay-and-display parking meter, was a technology that seemed to prove 
both gratifying and empowering for its users. Although other traffi  c-related 
infrastructural improvements, such as new roads, pedestrian bridges, and 
even traffi  c lights, gave the promise of effi  ciency, stability, and predict-
ability, their success relied signifi cantly on the eff orts of the state actors 
to manage how these roads, bridges, and lights would be used by drivers 
and walkers. Th e parking meters, though also a technology of government 
that was part of the engineering of public space, aff orded citizens a more 
direct relationship with civic order and regulation, one that was achieved 
through interface with technology rather than interaction with the human 
face of government. Th e parking meters, in a sense, created the possibility 
of a diff erent politics of mobility in Beirut. In this way, sentiments about 
governance were manifest too in discussions of a chaotic mobility in Beirut. 
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Maha, a woman in her fi ft ies who raised two now-grown daughters on her 
own, in summing up her feelings about how the state should deal with 
unruly driving, invoked the roles of parent and child: “Th e government is 
responsible fi rst, not the citizens. . . . It’s like parents and children, the par-
ents have to show the children the right way.” To extend Maha’s parent-child 
analogy a bit further, in the context of everyday mobility, an ill-functioning 
relationship between citizens and state was fostered by feelings, on the part 
of citizens, of not being taken care of by the state.
Mobile and Differentiated Citizens
In Flesh and Stone (1994), Richard Sennett  traces the historical develop-
ment of the Western civic body. Th e movement of this body, set in the 
urban context, is a desensitized one, he argues; it is a body that experiences 
space “as a means to the end of pure motion” (1994, 17). In the Western 
context, he writes, spatial forms and practices that limit contact between 
 bodies—and citizens—are both sought out and achieved through mecha-
nisms of planning as well as experiences of spatial movement. Th is body, 
Sennett  conceives, is passive rather than active, and the urban, Western 
citizen who inhabits it “wants simply to go through urban space, not to be 
aroused by it” (1994, 18).
In Beirut, I observed a diff erent kind of civic body. Entangled in the 
chaos of gett ing around, the civic body in this sett ing was exceedingly active 
and, what is more, many of the Beirutis I spoke with during my fi eldwork 
understood their movement through the city to be a meaningful aspect of 
their lives as citizens of the urban and national space. Th ese understand-
ings, I suggest, demonstrate that driving (or riding) is an everyday expe-
rience through which diff erent Lebanese express and recognize shared 
interests and sentiments about the development of the nation, civic culture, 
the political and governmental structure, and the national self. And yet, 
while driving or riding was a practice performed by all, vehicular mobility 
was also an arena for social division and diff erentiation. While I heard con-
sensus about the presence of a kind of chaos, for example, the movement of 
taxis and other public transit vehicles was oft en cited by those in positions 
of relative privilege to be both a producer and a product of the chaos. In this 
way, driving, as a specifi c form of spatial movement, had to do with one’s 
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right to take up public space and was an entitlement possessed unequally 
by Beirut’s residents.
In their talk about the chaos that characterized gett ing around Beirut, 
many residents described a national identity that involved the possession 
and demonstration of a maverick sensibility in the face of state ineff ectual-
ity, neglect, and corruption. Th e city, in this delineation of chaos, becomes 
a stage for the collective rhythm of diff erent social groups, a site of alliance.17 
However, narratives of gett ing around Beirut also revealed a city mapped by 
hierarchies of class and power. Th e mobility of the service taxi driver, for 
instance, was talked about by some as being the source of the chaos, and his 
lowly status and occupational maneuvers were thought to be a root cause of 
the “problem.” Th ose who own or drive private vehicles can get from point 
A to point B more quickly than those who take other forms of transport. 
But along the narrow, and oft en one-way, lanes of Beirut, the movement 
of service taxis and buses oft en impedes the movement of private vehicles. 
Th us we fi nd, in the discourse about chaos, a key contradiction. On the one 
hand, talk of gett ing around brings together diff erent kinds of Lebanese 
under a particular political imaginary: “clever” and “competent” citizens 
coping with a “developing” nation and incompetent state. On the other 
hand, distinctions among citizens, and their stratifi cation, are engendered 
by this same discourse. Like navigation through the “secured” city, which 
I discuss in chapter 4, an urban citizenship diff erentiated by mobility and 
spatial access is also produced through talk of a chaotic gett ing around. In 
this way, being mobile in Beirut is a signifi cant civic practice, one in which 
order and disorder commingle and various forms of boundaries, both social 
and territorial, are fashioned.
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6 • “THERE IS NO STATE”
On a Sunday aft ernoon in June 2010, along the main road in Mar 
Mikhael, an eastern Beirut neighborhood, a traffi  c patrol (dowriyya) was set 
up by the Internal Security Forces (ISF) to catch helmetless motorcyclists.1 
Th is att ention to and enforcement of the normally fl outed helmet law was 
part of Interior Minister Ziad Baroud’s public safety campaign. Baroud’s 
term began in 2008 during a tense standoff  between the March 14th and 
March 8th political camps that had turned violent and brought urban 
combat to the streets of Beirut and the nation to the brink of civil war.
Within this broader context of unsafety, two ISF policemen, acting on 
the ground to impose Baroud’s policy priorities for road safety, laid a trap. 
One policeman, dressed in ISF’s gray camoufl age, hid in the entryway of a 
building positioned along a curve in the road where he would go unnoticed 
by oncoming drivers. About twenty meters down the road, within the line 
of sight of the soldier, a policeman, wearing the traffi  c-police division’s blue 
uniform, stood in the street beside his motorcycle. On my way somewhere, 
I stopped to see what was going on. As a couple on a motorbike sped past 
the hidden policeman, he turned toward and signaled to the other police-
man by pantomiming whistling with his fi ngers in his mouth. Th e police-
man pulled the couple over and began to issue a ticket. Soon aft er the 
couple drove off , two young men on a motorbike drove toward the police-
men, but, at a split in the road, an SUV slowed and its driver spott ed the 
patrol. He beeped his horn to give notice of what lay ahead, and the young 
men turned around and sped off .
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What struck me about the patrol I observed that aft ernoon is how 
it recalled the sentiments held by traffi  c police who spoke to me about 
Beirut’s citizen-drivers’ irreverence toward their eff orts as agents of the 
state to regulate everyday mobility. Th e police had arranged a game of cat 
and mouse, but who was the cat and who was the mouse? Relying on the 
tactic of surprise att ack, the policemen put their bodies into their work as 
one stood exposed in the street and the other used perhaps the most rudi-
mentary of equipment, his hands, to set things in motion. Aft er this orches-
tration, civilians working together disregarded and easily evaded the trap 
police had laid for them. When the guys on the motorbike eff ortlessly fl ed 
the scene, I even felt a litt le sorry for the agents of the state because they 
were the ones made to appear vulnerable out in the public view.
Although this scene of citizens banding together to evade police reg-
ulation can be observed in countless sites around the world, in the con-
text of Beirut it was shaped by particular dynamics of policy and law 
enforcement that constituted the leadership priorities of Interior Minister 
Baroud. From the start of his tenure, Baroud vowed to get tough not only 
on violators of traffi  c laws,2 but on crime at all scales. As an att orney and 
low-profi le fi gure appointed by President Michel Suleiman, a conciliator 
between the March 14th and March 8th camps, Baroud took a ministe-
rial approach steeped in what anthropologists Jean Comaroff  and John 
Comaroff  have described as a globalized culture of legality whereby crack-
downs on criminality are asserted as the means and ends of governance. 
While the Comaroff s (2007, 136) describe how this culture of legality 
has appeared in response to emergent forms of profi teering by illicit and 
licit businesses in an era of neoliberal restructuring, as zones of deregula-
tion become spaces of opportunity, inventiveness, and violence, Baroud 
was focused on reining in everyday forms of lawlessness along with cor-
ruption among power holders who understood themselves to be above 
the law and who carried on business as usual amid the machinations of 
sectarian-based politics.
In staging his crackdown, Baroud took a hands-on rather than solely 
discursive approach. Stuck in traffi  c in downtown Beirut in December 
2009, he famously exited his car and began to try to improve the situation 
by removing barriers that were blocking roads. Aft erward, he made public 
his lett er to the ISF condemning their “closing public roads in the absence 
of administrative approval” from the proper authorities (Rizk 2009). Th is 
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incident was only the fi rst in which Baroud presented himself as a kind of 
Everyman by standing in the streets directing traffi  c, and it presaged future, 
and irreconcilable, diff erences between himself and the head of the ISF, 
General Ashraf Rifi . In its encouragement of adherence to the law, his pub-
lic stance was avowedly anticorruption and was aimed at political elites and 
regular citizens alike. Th rough word and deed, Baroud aligned himself with 
the lowest ranks of the ISF—the men directing traffi  c at intersections—
and he included offi  cials among his targets of civil reform. Like ordinary 
city residents, Baroud thought the chaos of traffi  c in Beirut was not only 
revealing but also constitutive of a kind of disorder at the broader scales of 
society and government. Although residents may not have exactly echoed 
Baroud’s discourse of legality as the antidote to this disorder, I found that 
in their comments about “the state,” they shared his raw feelings about the 
failings of structures of governance.
In this chapter, I show traffi  c encounters in Beirut to be a key site for the 
production of the state by focusing on how, through the policing of vehicu-
lar movement, members of the traffi  c police perform a kind of embodied 
work that is part of the everyday formation of the state and, in this respect, 
how civilians’ experiences with and ideas about traffi  c enforcement draw 
out understandings of the state as corrupt and ineff ective. From this fi eld of 
urban mobility, I consider how the state is constituted by the perspective of 
both citizens and street-level bureaucrats, who, despite, but also as a result 
of, their discord, share common ground in their sense of insecurity and dis-
appointment with the state.3
Beyond “the Weak State”
Th e persistence of clashes between political groups in Lebanon and the 
growing incorporation of Hizbullah into the government are the kinds 
of examples scholars of international politics, security studies, and policy 
makers alike use to characterize Lebanon as a “weak,” “failed,” or “fragile” 
state that has litt le military might and is susceptible to being overrun by 
internal, nonstate “terrorist” organizations with transnational links.4 Many 
of these theories of the weak state draw on a Weberian defi nition of the 
state as a single entity that can claim a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
violence over a given territory.5
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Th e understanding of the Lebanese state I present here seeks to move 
beyond interpretations of the state as weak or failed. Instead of pursuing a 
line of thinking about the state as a unitary “thing” that is categorically weak 
or strong, I ask, What might traffi  c encounters of and between police and 
citizens reveal about the state? By taking seriously the sense of powerless-
ness and insecurity both the traffi  c police and citizens att ribute to the fl awed 
functioning of the state “that is” as well as their expectations for the state that 
“could be,” I hope to off er an alternative to the weak-state discourse by show-
ing how state power is contingent upon various kinds of social relations that 
are worked out in—and productive of—civic life in everyday ways.
Th e traffi  c encounter is a localized and unspectacular site through which 
the idea of the state is mobilized. Moving beyond an exploration of how 
state projects of legibility are enacted, I show through my ethnography how 
citizens actually meet these projects head-on in their interactions with traf-
fi c police in Beirut. In the context of Lebanon’s disordered political fi eld and 
unfulfi lled hopes for a bett er-functioning state, I see these interactions less 
as the foot-dragging measures of everyday resistance that Scott  described 
(1985) than as outcomes of disaff ection with the state. Moreover, I illustrate 
how not only citizen-drivers but the traffi  c police as well convey these feel-
ings of disaff ection. Although we oft en think about state power in ways that 
consider subjects and agents of the state as adversaries, I off er a diff erent 
picture of the relations between these two groups, one in which they in fact 
share sentiments about the state and about the state of things.
I begin with an inquiry into how residents’ understandings of the state as 
ill-functioning, demonstrated by the oft -used expression ma fi  dowla (there 
is no state), emerge from the “chaotic” traffi  c encounter. I then elaborate 
this account of the state by shift ing from the perspective of citizens to that 
of agents of the state by looking closely at the workaday experiences of the 
traffi  c police and their endeavor to show the force of the state in spite of the 
challenges to its authority they endure. Finally, I delve further into the com-
plexities that surround police work by exploring how the wielding of wasta 
(connections) makes matt ers of class and status central in state projects of 
law application and enforcement. I conclude by considering what these per-
spectives of the traffi  c police and citizens tell us about their conceptions of 
the state. Curiously, feelings of disaff ection and being unprotected emerge 
as key themes of civic concern for both police and civilians as they reveal 
expectations for an as yet unrealized, diff erent kind of state.
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The Ill-Functioning State
As I discussed in chapter 5, when I asked people about the source of the 
so-called chaotic traffi  c conditions, the long civil and regional war was 
oft en referred to. “It’s because of the war,” I heard, and people would go on 
to say that reckless driving today is connected with the collapse of law and 
order during the civil war years. Even people too young to remember use 
the temporal frame of “before the civil war” to compare contemporary life 
with the way things were. Residents conveyed their sentiments about the 
ineff ectuality or breakdown of the state through these references to the civil 
war, and, while in service taxis, I oft en heard passengers and the taxi driver 
criticize the police specifi cally, and the state more broadly, for allowing the 
chaos on the streets to go unchecked.
When a garbage truck emptying dumpsters blocked traffi  c on a narrow 
thoroughfare during rush hour, for example, the occupants of my taxi not 
only blamed the trash collection company’s disregard for drivers but agreed 
that the police too were at fault as they were never around when problems 
like these arose. And while a global discourse emerged about the buzzing 
noise made by fans blowing horns called vuvuzelas during the 2010 World 
Cup in Johannesburg, many Beirutis I spoke with that summer also com-
plained about noise generated by the late-night-to-very-early-morning 
antics of young Lebanese caravanning around the city bearing the fl ags 
of their favorite teams, incessantly beeping car horns, and sett ing off  fi re-
works aft er the matches had concluded. Th e police, they said, do nothing 
to control this behavior, even though it is not only disturbing but unsafe. 
Drivers I accompanied, in buses, taxis, and private vehicles, would issue 
vitriolic complaints not only about the drivers who double- (sometimes 
triple-) parked along corridors, blocking the fl ow of traffi  c, but also about 
the state that allowed this kind of public behavior to go unchecked. 
Although Lebanese commonly greet policemen and soldiers with the 
respectful and patriotic appellation “[the] nation” (watan), in their talk 
about traffi  c and the state, they indicated disapproval, even disavowal, of 
the institutions charged with security and safety for the ordinary citizen.
Once, sitt ing in the backseat of a taxi, I listened to the driver, a man 
who looked to be in his fi ft ies, and his front passenger, a woman of simi-
lar age, discuss the bott leneck that had brought the car’s movement to a 
stop. Aft er their conversation trailed off  with mutual agreement about the 
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fact that “there is no state,” I asked, “When was there a state?” Th e ques-
tion seemed to catch them both off -guard, as it interrupted their focus both 
on the immediate present—sitt ing in traffi  c in a hot, crowded taxi—and 
the broader temporal context of contemporary life. “Before,” they went on 
to say aft er I pressed further, there had been a special police brigade that 
controlled traffi  c and no one dared disregard their authority. Th ey didn’t 
remember exactly when this was, that such a brigade existed, but it was dur-
ing a time “before the civil war” they said.6
Curiously though, as I show in the following section, the traffi  c police 
had emphasized to me their struggle to eff ect order through, for example, 
gett ing residents to comply with traffi  c rules. In particular, their att empt 
to create order out of the chaos was challenged by those who aimed to 
use their status, or their connections to someone else’s status, to disrupt, 
essentially, the eff ectiveness of the state. How do we reconcile these two 
seemingly contradictory understandings of vehicular mobility, that of a 
beleaguered police unit recounting their diffi  culties in enforcing the law on 
the one hand and civilians’ descriptions of the state as ineff ectual on the 
other? One way, I suggest, is to look closely at these understandings for the 
expression of shared sentiments about the state. Both groups, the police 
and the residents, articulate feelings of insecurity about the state and about 
the state of public and civic life.
Th is notion of sentiments about the state being shared by both civilians 
and police framed one of the more surprising moments of my research. 
Sitt ing in the public relations offi  ce of the ISF, where I had come to apply 
for offi  cial permission to conduct interviews with members of the traffi  c 
police, I talked with the offi  cer—his uniform seemed to indicate that he 
was of offi  cer rank—responsible for handling my request about my research 
on traffi  c in Beirut. He began commenting about how unruly the situation 
was, and, somewhere in the middle of his remarks, trying to explain to me 
what the root of the unruliness was, he observed summarily: “Well, there is 
no state.” While initially caught up in the crisp irony of his statement, I later 
considered the way in which he used this phrase, as did residents gett ing 
around the city, to express how traffi  c problems demonstrated a system that 
was not working as it should.7
Th e question begged is, Why do Beirutis regularly use the expression 
“there is no state” and not “there is no government” to decry the chaos on 
the roads? Th e answer, at least in part, lies in the broader problematic about 
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the state that is brought into play by the ways in which people make sense 
of the traffi  c encounter. Th e hazards of driving in Beirut—cars traveling at 
breakneck speeds, drunk drivers, unexpected road obstructions, poor light-
ing, double-parkers blocking the fl ow of cars, drivers heading the wrong 
way down one-way streets—are concrete illustrations of the kinds of every-
day and routine dangers that people cope with while being exposed to the 
risks posed by the outbreak of political violence and war.
Moreover, when Beirutis express feelings of being insecure and unpro-
tected through their comments about the state’s ineff ectuality with regard 
to traffi  c, they tie citizen safety and security—certainly in a corporeal but 
also in a more existential sense—to the apparatus of the state, as opposed 
to the workings of government. In short, it may be important for us to take 
note of the ways in which the categories of state and government are not 
interchangeable at a conceptual level because, quite simply, people them-
selves rely on and fi nd meaning in this distinction.
As Kivland (2012) observes about Haitians’ notions of statelessness, 
Beirutis’ claims that “there is no state” are expressions of a desire for some-
thing diff erent. Traffi  c is an immediate and concrete realm of public life 
through which people express unfulfi lled expectations for a state that might 
serve as a protector, and a provider, for ordinary citizens. Th is is a realm 
of life that is always already tied up with myriad other issues including the 
instability of and corruption in the political system, economic insecurities, 
poor infrastructure, and inadequate public services. In this way, people’s use 
of ma fi  dowla registers concerns that go beyond the specifi cities of traffi  c 
to convey feelings of dissatisfaction with an ill-functioning state that leaves 
them to fend for themselves.
Traffic Training
Hierarchically arranged around rank, supervisory role, and work duties, 
employment with the traffi  c-police division of the ISF, staff ed primarily by 
men ranging in age from their twenties to late forties, is a stable middle-
class job made att ractive by the social security, benefi ts, and relative pres-
tige it provides. Within the broader structure of the ISF, which directs all 
domestic security matt ers from staffi  ng at foreign embassies and the issu-
ing of visas to conducting intelligence operations, the traffi  c police play 
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what might be understood as a modest role within a highly signifi cant 
government agency. In a postwar era rife with political crisis, violence, and 
assassination and in a city inhabited by both visible and covert paramili-
tary groups that include the privately hired security forces of VIPs, armed 
civilians-cum-militias, and foreign mercenaries, the ISF manifests the 
Lebanese state in the day-to-day securing of public space.
Th e ISF is one of several departments of internal security under the 
helm of the Interior Ministry that constitute competitive fi efdoms identi-
fi ed with particular sectarian groups; the Bureau of Intelligence is thought 
to be Sunni-controlled, for example, and the General Security branch, Shi‘i-
run (Belloncle 2006). From 2005 to 2013 the ISF was led by General Rifi , 
a man who hails from the predominantly Sunni city of Tripoli, sharing a 
hometown with then–prime minister Najib Mikati (prime minister during 
particularly turbulent political times from April to July 2005 and from June 
2011 to March 2013). Th e ISF’s gendarmerie might act as the traffi  c police—
pulling over a driver who has committ ed a traffi  c violation, for instance—
but members of the traffi  c police do not undertake the domestic-security 
activities of the ISF’s gendarmerie. In this way, the traffi  c police are situ-
ated squarely within the state’s realm of policing through the maintaining 
of public order and the display of expertise, and, yet, they remain on the 
margins of the security apparatus as a whole.
Once, while meeting with a staff  member from YASA, the traffi  c-safety 
organization, I was surprised to learn that YASA also provides training to 
the traffi  c police. I wondered, Why do the traffi  c police need to be educated 
on the importance of traffi  c safety? Th is was a question I sorted out a pre-
liminary response to aft er att ending a YASA-led “class” for traffi  c-police 
trainees.8 In a tired-looking army administration building in Baabda, just 
outside Beirut, more than one hundred traffi  c-police trainees dressed in 
gray and white fatigues fi led into a large multipurpose room and stood in 
front of wooden chairs with desk arms att ached. Facing them on a stage, a 
soldier signaled that they should take their seats. He introduced the YASA 
representative and, over the next hour and a half, the young men listened 
to a driver-education lecture that began with the following message: “I’m 
not here to fl att er you. I’m speaking the truth when I say that you are in the 
privileged position of being responsible for the safety of society.”
As the lecture ran past the half-hour mark, the men grew restless.9 Semi-
muffl  ed conversations could be heard from where I was sitt ing at the front 
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of the lecture hall. Some gave up feigning interest altogether and laid their 
heads on the desks. Th ey livened up when the question-and-answer period 
began. With the exception of the fi rst question—“What’s a safe driving dis-
tance between cars?”—the trainees all gave examples from their own driv-
ing-accident experiences, seeking the lecturer’s assessment of who was at 
fault. Th e soldiers were invigorated, talking over one another to weigh in. As 
I listened, it seemed that what animated the young men most was a sharing 
of testimonials that ended in a determination of blame. Sitt ing in the front, I 
could see the lecturer from YASA, in his responses to their queries, becom-
ing frustrated as he struggled make this a teaching moment whereby their 
individual accounts might be turned into a civic lesson about the responsi-
bilities of all drivers. I considered how YASA’s role, in providing training to 
the traffi  c police, was to arm them with a sense of the signifi cance of their 
enterprise, as evidenced by the lecturer’s opening remarks about their being 
responsible for the safety of society. By elevating their position in the state 
security apparatus, the lecturer’s message seemed to be one not only of 
empowerment but also of accountability; it was a message about duty and 
honor that the trainees might carry with them to the fi eld of challenging 
vehicular, as well as human, relations when managing traffi  c in Beirut.
Showing the Force of the State
YASA was only one part of a transnational eff ort to enhance the capabili-
ties of Beirut’s traffi  c police through training and the provision of equip-
ment. Colonel Mohammad Al-Ayoubi, the director of the traffi  c police, 
described to me in summer 2010 how an agreement between the United 
States and the ISF endowed his division with new vehicles—mainly new 
Dodge Chargers and Harley Davidsons—as well as parts needed for older 
Harley Davidsons.10 Th is delivery was part of the stated goal of the U.S. State 
Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Aff airs (2009) to “assist legitimate, professional law enforcement institu-
tions in Lebanon and their eff ort to protect Lebanon’s territory and sover-
eignty.” Al-Ayoubi told me of another recently arrived import: consultants 
from the French Ministry of the Interior had begun training Lebanese in 
the areas of traffi  c-management technologies, on-the-ground traffi  c control 
at intersections, and intrapolice communications.
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Th is multinational brigade of development assistance dedicated to 
traffi  c safety reveals something about the country’s geopolitical signifi -
cance and the interest of foreign powers including, but not limited to, 
the United States, Iran, the Arab Gulf, and the European Union, in estab-
lishing and maintaining their spheres of infl uence. It is also related to 
Lebanon’s chief economic source, tourism, and the need for managing a 
public and infrastructural realm, particularly in and around Beirut, whose 
summer population can swell with nearly two million visitors in a country 
of about four million.11
Traffi  c management was under the jurisdiction of Colonel Al-Ayoubi, 
and he expressed disappointment with the status quo. For him, driver 
behavior, not traffi  c management, was the problem. In the midst of Interior 
Minister Baroud’s intensifi ed eff orts to enforce traffi  c laws, Al-Ayoubi 
explained: “Right now [summer 2010] we are making a campaign about 
seatbelts; we are stopping people and ticketing them for not wearing their 
seatbelt, and so, for right now, most will wear them. But if we stop, if we 
stop for one week, they will stop wearing them, and if you ask them why, 
they will say, ‘Well, because the ISF is not making a campaign!’” I did not 
add, but considered doing so while he was talking, how I had recently wit-
nessed one service taxi driver warn another about one seat-belt checkpoint 
up ahead in the road so the driver could put his on in time.
I met with Al-Ayoubi on a couple of occasions in his well-appointed 
offi  ce, replete with sofa, coff ee table, and exercise bike, in an otherwise 
worn building housing the traffi  c police division of the ISF in southeast-
ern Beirut. When we fi rst met, in 2006, he held the inferior rank of captain. 
His offi  ce seemed to have been the only air-conditioned one in a dilapi-
dated French Mandate-era building. He was stressed at work, receiving 
and answering frequent calls on his two-way radio. Four years later, he was 
more relaxed, though uninterested in discussing his promotion, and when 
I arrived at his offi  ce, I would fi nd him in uniform but sitt ing and chatt ing 
with men in plainclothes.
A well-traveled and personable middle-aged man who talked of visiting 
his sister each year in the Washington, D.C., suburbs, he used the French 
word mentalité to describe what he saw as one of the primary challenges 
the police face: “Th ere is a mentalité here, there is no respect for the law, . . . 
and it’s not because I am a man of the law that I say this. My response [to a 
comment about the ISF not being in the streets to enforce the seat-belt law] 
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is this: In the United States, in France, is there a police offi  cer at every inter-
section? Is it necessary to have one police offi  cer for each car and driver?”
While traffi  c police cited drivers’ irreverence for rules as a source of frus-
tration, they also talked about the challenges posed by the social dynamics 
that pervade the police-citizen encounter. “In a country where the whole 
country knows the whole country,” as one policeman put it, or “where if 
you don’t yourself know someone you can call who can get you out of a 
ticket, you likely know someone who does,” as another policeman said, the 
work of the traffi  c police involves daily streetside power struggles to apply 
the law.
For example, Al-Ayoubi spoke about how the police who work in the 
street, referred to by the military term ‘anaser (basic forces), get nervous 
about pulling over drivers of nice cars: “Th ey feel like, how can I give this 
person a ticket? Th ey might be someone important!” Two men who worked 
for Al-Ayoubi as supervisors and who together had more than twenty-fi ve 
years of experience in the fi eld concurred with this representation of how a 
routine traffi  c stop becomes a more complicated scene of status jockeying 
that necessitates their intervention. As self-described tongue-in-cheek “dip-
lomats,” they are called to scenes like these, scenes characterized by class- 
and status-based challenges—“Do you know who I am?” or “Who are you 
[to try to exert power over me]?”—born from the policeman’s att empt to 
constrain certain drivers’ mobility. Th is same kind of discursive disrup-
tion of the universal and fair application of the law—eff ected through the 
use of the phrase “Do you know who you’re talking to?”—is described by 
DaMatt a (1991) as a ritualized urban practice in Brazil that is emblematic of 
its uneven citizenship.
In this way, the traffi  c police, though endowed with power vested by the 
state, anticipate situations in which their power could easily be undermined 
by the workings of class and status. Th ey occupy a vexed position in the 
margins of the state in part because their ability to enforce the law is dis-
rupted by and contingent on localized relations of social hierarchy. Th ese 
are relations that might be worked out right there on the street, when posi-
tions of more and less power are made legible through verbal interaction, 
or, as in the example Al-Ayoubi gave, they create problems for the traffi  c 
police even in their anticipation.
Th e urgency of these confrontations between the status-wielding driver 
and the traffi  c policeman is perhaps best related by the fact that they 
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were described by the two supervisors as being on a par—that is, they 
required the supervisors’ presence—with accidents “in which someone is 
wounded.” Because they hold and display, through their uniform, the rank 
of offi  cer, the supervisors said, they are able to help work out problems like 
these that might arise between a policeman and a driver. As they arrive to 
the rescue of a policeman under siege streetside, astride the traffi  c-police 
division’s newest fl eet of Harley Davidsons, the offi  cers symbolize the ver-
tical authority and disciplinary power of the state but also the eff ort that 
goes into enacting statist authority. At the same time, however, by signify-
ing the verticalization of state authority,12 the offi  cers undercut the power 
of its lowest ranking members: if it is understood that the fi rst policeman 
that pulls you over is powerless to enforce the law, that it is only his superi-
ors you need to engage with, why not ignore the fi rst policeman and hang 
around for the next?
Moreover, in seeking to “show the force [of the state],” which is how the 
offi  cers described their actions, we see in these encounters an example of 
“modern statecraft  being frustrated in its goal to reduce the chaotic, disor-
derly and constantly changing social reality beneath it to something more 
closely resembling the administrative grid of its operations” (Scott  1998, 
82). Th e dynamics of class and status, which are oft en expressed through a 
demonstration of having connections, as I discuss further below, thwart the 
traffi  c police’s plan for operations, a key part of which is gett ing drivers to 
comply with their wishes. It is these kinds of interactions, and frustrations, 
that make the traffi  c police perhaps unlikely bedfellows with the drivers 
who complain about the police’s ineff ective management of traffi  c and, as 
well, the ill-functioning state.
One of the supervising offi  cers waxed hopeful toward the end of our 
meeting about the potential for mechanization to mitigate the wrangling 
with drivers that is a feature of their job. When computers inside the police 
vehicle issue tickets remotely, he thought, and not through a direct encoun-
ter between and police and citizens, things will be easier. Th is understanding 
of how traffi  c management in Lebanon could be improved by putt ing the 
task in the hands of machines rather than people was one shared by Colonel 
Al-Ayoubi when he talked about changing how tickets are issued: “Now 
they write it [the ticket] by hand, but we have a project to computerize tick-
ets so that they will be issued without contact between police and citizens. 
We are doing what we can to reduce contact between police and citizens.”
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Curiously, I did not hear talk of what might happen to all the traffi  c 
policemen if their job were to be performed by computers. Rather, the 
more pressing concern seemed to be devising a system that would take 
the human element out of traffi  c-law enforcement, not for convenience’s 
sake, to reduce error, or to cut personnel costs, but to improve its chances 
by removing from it the personal, face-to-face encounter. “Reducing con-
tact between police and citizens,” as Al-Ayoubi put it, was a move toward 
depersonalizing the state-citizen interaction by withdrawing its agents 
from actual social contexts in order to avoid the activation of personal net-
works and hierarchical dimensions of class that can and do arise from these 
contexts. We can understand this reduction of contact between state and 
citizen, exemplifi ed too by the CDR’s installation of the city’s fi rst park-
ing meters (as described in chapter 5), as an eff ort to abstract the state by 
reclaiming the boundary between a faceless, orderly state and the messy 
world of society. Enacting this boundary is a move to endow the state with 
a seeming coherence, power, and eff ectiveness, what political scientist 
Timothy Mitchell terms “the state eff ect” (1991).
At the Intersection
For the traffi  c police, encounters with drivers can be fraught with unease 
about the dynamics of power set in motion by a routine stop, but bodily 
stress and strain are also part of the job. Describing his job’s challenges, 
one policeman simply said, “And then there is the exhaustion. Th ere is so 
much exhaustion.” Shift s directing traffi  c at intersections are seven hours 
each, either from 6:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. or 1:30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m., and supervi-
sors come to the intersections to relieve soldiers for half-hour breaks and 
shorter bathroom and water breaks. I had observed police directing traffi  c 
throughout the city, usually as a passenger in a taxi or bus, and, particularly 
at the thorniest intersections, it was impossible not to notice the diffi  culties 
they faced:13 they visibly struggled, under the hot sun, to control mobility as 
drivers whose lanes of traffi  c a policeman had called to a stop crept into the 
intersection and darted across. Th is transgression would encourage others 
to follow suit. Th e social vulnerability of the police that emerged in their 
interactions with civilians who asserted class- and status-based rights to 
be above the law was joined by another type of vulnerability rooted in the 
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physical demands of the job and the public display of their inability to bring 
drivers under their thumb.
Sodeco, an intersection named for the retail and business complex it 
abuts, was identifi ed as one of the fi ve worst in the city by the supervis-
ing offi  cers. Th ere, I found a shady seat along on a concrete barrier wall, 
a spot from which to observe at peak times in the late aft ernoon. Sitt ing 
and watching, I empathized with the policeman. One aft ernoon in particu-
lar stood out. Th e day was hot, as all Beirut summer aft ernoons are, and 
the policeman exhorted drivers to stop and go. Th ese exhortations involved 
standard arm and hand signals but also yelling and shouting and, later, full 
body contact. Aft er he signaled one lane of traffi  c to stop so another could 
start, one car from the lane that he stopped began to sneak into the inter-
section hoping to make a just-in-time crossing. Th e policeman, his back to 
the car, turned in time and began yelling at the driver and gesturing for the 
car to move backward out of the intersection. Th e car showed no sign of 
retreat. Th e policeman leaned over and extended his arms onto the hood of 
car and, as it reversed, appeared to push it back into position.
What struck me most about this incident was how the policeman, 
although he was eventually successful in constraining the vehicle’s move-
ment, looked silly doing so. Th e driver’s behavior made the policeman, 
whose work standing in the street necessitates public exposure of the most 
literal kind, seem even more, well, exposed. I thought about how the traffi  c 
police serve as foot soldiers of the state in the sense that the public terrain of 
the streets makes up the front lines of state-making; they are a territory that, 
while marked by the belongings of various groups and interests, is used by 
all. Th e traffi  c police seek to establish order over this terrain, but, routinely, 
their authority fi nds litt le traction among drivers who, as one board mem-
ber of YASA put it, “already have someone on the phone who can get them 
out of the ticket by the time the policeman gets to their window.”
In describing their eff orts to control traffi  c, the policemen reveal how 
their role as agents of the state, albeit lowly ones, is enmeshed with and 
oft en subordinated to the power of civilians. Th is power, derived primar-
ily from class and status but also from a kind of irreverence toward what 
seems to be viewed as a toothless arm of the state, poses as much of an 
occupational hazard for the traffi  c police as the bodily stress and strain 
of their very physical work. A certain insecurity emerges from what we 
might otherwise understand to be their seemingly routine encounters 
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with drivers; higher-ups in the bureaucratic structure recognize and try 
to address this insecurity through various modes of intervention includ-
ing the pulling of rank to match or overcome drivers’ deployment of status 
with that of the state’s as well as techniques of mechanization that abstract 
the state and remove it from the realm of the personal and the social alto-
gether. In their embodied and oft en futile eff orts to manage the mobility 
of a restive, and socially diff erentiated, lot, the traffi  c police experience a 
kind of vulnerability that resonates with that expressed in civilians’ claims 
that “there is no state.”
During a bus ride I took in outer eastern Beirut, sentiments about how 
traffi  c problems signifi ed not just an ineff ective but also corrupt state were 
made plain. A car trying to turn around in the road blocked traffi  c, and the 
bus could not move forward. Th e bus driver, soon joined by several passen-
gers, began yelling at the driver of the car. Th e woman sitt ing in front of me 
cursed audibly, using a common and explicit profanity to condemn not the 
driver, but driving in Lebanon. Infuriated, the bus driver put his hands up 
and called out to all of us beseechingly, “How can these people get driver’s 
licenses? How can they drive? Th ey don’t know how to drive!” Th e woman 
in front of me spoke up again, issuing a succinct and stony reply of wasta.
Wasta refers to connections people have and use in order to obtain vari-
ous kinds of benefi ts for themselves or someone else. Th ese benefi ts range 
from the more short-term, such as expediting bureaucratic processes, to the 
longer-term, like fi nding a job or gett ing a promotion. As a type of favor-
itism based primarily on kinship ties, wasta resembles other networks of 
infl uence and patronage relied on by individuals in matt ers ranging from 
the momentous and potentially life-changing to the trivial and everyday.14 
In Lebanon, where state instability and civil confl ict have devolved from a 
political structure based on the precarious balance of power among repre-
sentatives of the nation’s sectarian groups, wasta is said to thrive because of 
the expectation that needs will be met more quickly and eff ectively through 
the exercise of personal relations rather than through “offi  cial” and “just” 
channels of government, merit, and performance. While the literature on 
wasta emphasizes its eff ects on the business climate, possibilities for career 
advancement, and nations’ economic competitiveness,15 I found that for 
Beirutis, wasta was a language for talking not only about the state but also 
about class: the unconnected are disadvantaged, while those connected to 
well-established families and groups do bett er in life.
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In brandishing the word wasta, the infuriated bus passenger demon-
strated the rawness and immediacy of sentiments, expressed by ordinary 
residents as well as by members of the traffi  c police, that link vehicular 
mobility with key aspects of civic and political culture. In the context of 
gett ing around the city, talk of wasta conveys a critique of the state’s culture 
of corruption, evidenced by the ability of certain drivers to buy licenses,16 
as the bus passenger complained, or to get out of tickets, as was suggested 
by the traffi  c police. At the same time, as a discourse from below, wasta, 
rather than the wider-ranging fasad (corruption), zeroes in on the fact that 
social inequality shapes the nature of one’s everyday encounters with the 
state. While I usually heard Beirutis talk about wasta with frustration and 
disdain, as a form of class injury that serves as a hindrance to their social 
mobility and sense of civic agency, for a few, like the teenager at a driver-
education school who gleefully waved her laminated card toward me telling 
nonchalantly of how her father used wasta to get her a driver’s license, the 
wielding of wasta brought fulfi llment.
Wasta is commonly talked about as something one either possesses or 
uses; oft en, in the beginning, middle, or end of stories Beirutis told about 
being frustrated with their dealings with the state, they would refer to their 
lack of it. Th is was the case when Kamal, a twenty-four-year-old whom I 
met volunteering at an event for a youth organization, told me a story about 
how aft er going to the police station to retrieve his towed car, he found it 
damaged and the fuel tank empty. He was sure that the car had been dam-
aged and siphoned of gas while in police possession, but, he said, “It’s not 
like I have wasta; . . . there was nothing I could do about it.” He questioned 
the police working in the offi  ce but backed off  quickly when no one off ered 
help, adding, “I always avoid too much of a confrontation with the police.” 
Kamal’s sense that there was no recourse in his situation and, moreover, 
that in pressing the point he would only make himself vulnerable to further 
mistreatment was also evident in streetside scenes between police and resi-
dents. Although dealings with traffi  c police working at intersections might 
be less anxious for residents than those with standard police (the ISF’s 
gendarmerie), for male drivers in particular,17 those from ordinary back-
grounds who do not drive cars bearing, for example, a high-status three- or 
four-digit license plate number (rather than the standard six), which retail 
for several thousand U.S. dollars,18 being pulled over by any member of the 
police while driving is an interaction one tries to keep nonconfrontational.
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Indeed, beyond a driver’s mode of transport and make and quality of 
the vehicle, license plates are a way in which social inequalities are made 
public and are directly apprehensible to all. Th ose who can aff ord to rent 
cars, usually foreigners or returning overseas Lebanese, usually drive vehi-
cles bearing green plates, whereas taxis have red ones, judges’ plates display 
an emblem symbolizing the scales of justice, and, moving up the hierar-
chy, members of parliament—and sometimes their kin—have blue license 
plates, while those driving without any plates at all are at the highest ech-
elon of power. Th is blatant hierarchy of license plates is part of the traffi  c 
policeman’s calculations about drivers’ status and his anticipation about 
the wasta these drivers may possess. Anxieties policemen face about pull-
ing someone over who might be important are also born from being fi sh 
out of water in their encounters with cosmopolitan Beirutis as, according to 
the traffi  c-police supervisors I spoke with, many of the men working in the 
street “are not from Beirut; they are from villages, and here they are now 
living in dormitories, without their families [for the fi rst time].”
For both police and civilians, the traffi  c encounter is a locus for everyday 
practices of corruption and social injustice that give rise to feelings of being 
frustrated by and disillusioned with the state. Th is frustration and disillu-
sionment, I suggest, are part of the conditions of insecurity that surround 
life in a militarized urban landscape. Th e insecurity that shapes and is 
shaped by mobility in Beirut is a piece with concerns about political insta-
bility and the state’s not providing a kind of safety net, social and otherwise, 
for its citizens.
The State That Could Be
I began this chapter by relating how Interior Minister Baroud, in his align-
ment with the traffi  c police in particular and crackdown on illegality more 
generally, openly shared citizens’ sentiments about an ineff ective and cor-
rupt state. Within a confl ict-laden and business-as-usual political climate, 
Baroud, by playing the part of a lone protagonist standing up to crime—
even that of the powerful—seemed to represent the kind of hoped-for 
alternative latent in comments made by both police and civilians that “there 
is no state.” Baroud’s own trajectory illustrates not the impossibility of this 
alternative, that of a fair and just state that provides for and protects even its 
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most ordinary citizens, but certainly the kinds of conditions challenging its 
realization.
In May 2011, Baroud resigned from his position aft er a fi nal confronta-
tion with General Rifi , director of the ISF. During a bizarre media-covered 
power play, Rifi , Baroud’s subordinate, publicly fl outed Baroud’s orders to 
resolve a confl ict Rifi  had escalated with another government offi  cial. In 
his resignation speech, a dejected Baroud, who came off  as a naïve idealist-
reformer beaten down by the intricacies and divisiveness of Lebanese poli-
tics, spoke about the breakdown of the Lebanese state. In his fi nal hour as a 
member of government, Baroud once again identifi ed himself with regular 
folk fed up with the status quo.
Baroud’s resignation illustrates one of the key fi ndings of my research: 
everyday interactions with the state in their traffi  c encounters leave Beirut’s 
citizens discontented and with unfulfi lled aspirations for the well-functioning, 
respectable, and protective state that could be. His departure signaled the 
ways in which people, sometimes even those at the helm of governance like 
Baroud or the would-be state-makers such as the traffi  c police, maintain 
unmet expectations about a state that could, and should, work bett er. In 
this sense of disaff ection with the state, which is an outcome of unfulfi lled 
desires for, in part, security and safety, we see a diff erent kind of retreat of 
the state than that which we tie to the ushering in of neoliberal governmen-
tality. Th is retreat is marked by the precedence of players participating in 
high-stakes games of political confl ict and negotiation over concerns for 
the common good. In a space where people say there is no state, the traffi  c 
encounter in fact represents a crucial site of state-making. In a city wracked 
by confl ict, in a militarized urban landscape territorialized by divisive 
political claims, the policing of traffi  c might also be understood as a seam 
that endeavors to fasten together, under the domain of state authority, civic 
space itself.
Th e encounter of the traffi  c police and driver provides an ethnographic 
view of bureaucratic embodiment in public space, one that illustrates 
the kinds of mundane practices that go into the project of state-making. 
It shows us too the multiplicity of actors who, as Abrams phrased it 
([1977] 1988), make up what a “state” is thought to be.
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CONCLUSION
In June 2013, I was riding in a service taxi driving along the 
Beirut highway that heads north from the airport area to downtown. It is 
an elevated highway that aff ords passengers a panoramic view of building 
rooft ops. On one rooft op, just off  to the side of the highway was a distress-
ing sign of the times: swaying in the light breeze was the black fl ag of the 
al-Nusra Front, an Al Qaeda affi  liate fi ghting in Syria against the Assad regime.
In summer 2013, the impact of the Syrian civil war was visible throughout 
the city. Th e sight of the al-Nusra Front fl ag, for example, demonstrated the 
war’s splintering eff ect on Lebanon’s already jagged political and security 
landscape, as supporters of groups fi ghting the Syrian regime clashed with 
those, like Hizbullah, who backed Assad’s forces. Hizbullah’s leader Hassan 
Nasrallah had just recently made the public announcement that Hizbullah 
soldiers were fi ghting alongside the Syrian army in order to defeat rebel 
groups who controlled areas that bordered Lebanon.1 Never before had 
Hizbullah guerrillas waged war outside Lebanon. Th ese border areas in the 
east, the sites of rocket-fi re exchange between armed groups, became just 
one of the many violent hotspots in the country that challenged the state 
security apparatus as militarized factions who supported the Syrian rebels in 
the northern city of Tripoli and an Islamic extremist group in the southern 
city of Saida also carried out regular att acks on Lebanese army deployments.
A deteriorating security situation and deepening political divides were 
not the only eff ects of the war in neighboring Syria, as the arrival of what 
is estimated to be, at the time of this writing, more than a million refugees 
strained Lebanon’s resources.2 One service driver put it this way: “Th e 
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Syrian war is burning Lebanon.” Th is was his response to my question kayf 
al-wada ‘a?—literally, “How is the situation?” but really more like “How are 
things going?” All these Syrians who have come into Beirut, he went on to 
say, “they are coming in and taking our jobs; they start driving taxis that 
are not registered, and now there are too many taxis on the road. We can’t 
survive like this.” During summer 2013, I heard many comments like this 
one about how people were being squeezed by the war. While the majority 
of Syrian refugees were living in sett lements and villages in other parts of 
Lebanon, many Syrians, from a range of class backgrounds, had come to 
Beirut and, for the fi rst time, not as male laborers on their own, but as fami-
lies. Beirutis remarked on how the presence of Syrians was contributing to 
climbing rents, to increased competition for jobs,3 and to a palpable sense 
of crowdedness in the very few free public spaces that city residents could 
call their own. On the streets of the city, Syrian license plates on private 
cars from areas roiled by war—Homs, Hama, Aleppo, Damascus—were a 
common sight. In this sense, the Syrian war and catastrophic humanitarian 
situation it has produced have placed both Syrians and Lebanese who live 
and work in Beirut and elsewhere in the country in an increasingly inse-
cure position as they have had to forge lives amid a contentious and violent 
political-economic landscape.
Mobility and the Unevenness of Citizenship
What struck me about the service driver’s plaintive statement—“we can’t 
survive like this”—was how it recalled stories about experiences of mobil-
ity that I had heard throughout my research, stories that form the core of 
this book. For my respondents, gett ing around Beirut meant having to 
confront and cope with the eff ects and conditions of a volatile geopolitics 
that is both domestic and regional. In summer 2013, the mobility situation 
was plainly evident, as traffi  c congestion intensifi ed as a result of the infl ux 
of cars owned by the city’s new Syrian residents and of sudden road clo-
sures established in response to the tides of political events and activities. 
One quiet Sunday morning in June, for instance, on my way from the east 
to the west side of the city, I encountered an army blockade surrounding 
the downtown area; it had been set up in anticipation of demonstrations 
against Hizbullah’s participation in the Syrian civil war. Th ese kinds of 
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sudden road closures not only changed routes of travel, they instantiated in 
public space the proximity of danger and the possibility of urban warfare. 
For the service driver, whose livelihood depends on the rate at which he 
makes his way through the city streets, these traffi  c problems posed another 
kind of threat, as they raised the specter of the inability to make ends meet. 
In these diff erent ways, as my ethnography has shown, the fi eld of mobility 
is central to the experience of urban citizenship in Beirut.
So, what does mobility tell us about what it means to be a citizen in 
this place? For one, it tells us something about the role inequalities in spa-
tial access and movement play in producing an uneven citizenship. In my 
research, I found that residents of the city understood movement through 
public space as a context in which class and status were thickly writt en.4 
Th e  privileged and the well-connected were understood to be able to 
buy off  police, for example, and the secured—and sometimes itinerant—
enclaves of VIPs intensifi ed processes of “elitization” in the city by stripping 
away, sidewalk by sidewalk, more public space from the public. Th e realm 
of mobility, in this sense, exposed some of the inequalities that constituted 
the city itself. Mobility was also an arena through which the workings of 
political sectarianism were produced as the city’s political sectarian geog-
raphy shaped, and was also shaped by, experiences and understandings of 
spatial movement. Feelings of safety and unsafety that had to do with the 
city’s political sectarian territorialization—a territorialization marked by a 
multilayered temporality of confl ict comprising the past, the present, and 
the anticipated future—emerged in stories people told about which routes 
they and their children would and would not take. Mobility, as I have illus-
trated, played a critical role in diff erentiating residents from one another 
not just by class and status but also by political affi  liation.
By focusing on the ways in which mobility and spatial access produce 
an uneven urban citizenship in Beirut, I have taken a diff erent path from 
that traversed by much of the scholarship on the city’s social and political 
geography, which emphasizes how sectarianism has confi gured, divided, 
and otherwise shaped the experience of space and place not just in Beirut 
but in Lebanon as a whole. Without question, sectarian diff erence is vital to 
any understanding of the social constitution of space in Beirut, and yet, as I 
have shown, it off ers us only one lens on this process. By providing insight 
into the ways in which class and status confi gure how people live and move 
through the city, I have aimed to contribute to studies of the Middle East 
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that address the signifi cance of social class in urban life through a per-
spective that goes beyond a focus on consumption practices and ideas of 
modernity and draws our att ention instead to the ways in which class and 
status are enacted in the civic and public realm of the streets.
Encountering the State
Th e stories about and experiences of moving through the city I have traced 
in this book also tell us something about the relationship between citizens 
and the state. In my conversations with Beirutis about traffi  c and mobility, 
the abstract category of “the state” was used by people in everyday parlance, 
but there was also a particular idea of the state, as an entity of government 
endowed with the responsibility of securing its citizens in the public realm, 
that emerged as salient. A lack of state regulation of the chaos on the roads 
led to an excessive number of accidents and injuries, many pointed out, and 
practices of going around and above the law—purchasing driver’s licenses, for 
example—have riddled the state with corruption. In short, Beirutis framed 
the lack of road safety and the arena of mobility more generally through ref-
erences to the state. In this way, in my research, I found support for anthro-
pologist Begoña Aretxaga’s argument (2003, 395) about the staying power of 
the state. While processes of neoliberal capitalist globalization have eroded 
many functions of the state, she argued, the state remains a crucial social and 
political presence. In Beirut, everyday mobility, as I have demonstrated in 
this book, was an important discursive context not only through which peo-
ple registered civic concerns about the state that is but also through which 
the resources and powers of the state that could be were imagined.
Notions of being unprotected by the state also emerged in the ways 
both civilians and the police described the traffi  c situation using the phrase 
ma fi  dowla (there is no state). Th is expression of statelessness conveyed 
an unmistakable cynicism about the state. But something more than cyni-
cism framed the structure of feeling toward the Lebanese state among my 
respondents. Amid, and also as a consequence of, an unstable and insecure 
postwar climate characterized by the devastation of war with Israel in sum-
mer 2006, ongoing electricity shortages, the continual sparring of transna-
tionally backed internal political groups, and the fl owing over of confl ict 
from the Syrian war, I heard in the cynical remarks about there not being 
a state aspirations for one that worked diff erently and that off ered security 
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and protection for its citizens. Th e ill-functioning state that citizens did not 
feel protected by on the roads is the same one that could not claim or even 
pretend to protect city dwellers from other kinds of vulnerabilities: the 
threat of regional war, for instance, as well as economic and health-related 
insecurities associated with soaring rents, a limited social safety net, and a 
lack of environmental policies aimed at reducing increasing rates of pollu-
tion (Fawaz, Harb, and Gharbieh, 2012, 180).5
Th rough my discussion of spatial mobility as a social and discursive reg-
ister through which Beirutis map out their experiences and understand-
ings of the state, I have sought to take seriously people’s sentiments about 
feeling unprotected by the state. In doing so, I have made conceptions 
about the weakness of the Lebanese state the basis of my analysis rather 
than the concluding point, which is oft en the case in academic and policy 
discourse that relies on the paradigm of the “weak,” “failed,” or “fragile” 
state in the examination of Lebanon. In light of Philip Abrams’s call to 
demystify the idea of the state,6 my ethnography of the embodied labor of 
the traffi  c police shows the state in its nitt y-gritt y details as a set of prac-
tices and eff orts that are undertaken by a multiplicity of actors in everyday 
ways. Th e perspective of the state I have provided is thus one that con-
siders state governance to be a multifaceted human and social enterprise 
instead of a coherent and autonomous entity.7 Th is is a public and spatial 
enterprise comprised, for example, of traffi  c policemen at intersections, 
patrols set up to catch helmetless motor-scooter drivers, and, sometimes, 
the direct on-the-ground actions of leaders like Interior Minister Ziad 
Baroud, who once physically removed illegal barriers that impeded traffi  c 
fl ow in the downtown area.
Moving through the Insecure City
Th eorist of space Henri Lefebvre conceived of the city as the site of encoun-
ter par excellence, a place where diff erent kinds of people not only interact 
but where certain kinds of collectivities might be formed.8 As my ethnog-
raphy has shown, the experience of being mobile in the city is central to 
this encounter. In their mobility experiences, drivers, walkers, and passen-
gers in Beirut navigated the city’s class, political, and militarized geography 
through encounters with traffi  c police, roadside displays of party politics, 
and each other. Th ese prosaic scenes of gett ing around the city, I have 
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argued, are in fact sites of uncommon civic signifi cance that produce—
and in turn are produced by—urban citizenship in a place where and a 
time when everyday life is framed by intersecting forms of insecurity. By 
focusing on the physical movement of people through urban space, I have 
provided a departure from anthropology’s long-established concern with 
human movement across transnational borders, and I have engaged public 
scenes of spatial mobility, from rides in cars with student drivers to pedes-
trian navigations around security barriers and conversations between pas-
sengers in shared taxis, to demonstrate how class, politics, and state power 
are spatialized in the urban public realm.
During my research, I found the constellation of experiences that consti-
tute this urban public realm to be characterized by dynamism and eff erves-
cence, to be sure, but also by discontent. Pervasive corruption among the 
power holders, the private takeover of public space, and an ineffi  cient state 
that leaves citizens to fend for themselves prevailed in the stories Beirutis 
told about their mobility experiences. In these stories, people expressed not 
just criticism of but also disaff ection with a system of governance and geopo-
litical landscape that rendered them insecure. In these expressions of disaf-
fection, captured by the kinds of comments service taxi drivers oft en shared 
with me—“Lebanon is run by just a few people” and “If they [the powers that 
be] want there to be a war, then there will be; they decide what will happen 
in Lebanon”—I heard the desire for an alternative civic and political order. 
Amid the fractious politics of the country and region, it remains to be seen 
how this alternative, and the lives of Beirut’s urban citizens, might take shape.
But people’s lives in Beirut are made insecure not only by public violence 
and Lebanon’s contentious geopolitical environment but also by the chal-
lenge of making ends meet and of coping with concerns about downward 
social mobility and the lack of a safety net. Th us, this ethnography is also 
about lives that are part of the broader global experience having to do with 
the anxieties about being unprotected that characterize the human condi-
tion in the early twenty-fi rst century. Moreover, the militarized and secured 
urban sett ing that Beirutis navigate on a day-to-day basis is increasingly 
salient for the rest of the world, as the intensifi cation of policing, surveil-
lance, and security are quickly becoming one of the central features of life 
in the contemporary city. Th e experience of being mobile in Beirut, then, 
tells us about the present in a zone of confl ict and also, potentially, about 
our future.
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Introduction
1. Hizbullah, “the party of God,” is an Islamic resistance group formed aft er the Israeli 
invasion and the arrival of the U.S. military in 1982, during the civil and regional war 
(1975–1990). Th e group, which I discuss further in chapters 2 and 3, was founded to 
defend Lebanon against and to liberate the country from Israel occupation and Western 
control. For more on Hizbullah’s history and growth, see Norton (2014).
2. “Israel/Lebanon: Israeli Indiscriminate Att acks Killed Most Civilians,” Human 
Rights Watch, accessed September 2, 2008, htt p://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2007/
09/06/isrlpa16781.htm.
3. For recent anthropological work that considers the role of mobility in producing 
urban inequality, see Caldeira (2012) and Lutz (2014).
4. Services are shared taxis fl agged down in the streets. Th ey are the most widely used 
form of public transit in Beirut. During my fi rst research period, September 2004–June 
2006, a ride in a service cost 1,000LL (about US$0.66). Following the war with Israel 
during summer 2006, according to Ilham Khabbaz, whom I met with in summer 2010, 
of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, the Ministry agreed to the request of 
the Taxi Drivers Syndicate for an offi  cial fare increase of 500LL. In practice, she said, 
drivers asked for 2,000LL rather than 1,500LL and received this amount from passen-
gers. Th us, following the 2006 war, the fare for a service ride became 2,000LL (about 
US$1.30)
5. Popular and cultural productions focused on the city’s traffi  c situation include the 
Al-Fassad (Corruption) television news show on July 9, 2010, with guest Ziad Aql, 
director of the Youth Association for Social Awareness (YASA), a traffi  c-safety orga-
nization; the theatrical production ‘Ajat as-sayr (Traffi  c Jam), staged at the Monnot 
Th eater in Beirut in 2013; the documentaries Taxi Talk (2009) and Taxi Beirut (2011); 
and the popular web-based video series Shankaboot, which chronicles the life of a deliv-
ery worker on a motor scooter (see htt p://www.shankaboot.com/).
6. Oft en described as a civil war, the protracted confl ict in Lebanon (1975–1990) 
had both domestic and regional dimensions and was fought by the armies of several 
nations. See chapter 2 for a complete overview of the war.
7. In particular, I draw on Low’s (2004) and Caldeira’s (2000) ethnographic investiga-
tions of sociospatial inequality in my theorization of how social power is constituted 
through spatial movement. I share Low’s and Caldeira’s conceptual approach to space: 
that space is socially constructed and that the social is spatially constructed as opposed 
to the idea that space is a mere container or “sett ing” for social life.
8. Th e understanding of sectarian identity that I hope to convey here is a nonessen-
tialist one that rejects the idea of there being a kind of necessary correspondence 
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(Hall 1985) between sectarian belonging and other characteristics such as political ide-
ology, religious belief and practice, and class status. Indeed, features of identity do not 
match up in such an uncomplicated way in any context, and Lebanon is no exception. 
Many Lebanese reject the idea that they can and should be defi ned in sectarian terms, 
and this sentiment is formalized in the vibrant activism of antisectarian civil society 
groups whose aims range from the establishment of a unifi ed and secular (rather than 
sect-based) civil code that governs personal-status laws to the toppling of the “sectarian 
regime.” And yet, because Lebanese religious identities have been mobilized for politi-
cal and social purposes since the nineteenth century (Makdisi 2000), sect remains a 
meaningful indigenous category. In this vein I emphasize the political aspects of sec-
tarian identity in this chapter, rather than those that have to do with religious belief 
and practice, in order to investigate the role political sectarianism plays in confi guring 
everyday geographies. Th us, I use the term political sectarianism primarily to highlight 
the ways in which sectarian identity is animated through mechanisms of the state and 
citizenship that are governed by and through the workings of party politics.
9. Deeb and Harb (2013, 234n17) note that “prior prisoner exchanges between 
Hizbullah and Israel set the precedent for Hizbullah’s capture of Israeli soldiers to use in 
future exchanges.” For more on the July 2006 war, see “Th e Sixth War” (2006).
10. Th ese studies include Ghannam’s (2002) on Cairo and Kanna’s (2011) on Dubai.
11. Here I draw on the notion of the wounded city as explored in Schneider and Susser 
(2003).
12. For ethnographic examinations of spatial movement amid confl ict and insecurity 
in this region, see Ochs (2011) on Israel and Allen (2008) and Peteet (forthcoming) on 
Palestine.
13. See, for example, Amar (2013) on governance by the security state in Cairo and Rio 
de Janeiro and Penglase (2014) on the daily insecurities of life in a Brazilian favela.
14. For an investigation of what it looks like on the ground when citizens move to 
 protect themselves and their communities, see Goldstein (2012).
15. See Gusterson and Besteman (2010) for a multifaceted approach to the kinds of 
lived insecurities faced by Americans in the face of growing inequality and weakened 
structures of social support in the United States.
16. On the experience of checkpoints and closure for Palestinians, see Allen (2008); 
Hammami (2004); Peteet (forthcoming); Wick (2011).
17. In a social and psychological analysis of emotions in everyday situations, Katz 
(1999) closely examines the emotions of driving.
18. A group of scholars (mainly from Europe and the United Kingdom in the fi elds 
of sociology and human geography) have forged an interdisciplinary fi eld of mobility 
studies (see Hannam, Sheller, and Urry 2006), which investigates the physical move-
ment of people and objects as well as the movement of images and information across 
space. Th ese mobility studies have drawn our att ention to the broader social processes 
that produce and inhibit movement but, in their abstract and case-study approaches, 
have been less eff ective in providing concrete insights into the diff erent kinds of power 
relations that surround everyday mobility practice. Th ere is also a signifi cant body 
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of historical work on automobility that focuses primarily on the United States and 
Europe.
19. Th e contributions of feminist thought to our understanding of space and place have 
been interdisciplinary and include, to highlight just a few areas of research, studies of 
housing and interior design (Hayden 1982), gated communities (Low 2004), and com-
munity organization (Pellow 2008), as well as theoretical projects that integrate gen-
der analyses into critical geography studies of capitalism and economic restructuring 
(Massey 1994).
20. Fenster and Hamdan-Saliba (2013) highlight these issues in their review of gender 
and feminist geography in the Middle East. Works that take up issues of gender and 
space in Middle Eastern cities include Ghannam’s (2013) research about young men 
and women in low-income Cairo, which traces gendered experiences of public mobil-
ity; Newcomb’s (2008) account of gender and identity in Fes, Morocco; de Koning’s 
(2009) ethnography of elite consumption practices and uses of Cairo’s public space; 
and an edited volume by Rieker and Ali (2008).
21. Ethnographic works concerned with masculinity in the Middle East include 
Ghannam (2013) and Inhorn (2012).
22. Here I am inspired by theorist of space Henri Lefebvre ([1968] 1996), who linked 
enactments of citizenship to the urban through what he referred to as “the right to the 
city”—that is, the right to inhabit the city in the broadest sense and thereby actively 
produce the city. Relations of power confound exercise of this right as users of the city 
confront limits to their spatial, civic, and political possibilities by structures of domi-
nance and control.
23. Increasingly, scholars have seen modern citizenship not only as a category of 
legal and political membership in a nation-state but also as a site of “multiple logics 
of belonging” (Vora 2013, 33) informed by both historical and contemporary cultural, 
social, and political economic experiences of, among others, transnationalism, migra-
tion, diaspora, and consumerism.
24. Th is literature confounds the state-society binary in various ways by, for example, 
interrogating theories of the state that endow it with a coherence, autonomy, and unity 
that it does not possess (Mitchell 1991), conceiving of the state as being made up of a 
multiplicity of actors (Abrams [1977] 1988), examining the spatial characteristics of the 
state (Gupta and Ferguson 2002), and undertaking ethnographic investigations of 
state-citizen interaction (Sharma and Gupta 2006).
25. See chapter 6 for more on this understanding of Lebanon as a weak state.
Chapter 1: The Privatized City
1. Th e fi rst Palestinian refugees sett led in and around Beirut aft er the establishment of 
Israel in 1948 and signifi cantly more arrived following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Th e 
two largest refugee camps near Beirut—Burj al-Barajneh and Sabra-Shatila—are adja-
cent to the Hizbullah-controlled neighborhoods of the southern suburbs. Th e United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) 
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reports that many, but not all, of the 455,000 Palestinian refugees registered in Lebanon 
live in camps (see UNRWA’s webpage about Lebanon, htt p://www.unrwa.org/where-
we-work/lebanon). Living conditions for the majority of Palestinians in Lebanon, both 
within and outside the camps, are characterized by poverty, disenfranchisement, and 
overcrowded habitation with inadequate infrastructure. Th ose living in the camps and 
informal sett lements around Beirut experience, in addition, social and spatial exclu-
sion eff ected through their geographical isolation from other parts of Beirut as well 
as constraints on access to the camps by nonresidents (Hanafi , Chaaban, and Seyfert 
2012; Peteet 2005). In 2005, offi  cially registered Palestinian refugees were granted per-
mission by the Lebanese state to work in the clerical and administrative sectors for the 
fi rst time, but they are still prohibited from seeking employment in many other pro-
fessions and can neither legally own nor inherit property or petition to gain Lebanese 
citizenship (Khalili 2007, 56). Refugees also have extremely limited access to gov-
ernmental  facilities, including schools, and no access to public social services. Most 
rely on UNRWA and, increasingly, NGOs for education, health, and social services. 
Th e Lebanese government justifi es the lack of Palestinian civil and political rights—
and  representation—by claiming that Palestinians are only temporarily residing in 
Lebanon. For more on Palestinians in Lebanon, see Allan (2013); Hanafi , Chaaban, and 
Seyfert (2012); Khalili (2007); and Peteet (2005). 
2. Th is estimate from UN-Habitat (2012) includes neither migrant workers nor 
 refugees who have come to Beirut since the escalation of the Syrian confl ict in late 2011.
3. Lebanon has six administrative governorates that are divided into twenty-fi ve 
 districts and then subdivided into municipalities. Municipal Beirut comprises a gov-
ernorate and a district whereas its suburbs are municipalities housed within other 
districts.
4. According to Fricke (2005, 177), nearly half of Beirutis rent their homes, and tenants 
typically pass their leases on through family members.
5. Beirut’s downtown area is variously called in English the “Beirut Central District” 
(or BCD for short), which is how the area’s postwar developers oft en refer to it; 
“Solidere,” which refers precisely to the company that redeveloped it aft er the war; and 
“downtown”; in Arabic, wast al-balad; in French, centre-ville (city center or downtown).
6. Sociologist Samir Khalaf (1985, 231) discusses the role of private property in the 
planning and design of Beirut and also its signifi cance as a source of wealth.
7. For more on the Armenian community in Lebanon, see Migliorino (2008).
8. Extending across the midsection of much of the country, the Lebanese mountains 
are a site of biblical importance.
9. Gates (1998) outlines how the development of Lebanon’s “tertiary” (service) sector 
became the most productive segment of the economy and how the mercantile elite—
in collaboration with French commercial interests—succeeded in creating an extreme 
state of laissez-faire.
10. Th e Tanzimat reforms created conditions favorable for investment in such projects 
as the construction of a toll road between Beirut and Damascus and the rebuilding of 
the city’s water-supply system (Fawaz 1983, 78).
 Notes to Pages 22–24 149
11. Religious violence of the nineteenth century, which culminated in sectarian mobi-
lizations and massacres in 1860, was, as Makdisi (2000) argues, the outcome of a joint 
“modernizing” eff ort by Ott oman and European powers that reconfi gured the basis of 
political loyalties from peasant-noble to sectarian ties. Th is new culture of sectarian-
ism reconfi gured the geography of Lebanon into distinct sectarian communities and 
“singled out religious affi  liation as the defi ning public and political characteristic of a 
modern subject and citizen” (174).
12. Hanssen (2005) and Sehnaoui (2002) provide elaborate descriptions of these 
 leisure sites.
13. At the outbreak of war, the Ott oman government abolished Lebanon’s semiau-
tonomous status and established a military occupation of the country. Anti-Ott oman 
political activity was violently repressed (Volk 2010), and food shortages during the 
war—aggravated by a locust plague in 1915—which were an outcome of shipping inter-
ruptions and military requisition of supplies by the Ott oman army, resulted in a famine 
that claimed the lives of more than one hundred thousand residents of Beirut and the 
Mount Lebanon region (Traboulsi 2007, 72).
14. Maronites are an Eastern Catholic community that takes its name from a fourth-
century monk. Since the sixteenth century, French Catholic missionaries had devel-
oped ties to the Ott oman Empire’s indigenous Catholics and had seen themselves as 
their protectors (Dueck 2012).
15. Maronite political infl uence was expanded through their placement in positions 
in the high commissioner’s administration in Beirut, for example, and their increased 
representation in elite military divisions (Picard 1996, 65; Salibi 1988, 35). Th ese forms 
of patronage and centuries-old cultural and economic ties meant that Maronites were 
loyal to the newly established state whereas many Muslims who had aspired to create 
an independent and unifi ed Syrian Arab nation constituted by its natural geographical 
borders rather than those drawn by the colonial power rejected the mandate.
16. Owen (1976) analyzes the underdevelopment of industry and agriculture as a 
direct consequence of the decision to create a Greater Lebanon, whereas Gates (1998) 
emphasizes this underdevelopment as being an outcome of the coalition of fi nancial 
interests among the national mercantile elite.
17. Social Watch provides a concise description of the country’s regional disparities; 
accessed December 17, 2014, htt p://www.socialwatch.org/node/10767.
18. Naiden and Harl (2009) argue that Beirut’s commercial strength and thus its role as 
a political asset make it a veritable city-state.
19. See Th ompson (2000) for analyses of French rule through paternalism and a 
 mediating elite.
20. Th ere are eighteen diff erent sects documented as existing in Lebanon. While 
English-language texts sometimes use the words communitarian or confessionalist to 
describe Lebanon’s political system, the Arabic words ta’if (sect) and ta’ifi  (sectarian) 
were those used most oft en by my respondents to describe the political and social 
structure. For this reason, I adhere to the usage of these latt er terms rather than the 
former except when citing others.
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21. Th e French urban planner Baron de Haussmann transformed Paris in the 1860s. 
Features of this transformation included the creation of wide boulevards, architec-
tural uniformity achieved through uninterrupted building façades, and the produc-
tion of consumer and civic areas for social and economic use by the “modern” French 
bourgeoisie.
22. However, in the end, not all aspects of Haussmann’s Paris could be exported. Two 
of the avenues that radiated out from the point of the “star” at Place de l’Etoile were 
cut off  because they ran into three important historic religious structures (Davie 2003).
23. In 1922, Ott oman Turkish was abolished in schools where it was still taught and 
French and Arabic were made the offi  cial languages of Lebanon. Language, as historian 
Nadya Sbaiti notes, was central to how the mandate extended its discursive and physi-
cal authority: “Language was the means through which people could assert or express 
their own national sentiments, and, particularly in Beirut, it was also the axis around 
which national, religious and class affi  liations were formulated by the residents of the 
new Lebanon” (Sbaiti 2009, 77). See Dueck (2010) also for a discussion of the role of 
education in French governance of Lebanon.
24. Saliba (2004) considers Beirut’s eclectic mix of Western and Eastern architecture as 
an articulation of its “cultural dualism,” which itself constitutes a kind of national style.
25. Constantinos Doxiadis (1958), the French development organization Institut 
International de Recherche et de Formation, Education Cultures Développement 
(1959–1964), Michel Ecochard (1961–1964), the Atelier Parisien d’Urbanisme (1977), 
and more recently the Institut d’Aménagement et d’Urbanisme de la Région Ile de 
France (1983–1986 and 1991 onward) have developed master plans for Beirut. For more 
on these master plans, see Verdeil (2005).
26. Th e planning system in Lebanon is complex. Planning occurs at three main levels: 
national, regional, and municipal. At the national level, the Directorate General for 
Urban Planning within the Ministry of Public Works and Transport develops plan-
ning regulations and master plans and issues building permits for some municipalities. 
Th e Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) is a semi-governmental 
agency linked with the Council of Ministers, which is responsible for the allocation 
of the majority of funds earmarked for the post–civil war reconstruction of Lebanon, 
supersedes all other public institutions in implementation decisions, and governs a 
body called the Higher Council for Urban Planning. Th e municipal and regional levels 
(regions are collaborations or federations of municipalities) are responsible within their 
geographic territories for planning and day-to-day maintenance of infrastructure, pub-
lic transportation, and so forth. Some municipalities issue building and construction 
permits. For more on Lebanon’s planning organization and processes, see Stevenson 
(2007). See UNDP (2011) on Beirut as haphazard, Khalaf and Kongstad (1973) on the 
city as unplanned, and Perry (2002) on Beirut as unregulated.
27. As an example of this kind of political infi ghting, it was widely reported that Ghazi 
Aridi, head of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, was forced out of his posi-
tion in 2013 as a result of his clashes with Walid Jumblatt , a fellow Druze (a minority 
religious sect in Lebanon), but a more powerful, political leader.
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28. See chapter 3 for a discussion of Solidere’s rebuilding of downtown. Solidere is an 
acronym for Société Libanaise pour le Développement et la Reconstruction de Beyrouth, 
French for the Lebanese Company for the Development and Reconstruction of Beirut.
29. For scholarship that examines these processes in the Arab world, see Elsheshtawy 
(2008); Singerman (2011); and Singerman and Amar (2006).
30. Solh made these comments at a public symposium, “City Debates,” held at the 
American University of Beirut on May 12, 2006.
31. Th is issue of varying setbacks and lack of regulation of the built environment is 
 discussed in a UNDP report (2011, 252).
32. Beirut’s fi rst street atlas, Zawarib Beirut, was fi rst published in 2005 and was aimed 
primarily at an audience of Lebanese ex-pats returning to the city for leisure and business; 
they found it challenging to navigate the city without precise street names and addresses.
33. See Roy and AlSayyad (2003) for a discussion of informality in contemporary 
urbanization processes.
34. While Krijnen and Fawaz (2010) track the increase in these practices of informal 
decision making and allowing exceptions to the law, Fawaz (2009c) demonstrates the 
historical precedence for this “building by exception” through a discussion of plan-
ning regulations and illegal housing in Beirut’s peripheries. According to Riachi (1963), 
until 1945 the prevailing type of construction in the city was the three-story, two-
apartment walk-up building. Seven- and eight-story buildings appeared during a con-
struction boom aft er 1945, and later, in 1954, a special amendment to the building code 
was passed by Parliament permitt ing a maximum of nine fl oors per building. Krijnen 
and Fawaz (2010) provide a detailed analysis of processes of informality in the plan-
ning, design, and construction of Beirut’s built environment.
35. Zoning exists for only some of Beirut’s land, and rezoning, aft er original regulations 
“expire,” is common (Glasze and Alkhayyal 2002, 332). Khalaf has writt en about how 
informal patron-client relations infl uence zoning to the degree that “virtually everyone 
within the government civil bureaucracy—from the simple municipal clerk who over-
looks a minor transgression to a high government offi  cial who intervenes on behalf of 
either his client or patron to reroute a road network or rezone a certain area—is placed 
in a strategic position to aff ect the redistribution of rewards and benefi ts. Such manipu-
lations are especially frequent when the case involves land or real estate” (1985, 230).
36. Here I draw on Fawaz’s (2009a) insights into the role of Hizbullah in urban plan-
ning and construction.
37. For more on energy hawking in Beirut, see Justin Salhani’s article on the website 
for the nonprofi t organization Next City, “Power Cuts in Beirut Spawn an Informal 
Energy-Hawking Industry,” accessed December 17, 2014, htt p://nextcity.org/daily/
entry/power-cuts-in-beirut-spawn-an-informal-energy-hawking-industry.
38. Th e French built the fi rst railway in Lebanon at the end of the nineteenth century. 
For much of the twentieth century, there were lines connecting Beirut and Damascus, 
the eastern Bekaa Valley with Aleppo, and another that ran along the coast. Th e rail net-
work, which had already fallen out of use by the 1970s because of the popularity of cars 
and buses, was destroyed during the civil and regional war and has not been revitalized.
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39. A 1931 announcement in the Lebanese newspaper La Syrie about the founding of 
a new organization, the Association of Automobile Importers, championed the ben-
efi ts of the automobile for the tourism sector and urged the government to ensure that 
the nation’s roadways were improved so as to reap these benefi ts: “Th e vehicle, with its 
indispensable ally, the good road, encourages and facilitates the arrival of tourists to a 
country. . . . Lebanon, once the seat of humanity and of religions and civilizations, is 
sure to att ract an increasing number of tourists provided that a wise legislation facili-
tates and develops the touristic eff ort” (La Syrie, May 8, 1931).
40. “Beirut Tourist Police Att empt to Silence Automobile Horns” (1964) details the 
roles and responsibilities of this special traffi  c-police force.
41. Nakkash and Jouzy (1973) off er a picture of the traffi  c congestion during this 
time.
42. Th ese and other statistics regarding traffi  c in Beirut can be found in a report by 
Aoun et al. (2013).
43. According to Ilham Khabbaz, whom I met with in summer 2010, director of Land 
Transport at the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, intensifying traffi  c conges-
tion was also an outcome of the growing number of public transportation vehicles 
operating illegally without proper licensing—including shared service taxis, minibuses, 
and buses.
44. Th e suffi  x ayn denotes the dual or two of something in Arabic. Lebanese commonly 
add this to non-Arabic words like service or Bonjour.
45. For more on the city’s parking problems, see a 2011 UNDP report (244).
46. See, for example, Nahnoo (Arabic for “we”), a youth organization (nahnoo.org), 
and the Beirut Green Project (beirutgreenproject.wordpress.com).
47. For more on the city’s pollution problem, see Chabban, Aoub, and Oulabi (2001) 
on air quality, Korfali and Massoud (2003) on noise, and a UNDP report (2011) on 
 pollution and environmental degradation.
48. Th e Fouad Boutros Highway project, which was still in the proposal stage as of this 
writing, is a controversial plan to build a 1.3 km highway linking Ashrafi eh with the port 
area. Th e project has been widely protested by residents who argue that it will destroy 
historic properties and increase neighborhood traffi  c.
49. In their work on the political economy of urban development, Logan and Molotch 
(1987) outline the political, planning, and investment processes that constitute the 
city as a “growth machine” in which the urban landscape is developed for its exchange 
rather than use value.
50. Sarkis has been an active in both public and scholarly forums about Beirut’s urban 
development; see, for example, Rowe and Sarkis (1998).
51. Th e notion of the right to the city is an idea fi rst proposed by Lefebvre ([1968] 
1996). Lefebvre conceived of it as the “right to urban life,” a right with which ordinary 
residents of the city are endowed and which can become a basis for class-based political 
and structural change. David Harvey (2008) reexamines the right to the city through 
the relations between urbanization and capitalism and calls for a democratization of 
the power to shape processes of urbanization.
 Notes to Pages 35–40 153
Chapter 2: The Space of War
1. For more on the National Museum and its emphasis on a Phoenician national nar-
rative that orients Lebanon’s past toward the West and away from that of the eastern 
Islamic world, see Kaufman (2004).
2. Here I draw on Tahan’s (2005) discussion of the museum during wartime along with 
artist Lamia Joreige’s (2013) narrative that accompanied her installation documenting 
the history of the National Museum.
3. In everyday parlance, I found that people did use the term civil war (al-harb 
 al-ahliya), although they assumed knowledge and understanding, on the part of those 
they were speaking with, of the regional dimensions of the war. In short, while the term 
civil war was regularly used, it was shorthand for a war of strategic global geopolitical 
signifi cance that was fought by both domestic and regional players.
4. Article 9 of the constitution, for example, put rights and rulings on personal  status 
(marriage, divorce, custody, adoption, inheritance) under the domain of religious 
 sectarian communities (Traboulsi 2007, 90).
5. Th is idea of Lebanon’s Muslim and Arab character represented an ideological com-
promise between the Muslim and Christian groups. Th e compromise was that Muslims 
would recognize the distinct nature of their country, marked by its sectarian political 
system and historic ties with the West, and that Christians would renounce any protec-
tive links to the European powers and affi  rm the Arab character of the country and its 
membership in the Arab world.
6. For more about the 1932 census and its enduring political signifi cance, see Maktabi 
(1999).
7. See Jim Lehrer’s PBS News Hour interview with President George W. Bush about the 
state of the war in Iraq (Bush, 2007).
8. Th e confl ict also marked a new phase of U.S.-Lebanon relations and the progres-
sively deeper level of U.S. engagement in both regional and Lebanese politics. See 
Gendzier (1997) for a careful reading of the 1958 confl ict and its signifi cance for U.S.-
Lebanon relations.
9. See Traboulsi (2007, 160) for statistics on the cost of living between 1967 and 1975; 
Picard (1996, 94) on the unemployment rate in 1975; and Joseph (1983, 11) on the 
 percentage of the population controlling the GNP. Khalaf (2002) provides a detailed 
picture of the economic situation in the prewar moment.
10. Indeed, the militias became large business enterprises during Lebanon’s war. 
Among other activities, Traboulsi describes how the militias monopolized foreign 
trade, controlled the lott ery business, participated in the narcotics traffi  c, devel-
oped a black market of imports to Syria, and engaged in “exchange services” with 
the bourgeoisie (protection money in return for import and export quotas or sheer 
profi teering). Th ey became an integral part of that class, entering into close business 
partnerships with many of its members, especially in the fl our and fuel trade (2007, 
236–237).
11. Th ese fi gures are from Peteet’s (2005) study of Palestinians in Lebanon.
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12. Th ere are now twelve camps in Lebanon. See the UNRWA website (htt p://www
.unrwa.org/) for information on the present situation.
13. Several anthropologists have documented the experience of Palestinians in 
Lebanon. See, for example, Allan (2013); Khalili (2007); and Peteet (2005).
14. Fisk’s on-the-ground narrative Pity the Nation (2002) provides this kind of account 
by detailing the many stages, theaters, and episodes of the war. Haugbolle (2011) off ers 
a thorough review of the historiography and memory of the war.
15. Haugbolle (2012) analyzes discourses about masculinity and militiamen during the 
war from various angles, including that of the “litt le militia man,” who takes up arms in 
the midst of the transition from boyhood to manhood.
16. Here, I borrow Picard’s term (1996, 149) to describe the divided political and 
 administrative structure of the city during the war.
17. Israeli troops withdrew from South Lebanon in 2000, and a United Nations Interim 
Force in Lebanon zone was established in an area between the city of Tyre and the 
Israeli border. For more on Hizbullah and the Israeli withdrawal, see Norton (2000). 
Many Lebanese and Hizbullah dispute the Israeli occupation of a piece of land at the 
Lebanon-Syria border called Shebaa Farms, which Israel seized as part of the Golan 
Heights in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Th e possession of weapons by Hizbullah is an 
ongoing issue of political contention in Lebanon.
18. Th ese fi gures are taken from Labaki and Abou Rjeily (1994, cited in Haugbolle 
2011). In his review of the historiography and memory of the war across scholarly, 
 literary, and artistic realms, Haugbolle (2011) discusses politicization surrounding the 
quantifi cation of the war’s casualties.
19. I have heard the ending of the war referred to as the moment when “people tired of 
fi ghting one another” but also as the moment when the powers-that-be tired of having 
the militias fi ght for them because the war had ceased to be profi table.
20. Although the Ta’if Accord increased the number of parliamentary seats from 99 
to 108, in 1992 this number was changed to 128. Farid el Khazen discusses the rumors 
and lack of transparency surrounding the decision to establish 128 as the number of 
seats. Th e before Ta’if/aft er Ta’if parliamentary seat distribution looked like this: 
Maronite before Ta’if 30/aft er Ta’if 34, Greek Orthodox 11/14, Greek Catholic 6/8, 
Armenian Orthodox 4/5, Armenian Catholic 1/1, Protestant 1/1, Other Christians 1/1, 
total Christians 54/64; Sunni Muslims 20/27, Shi‘i Muslims 19/27, Druze Muslims 6/8, 
Alawite Muslims 0/2, total Muslims 45/64. Total seats 99/128 (el Khazen 1994).
21. Amnesty International states: “No criminal investigations or prosecutions were ini-
tiated into mass human rights abuses that were committ ed with impunity during and 
aft er the 1975–1990 war. Abuses included killings of civilians; abductions and enforced 
disappearances of Palestinians, Lebanese and foreign nationals; and arbitrary deten-
tions by various armed militias and Syrian and Israeli government forces.” (Lebanon—
Amnesty International Report 2008, accessed December 18, 2014, htt p://www.amnesty
.org/en/region/lebanon/report-2008.)
22. For example, aft er returning from exile in France in 2005, Michel Aoun, a former 
Lebanese Army commander during Lebanon’s war, became the leader of the Free 
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Patriotic Movement, a powerful political party with a substantial number of parlia-
mentary seats. Nabih Berri, the current speaker of Parliament, led the Amal Movement 
during the war and the War of the Camps, in which several Palestinian refugee camps 
were besieged.
23. According to Mawad (2009), because the state gives schools the freedom to choose 
their own history textbooks, schools usually select one that is in line with their political 
and religious affi  liation. Th is point highlights the ways in which political groups, some 
of which are framed through religion, are not only active in providing interpretations of 
present-day issues but serve as interpreters of the past.
24. Th is is the outlook that Peleikis (2006) encountered in her research with residents 
of a multisectarian village in the Shouf district of Mount Lebanon.
25. A signifi cant amount of scholarly and artistic work also engages memories of the 
war. See, for example, West Beirut (1998); Larkin (2012); Makdisi (1999); Raad (2007). 
Th ere are also ways in which the war is mined in popular culture for its irony-laced 
“cool” factor. For instance, in 2004, a bar named “1975” with waiters in camoufl age, fl oor 
seating lined with sandbags, and graffi  ti-marked walls opened in the upscale nightlife 
district of Monot, a playground for the young and affl  uent.
26. Th e phrase in Arabic is ‘amaru al-hajr bas ma ‘amaru an-nas.
27. Th e Syrian army fi rst entered Lebanon in 1976 at the request of Lebanese President 
Suleiman Frangieh in the second year of the war, and the Arab League then gave Syria 
a mandate to retain troops in Lebanon with the objective of restoring peace. Syria 
became one of the major players in the war and asserted throughout that its actions 
were necessary to ensure the protection of both Syria and Lebanon.
28. Larkin describes one such plaque commemorating a martyr of the Syrian Social 
Nationalist Party in the Hamra neighborhood (2012, 104), and on walks through 
Ashrafi eh and adjacent neighborhoods I have seen graffi  ti and banners honoring 
Bashir Gemayel, commander of the Lebanese Forces militia and senior member of the 
Phalange party, who was killed in 1982. For a discussion of martyrdom in the Lebanese 
context, see Volk (2010, 32–35).
29. In Larkin’s research (2012) with members of what he calls the “post-memory” 
 generation, the war was always present in their sentiments about political, civic, and 
social life.
30. Saree Makdisi argues, however, that the built fabric of downtown was damaged 
more by the reconstruction eff orts than by the war itself: “It is estimated that, as the 
result of demolition, by the time reconstruction eff orts began in earnest in 1993, approx-
imately 80 percent of the structures in the downtown area had been damaged beyond 
repair, whereas only around a third held that status as a result of damage infl icted during 
the war itself ” (1997, 674).
31. Prior to the war, downtown was a transportation hub with buses and service taxis 
lined up around Martyr’s Square beside signs indicating their destinations. As an eclec-
tic retail center, with sex-based commercial activity along with upmarket shops and res-
taurants, and as a point of origin for travel to other parts of Beirut, downtown was used 
by most of the city’s residents. For more on downtown in the era prior to the long war 
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in Lebanon, see Khalaf (2006). For more on the early plans to rebuild downtown, see 
Beyhum (1992).
32. See Makdisi (1997, 667) for more on the demolition that was undertaken.
33. Residents and owners of property in the city center were off ered modest compensa-
tion packages. Many of the displaced residents had fl ed to Beirut from rural areas dur-
ing the war. Some residents were accused by Solidere of being “occupiers” or wartime 
militia members (or both) who fi led illegitimate claims in order to receive compensa-
tion. According to the government, anyone who could present persuasive arguments 
or evidence showing that they were uprooted or relocated at least once during the war 
qualifi ed for compensation from the Ministry of the Displaced and the Central Fund for 
the Displaced (Sawalha 2003, 276–278). Th e stated diff erences between the categories of 
“the displaced” and “the occupiers” were a subject of contention. In exchange for expro-
priation, property owners were off ered Solidere shares. And it was stipulated that owners 
(or other interested parties) who wished to save buildings from demolition and instead 
recover and restore them would have to pay the company a 12 percent surcharge on the 
estimated value of the lot and be prepared to repair the building within two years.
34. Makdisi (1997) discusses the ancient archeological dimensions of the area.
35. For scholarly work on the downtown reconstruction and the politics of memory, 
see, for example, Haugbolle (2011); Makdisi (1997); Nagel (2002); Sawalha (2010); 
Schmid (2002); Yahya (2007). 
36. For more on the notion of urbicide, see Fregonese (2009) on Beirut and Coward 
(2004) on Bosnia.
37. See Grodach (2002) on Bosnia and Lee (2013) and Nagle (2009) on Belfast.
38. See Hazbun (2008) for more on the eff ects of 9/11 on Arab tourism fl ows.
39. Volk (2010) provides a careful reading of the Hariri burial site and its visual 
iconography.
40. See Human Rights Watch, “Israel/Lebanon: Israeli Indiscriminate Att acks Kill 
Most Civilians,” accessed December 18, 2014, htt p://www.hrw.org/news/2007/09/05/
israellebanon-israeli-indiscriminate-att acks-killed-most-civilians.
41. For more about the threat of war debris, see the Lebanon section on the United 
Nations Offi  ce for Project Services website (htt p://www.unops.org).
42. Hermez (2012) conceptualizes this state of anticipating future war, which is shaped 
by past experiences of confl ict in Lebanon.
Chapter 3: Politics and Public Space
Parts of this chapter appeared in Kristin Monroe, “Youth Expressions of Class and 
Mobility,” in Everyday Life in the Muslim Middle East, 3rd ed., ed. Donna Lee Bowen, 
Evelyn A. Early, and Becky Schulthies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), 
39–48. I thank Indiana University Press for permission to use this material.
1. In considering how everyday uses of the city can shed light on the workings of politi-
cal sectarianism, I draw on de Certeau’s notion of “spatial stories,” which “have the 
function of founding and articulating spaces” (1984, 122).
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2. For more on other divided cities, see Calame and Charlesworth (2009) on Belfast, 
Jerusalem, Mostar, and Nicosia, and see Allegra, Casaglia, and Rokem (2012) on the 
concept of the divided city.
3. Hizbullah expanded its role in government in 2005; for more, see Deeb and Harb 
(2013, 41).
4. Th ese are young people from middle- and upper-class backgrounds who lived in 
neighborhoods of municipal Beirut and the northern suburbs. Th ey shared many of the 
same leisure activities of the youth of the southern suburbs that Deeb and Harb (2013) 
describe; however, the subjects of piety and morality were not central in our conversa-
tions or in their talk about where they liked to have fun in the city.
5. Genberg (2002) also describes how boundaries between neighborhoods are drawn 
through various kinds of visual and aural sectarian markers.
6. See chapter 2 for a historical overview of the sectarian composition of the Lebanese 
government. Electoral reform has been a contentious and key political issue since 
the end of the civil and regional war. For more, see Arda Arsenian Ekmekji’s report 
“Confessionalism and Electoral Reform in Lebanon,” accessed December 18, 2014, htt p://
www.aspeninstitute.org/publications/confessionalism-electoral-reform-lebanon.
7. On the allocation of welfare resources in Lebanon, see Cammett  (2014).
8. Th e American University of Beirut is a selective and expensive English-language pri-
vate university founded by U.S. Protestant missionaries in the late nineteenth century. 
Th e majority of its students are from relatively privileged backgrounds in comparison 
with the average Lebanese.
9. For more on the mosque’s construction and its relation to Sunni leadership in 
Lebanon, see Vloeberghs (2012).
10. Khalaf tracks these and other developments of the downtown environment in the 
post-1990 period (2006, 165).
11. For more on the relations of patronage that butt ress the Lebanese political system, 
see Hamzeh (2001).
12. See, for example, Wedeen (1999) on the practice of public visual display of political 
leaders in Syria as a means of symbolic domination.
13. Th e singular, dahiya (suburb), is used to refer to the group of majority Shi‘i areas in 
southern Beirut, and the plural, al-dawahi (suburbs), is used to refer to other suburban 
areas. For more on the formation of and nomenclature surrounding Dahiya, see Deeb 
and Harb (2013, 46–49).
14. Deeb and Harb discuss the area’s lack of singularity in regard to these characteris-
tics (2013, 178).
15. Deeb (2006) and Deeb and Harb (2013) provide in-depth ethnographic investiga-
tions of piety and space in Dahiya.
16. Fawaz, Harb, and Gharbieh describe these manifestations of neighborhood secu-
rity in their report on “Living Beirut’s Security Zones” (2012, 181–182).
17. Th e Phalange is a political party supported mainly by Maronite Christians. It played 
a major role in Lebanon’s war, and aft er a decline in the late 1980s and 1990s reemerged 
in the early 2000s. It is a member of the March 14th Alliance.
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18. Fawaz, Harb, and Gharbieh discuss this as a form security intended to counter 
the threat posed by intercommunal riots, which generally occur at the intersection of 
diff erent territories (2012, 181).
19. See chapter 4 for further discussion of security processes in public space.
20. Years aft er this conversation with Layla, on May 22, 2007, a bomb did explode late 
at night in the parking lot of ABC mall, killing one and injuring nine others. Less than 
twenty-four hours later, a bomb went off  in Verdun, near the Dunes shopping center, 
injuring ten, including two children.
21. Kegels (2007) reports similar fi ndings about privileged young Beirutis continuing 
to go out seeking nightlife during the 2005–2006 period of bombings.
22. Th is paradoxical image was expressed in the photo that won the World Press Photo 
Award in 2007. Widely discussed in the Western media, the photo depicts  fashionable 
young people driving by and taking photos of destroyed buildings in the southern 
 suburbs of Beirut.
23. For more on the state surveillance of young people in other contexts within the 
region, see Varzi’s (2006) description of how the public conduct of Tehranian youth 
is surveiled and policed in a city “inhabited by the state” and Ghannam’s (2013) dis-
cussion of male working-class youth in Cairo and their encounters with state security 
forces.
24. In addition to this sense of physical safety that arises from sectarian ties, other 
forms of security are cultivated through sectarian affi  liation. As Sawalha found, the 
government’s failure to provide city residents with necessary urban services—such as 
electricity, building and elevator safety, and tenants’ rights—forces Beirutis to rely on 
sectarian connections to meet their needs (2010, 64).
25. For example, a French fi rst name is oft en understood to identify an individual as 
Christian, while males named Ali or Hussein (prominent fi gures in the Shi‘i hagiogra-
phy) are thought to indicate a Shi‘i family background
26. Th ere is youth activism against sectarianism in Beirut, and this movement has been 
energized by the opening in the Mar Mikhael neighborhood of bookstores, galleries, 
and cafes that serve as a kind of launching pad and organizing base.
27. Interestingly, another report found that Lebanese youth showed “high levels of sec-
tarian bias (in-group favoritism) along with low levels of acceptance of inter-sectarian 
relationships” (Harb 2010, 17–18).
Chapter 4: Securing Beirut
Parts of this chapter appeared in Kristin V. Monroe, “Being Mobile in Beirut,” City & 
Society 23, no. 1 (2011): 91–111. I thank Wiley for permission to use this material.
1. Th is intensifi cation of security for the protection of prominent and public fi gures 
is but one of the fi ve modalities of security in Beirut that Fawaz, Harb, and Gharbieh 
(2012) outline.
2. For more on the relationship between automobility and warfare, see Davis (2007).
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3. On gated residences, surveillance, and private security in urban sites, see Caldeira 
(2000); Davis (1992); Low (2004); and Zhang (2010). On the role of vigilante groups 
performing extrastate security, see Goldstein (2012).
4. For more on these modes of collaborative policing between private and state-based 
forces, see Yarwood (2007) on multiagency policing and Jones and Newburn (2006) 
on plural policing.
5. Drawing on Allen Feldman’s (2004) formulation of “securocratic warfare,” I use the 
term securocracy to refer to the ways in which heightened anxieties about the security 
of high-profi le individuals appear not only as a spatial phenomenon but also as part of 
broader political strategy.
6. Writings about SUVs have focused on their materiality (Miller 2007), how their size 
and weight create physical dangers for other users of the road ( Jain 2002), and how 
they encourage an atomistic model of citizenship in which drivers inhabit buff er zones 
that limit their contact with others (Mitchell 2005).
7. Geographer Louise Amoore (2011) refers to this calculation as the “ontology of 
association.”
8. Th ese skills and tactics bring to mind the “ways of operating” de Certeau (1984) 
described as part of the everyday practice of making one’s way across spatial terrain.
9. See Fawaz, Gharbieh, and Harb (2009) for a vivid picture of the complexities sur-
rounding Beirut’s security context.
10. U.S. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3 was issued in March 2002 and 
requires the att orney general in consultation with the assistant to the president for 
Homeland Security to assign the United States one of fi ve “threat conditions” identi-
fi ed by a description and corresponding color. See “Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive-3,” George W. Bush White House Archives, accessed December 19, 2014, htt p://
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020312–5.html.
11. Moreover, the increased militarization of the city not only connected this period 
with that of the civil war but also masculinized public space. Urban space was increas-
ingly governed by men with guns, and moving through the city entailed regular inter-
actions with them. Th ese interactions were gendered, for example, through the use of 
aggressive verbal and physical action and the assertion of a masculinist protectionism 
particularly in relation to (some) women and children.
Chapter 5: The Chaos of Driving
Parts of this chapter appeared in Kristin V. Monroe, “Being Mobile in Beirut,” City & 
Society 23, no. 1 (2011): 91–111. I thank Wiley for permission to use this material.
1. Lebanese Arabic is peppered with French words. Some Lebanese, for instance, use 
the French word accident rather than the Arabic hadith.
2. Statistics I obtained from the traffi  c-police division of the Internal Security Forces 
(ISF) recorded 6,508 injuries and 513 fatalities resulting from traffi  c accidents in 2009. 
In interpreting such statistics, the Youth Association for Social Awareness (YASA) 
160 Notes to Pages 103–115
highlights the size and population fi gures of Lebanon, the existence of underreport-
ing, and the fact that the traffi  c police investigate neither damages-only accidents 
nor those involving army and police vehicles, which may constitute about 15 per-
cent of all road-related fatalities according to the Scientifi c Research Foundation, 
YASA website, accessed December 10, 2014, htt p://www.yasa.org/en/Sectiondet
.aspx?id=10&id2=371.
3. Buses, like service taxis, are also fl agged down as there are no fi xed stops along the 
bus routes. Th e routes themselves can vary as drivers oft en choose to avoid traffi  c or 
construction by taking a diff erent series of streets that are not along their typical route. 
Buses came to replace the tram system in the early 1960s.
4. I use the male pronoun for service taxi drivers because in my time living in Beirut, 
I never saw a female taxi driver, although a friend insists that there are a few. She told 
me that she had seen two aft er living in Beirut for thirteen years.
5. Statistic from the World Bank’s country profi le of Lebanon, accessed October 12, 
2010, htt p://web.worldbank.org/. Th e most current annual per capita income data 
from the World Bank is US$17,090.
6. Examples of cultural productions highlighting the intergroup sociality that takes 
place in service taxis are the feature fi lm Taxi Ballad (2012), the documentary fi lm Taxi 
Talk (2009), and a collection of essays in Arabic, Beirut bil Service (Krideyah 2009).
7. Stoller (1982) describes the bush taxi as a rich ethnographic site through which the 
anthropologist learns to interpret the signs that constitute the discourse of social action.
8. While perusing issues of L’Orient-Le Jour from the 1960s, I found articles about the 
service taxi system that confi rmed comments by older Beirutis that “before the [civil 
and regional] war, the taxis were more orderly” because they followed fi xed routes to 
diff erent sectors of the city.
9. Most upper-income residents I met with said they rarely or never took service taxis, 
and women from this same class background voiced concerns about the safety of these 
taxis with reference to both themselves and their preteen and teenaged daughters.
10. Notar (2012b) discusses this phenomenon in the context of urban China.
11. As I describe here in the context of Beirutis’ various understandings of the chaos of 
driving, Anderson (1983) saw this “deep, horizontal comradeship” as being produced in 
spite of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in a national community.
12. Curiously, a French Mandate-era Lebanese newspaper cartoon I came across 
encouraged me to think about the origins of this discourse about “becoming” or 
“being” Lebanese through the way in which one drove. Th e 1922 cartoon from 
Al-Ma‘aarad, entitled “How to Transgress Rules,” depicted a curbside lined with parked 
cars with a sign declaring “Parking of cars and carriages prohibited.”
13. Although emerging from an ecological perspective, the topic of social disorganiza-
tion also engaged early urban studies scholars of the Chicago School. See, for example, 
Park, Burgess, and McKenzie’s now-classic Th e City (1925). 
14. As-Safi r, April 10, 1995, 5.
15. From “Fadlallah lors de sa Réception d’une Délégation de l’organisation YASA: 
Livrer un Permis de Conduire à un Non Méritant est Illicite et est Une Fraude!” 
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accessed June 14, 2010. htt p://www.yasa.org/fr/Section.aspx?id=6 (article now 
deleted from site).
16. From “Fadlallah a Reçu le Député Pierre Dakkash et le Rassemblement des Jeunes 
pour la Sensibilisation Sociale,” accessed June 14, 2010. htt p://www.yasa.org/fr/
Section.aspx?id=6 (article now deleted from site).
17. Here I invoke Lefebvre’s idea that cities have collective rhythms that are deter-
mined by the varied and contradictory forms of alliances that human groups create and 
in which class and political relations intervene ([1968] 1996, 234).
Chapter 6: “There Is No State”
1. Th e ISF is the domestic police force under the authority of the Ministry of the 
Interior; among other duties, it administers traffi  c policing. Although separate from the 
armed forces, the ISF is paramilitary in its organization, decorum, and uniforms.
2. Baroud increased traffi  c fi nes, the number of traffi  c police, and the allocation of funds 
for traffi  c management, for example, while expanding the use of radar equipment. See 
Sikimic (2010).
3. Ethnographic att ention is now being paid to the everyday bureaucratic activities and 
actors that make up the state. See, for example, Gupta (2012) and Navaro-Yashin (2012).
4. For examples of this kind of weak-state analysis of Lebanon, see Hanf (1993); Pan 
(2006); Rotberg (2003).
5. In the Lebanese context, however, Fregonese (2012) argues that a conception of a 
single sovereignty is ill-fi tt ing as Lebanon is characterized by multiple sovereignties 
constituted by both state and nonstate actors.
6. Th e 16th Brigade was a special police force “of the most modern means” created in 
1959 during Fouad Chehab’s presidency to deal with emergencies related to internal 
security (Malsagne 2008).
7. In saying “there is no state,” the policeman recalled to me the cynicism of the state 
administration workers in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus—a self-declared 
but internationally unrecognized state—which Navaro-Yashin (2012) refers to as being 
a “made-up state.” In his verbiage, the police offi  cer may also have sought to distance 
himself, as the Indian government workers in Gupta and Sharma’s research did (2006, 
286), from the well-circulated image of the lazy, ineffi  cient, and corrupt state worker 
and thereby to remove himself, as it were, from the sullied reputation of the state and its 
functionaries like the traffi  c police.
8. Police training takes place in military schools where recruits participate in a month-
long specialization program like policing traffi  c. For more on Lebanon’s security 
 apparatus, see Nashabe (2009).
9. Although offi  cially the ISF is not an exclusively male organization and while public 
relations materials for the ISF include images of women and I saw several when visiting 
ISF offi  ces, on the streets I have only rarely seen female members of the ISF.
10. USAID provided this assistance. See, for example, usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACR061
.pdf, accessed May 16, 2012.
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11. Th ese numbers ebb and fl ow in response to domestic and regional political ten-
sions and dynamics. Th e highest tourism levels thus far in the post-civil and regional 
war era—two million visitors—were recorded in 2009 (Kourchid 2009).
12. Here I make reference to Gupta and Ferguson’s (2002) analysis of the spatiality of 
the state and specifi cally its vertical and encompassing dimensions.
13. As noted, in 2004, there were only a few traffi  c lights downtown. By summer 2010, 
additional traffi  c lights had appeared and more drivers obeyed them. However, at the 
most unwieldy intersections policemen still controlled traffi  c.
14. For analyses of networks of favoritism and patronage in Lebanon and beyond, see 
Cunningham and Sarayrah (1994); Joseph (1983); Lomnitz (1971); and Makhoul and 
Harrison (2004).
15. On wasta’s eff ect on the business climate, see Loewe, Blume, and Speer (2008); 
on possibilities for career advancement, see Tlaiss and Kauser (2011); and on nations’ 
economic competitiveness, see Mohamed and Hamdy (2008).
16. In addition to buying licenses, many Lebanese criticize the ease with which people 
obtain them. Journalist Habib Batt ah’s June 18, 2013, blogspot referred to Lebanon’s 
Department of Motor Vehicles as “Th e Most Dangerous Place in Lebanon”—a place 
where “thousands of killers are licensed each year” aft er taking a sham of a driving test. 
“Th e Most Dangerous Place in Lebanon,” accessed December 19, 2014, htt p://www
.beirutreport.com/2013/06/the-most-dangerous-place-in-lebanon.html.
17. Th is is due to the potential for a male-male encounter in this cultural context of 
policing, in which the hegemonic view of women is as nonthreatening, to become a 
violent power play.
18. On luxury license plates, see Braun (2004).
Conclusion
1. Nasrallah made this announcement on May 25, 2013. Th e day aft er his speech, rocket 
fi re att acked Hizbullah-affi  liated areas in Beirut and Hermel in eastern Lebanon. Syrian 
rebels were blamed for what was widely held to be a retaliatory att ack. For more on the 
speech and the att acks, see “Nasrallah on Syria: Th e Batt le Is Ours,” Al-Monitor website, 
accessed December 19, 2014, htt p://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/
nasrallah-hezbollah-syria-speech-rockets.html#.
2. Th is statistic is from the U.N. refugee agency, UNHCR, “Syria Regional Refugee 
Response,” accessed December 16, 2014, htt p://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/ 
country.php?id=122.
3. For more on how the refugee crisis has aff ected Lebanon’s economic and labor situa-
tion, see the International Labour Organization report (2014, 36).
4. Here, I borrow Neil Smith’s phrasing, from his entreaty for increased att ention to 
class in contemporary social theory and geography, about how “class is thickly writt en 
through cultural, political, and economic landscapes” (2000, 1012).
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5. And, yet, members of government do make these kinds of claims, as Interior 
Minister Marwan Charbel did in summer 2013, when, amid the rising political violence 
associated with the Syrian civil war, he assured Lebanese that the state protects all 
Lebanese citizens (see, for example, “Th e State Embraces All Parties,” National News 
Agency website, accessed December 19, 2014, htt p://www.nna-leb.gov.lb/en/show-
news/14298/) and rejects “private security” checkpoints and patrols established by 
groups other than state security and military units (see, for example, “Th e State Rejects 
Private Security Measures,” Daily Star, accessed December 19, 2014, htt p://www
.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2013/Sep-12/230967-charbel-state-rejects-
private-security-measures.ashx#axzz2kGXw2ibv).
6. Abrams proposes alternative modes of conceptualizing the state in his landmark 
essay “Notes on the Diffi  culty of Studying the State” ([1977] 1988, 82).
7. Here I reference Timothy Mitchell’s critique (1991) of theorization of the state as a 
coherent, autonomous entity that operates in a separate realm from that of society.
8. Lefebvre wrote about the character—and social promise—of the city in several 
essays and addressed the nature of the urban fabric as a place of encounter in “Th e 
Right to the City” ([1968] 1996, 158).
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